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ABSTRACT 
My thesis explores how memory and trauma permeate the work of the poet Félix Grande 
(Mérida, Spain, 1937). It addresses the question of how his particular understanding of 
memory is opposed to a rather bleak view of it held by many other Spanish poets of the 
time. Grande does not yield to a generalized discrediting of memory. On the contrary, 
memory is the driving force behind his writing, and this thesis constitutes an analysis of 
its mechanisms. The originality of Grande’s work stems from the ways in which it shares 
common ground with contemporary research carried out by disciplines that integrate 
Memory and Trauma Studies. His poetic voice struggles to grasp aspects of memory 
whose articulation proves traumatic. These elements resist symbolic translation and turn 
his poetry into a work of constant rumination without closure. Grande’s work illustrates 
that literature is both inextricably linked to memory, and is well equipped to deal with 
trauma, as the labour carried out by memory, weaving and un-weaving, especially in its 
attempts to mourn, is at the heart of his artistic production. Finally, his work instantiates a 
relationship with language and memory which, while recognising the limits of language 
to express and of memory to retrieve the past, goes beyond this initial distrust to offer a 
positive perspective on these faculties, as the means for establishing modes of survival 
and rethinking our connections to the unknown.       
  
4
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Identifying (justifying) memory and trauma as problematics in Grande’s work 6 
1.2 Framing memory: its historical context under Francoism ................................ 26 
2. Theoretical frameworks.......................................................................................... 34 
2.1 Towards a definition of memory: cognitive, philosophic and literary views.... 34 
2.2 Trauma and its relation to memory and literature (especially poetry) .............. 52 
2.3 Trauma and exile............................................................................................... 58 
2.4 The Spanish crisis of the word and its implications for memory...................... 63 
2.5 Beyond the “social/culturalist” poetry debate................................................... 78 
2.6 The Spanish poetics of silence revisited ........................................................... 86 
2.7 Silence in language and the fashioning of the self .......................................... 111 
3. Language, memory and forgetting in Grande’s work ....................................... 133 
3.1 Surviving separation through language........................................................... 133 
3.2 Grande’s “theory” of memory and forgetting ................................................. 146 
4. Trauma in the poetry of Félix Grande ................................................................ 175 
4.1 The poetic voice’s impossible witnessing....................................................... 175 
4.2 The losses behind silence, guilt and hyperbolic pain ...................................... 182 
4.3 Awakening to trauma and the role of art......................................................... 205 
4.4 Spatializing trauma or the content of the form................................................ 222 
4.5 Fear.................................................................................................................. 234 
  
5
4.6 Illness, stasis and death ................................................................................... 245 
4.7 Fleeing: forgetting between necessity and (un) ethicality............................... 270 
5. Conclusion to the thesis ........................................................................................ 280 
6. Selected bibliography............................................................................................ 291 
  
6
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Identifying (justifying) memory and trauma as problematics in Grande’s work 
 
Una nueva forma de narrar no implica necesariamente innovaciones espectaculares de 
carácter técnico o verbal sino un simple desplazamiento de la óptica. El asunto consiste 
en encontrar el ángulo novedoso que nos permita una aprehensión inédita de la realidad.  
(Julio Ramón Ribeyro, La tentación del fracaso) 
 
Memory appears to be a recurrent element in the poetry of the Spanish poetical 
generations of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet very few books deal with the subject in relation 
to the poetry written in post-Civil War Spain.1 Félix Grande (Mérida, Badajoz, 1937), a 
poet whose poetic work spans the period between 1958 and 1984, produced significant 
ideas in the field of memory which, to a great degree, represented a shift in the ways it 
was generally viewed and by other poets of the time.2 However, no one has yet examined 
at length the treatment of memory in his work.  
                                                 
1 For an analysis of memory in the work of Francisco Brines, for instance, see Gómez Toré 
(2002). 
2 See Pérez Parejo (2002), García Martín (1986) and Lanz (2000) on the importance of memory in 
these generations. I use the controversial notion of “generation”, following Debicki, as an 
operative concept to refer to the Spanish poets born between 1929 and 1938: “it seems preferable 
to me […] to accept the concept of a generation as a pragmatic way of grouping and examining a 
set of writers who clearly have much in common, whose backgrounds and work differ in 
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The main trait distinguishing Grande’s work from that of many other poets of his 
literary generation is that the former seems to take a step further in exploring the meaning 
and workings of memory. Grande’s texts are not simply concerned with the passage of 
time. His poems also raise other interesting questions, such as the relationship between 
memory and specific visions of time, the fashioning of identity through memory, or the 
interweaving of memory and ethics. 
Grande’s poetry has also been affected by the same neglectful attitude that, according 
to Middleton and Woods, has led critics to focus on contemporary poetry’s confessional 
style, leaving unnoticed “the significance of the treatment of time and memory in poetry” 
(2000: 188). The existing body of criticism on Grande’s work does not enter into any 
attempted detailed interpretations or explanations of how time, and more significantly, the 
effects of catastrophe manifest themselves in his work. Critics have limited their criticism 
to highlighting the autobiographical dimension of his poetry, without taking into account 
the fact that the concept of autobiography itself is complex and problematic.3 Indeed, 
there is still much debate as to whether or not autobiography should be viewed as mere 
fiction, or if it should instead be seen to lay claim to a certain veracity.4 
                                                                                                                                                  
significant ways from those of their contemporaries who are older or younger, and who can be 
best understood when studied in relation to one another” (1982: 15). 
3 See my bibliography on Grande’s work. 
4 An illustrative case is that of Philippe Lejeune. Lejeune’s views have varied from his conviction 
about the “fictional” status of the genre of autobiography in 1975, toward a radical 
reconsideration of the latter, to the extent of expressing remorse: ¿Cómo he podido escribir 
semejantes cosas? [he refers to his old assumptions] Sin duda exagero porque quiero mostrar la 
importancia del pacto: sólo él establece la diferencia. Pero se me va la mano. […] Y sobre todo 
me confundo, asimilo relato y ficción, craso error. Hoy sé que narrar la vida es simplemente vivir. 
Nosotros somos hombres-relato. La ficción es inventar algo diferente a esta vida. He leído a Paul 
Ricoeur (incluso si a veces no le he entendido del todo), sé que la identidad narrativa no es una 
quimera” (2004: 163).  
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I will try to demonstrate that Grande’s poetry—I shall mainly focus on poems written 
in the period 1952-1984, although I will also be referring to his works in prose—is 
intimately linked to memory, not only because it abounds in memories.5 Many of his 
poems also reflect on memory’s psychic mechanisms, on how these work and why they 
are essential for survival. Furthermore, there is a third fundamental link between memory 
and Grande’s work: certain configurations of memory in his poetry emanate from the 
need to create sites (of containment) of personal and collective catastrophe. Both the 
necessity to survive and a moral imperative are conflated in his work and direct his 
writing.  
Memory appears to be at the origin of Grande’s artistic production, constituting, also, 
a point of arrival, connecting past with future, character with will, destiny with freedom. 
His texts often begin with an exercise of memory, as if memory were a sort of breakfast 
in the early morning whose energy one needs in order to go through the day: 
“Desayunémonos con una hostia de recuerdo”, he writes in “Diana” from Taranto (45-
46).6 Yet memory is only energetic in appearance, for it often moves relentlessly in 
circles, back and forth to the same enigmatic loss that grounds Grande’s poetry. 
Furthermore, it seems to constitute a source of ethical indignation that both reinforces and 
paralyses the self. Grande’s approach to memory entails a specific “theory” of the self 
and its main components—language and freedom. And “freedom” in this case means, as 
shall be seen, engaging the imagination with ethical choices.  
                                                 
5 Grande has another work in verse in progress. 
6 When page numbers of Grande’s poetry are given without a year, they will all belong to his 
(1989) work, where all his poetry is collected. 
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This thesis shows that Grande’s poetry embarks on a quest through language, which 
leads to both voluntary and unconscious formations of memory and to linguistic 
elaborations of biographical and historical traumatic events. Despite the distrust with 
which many of Grande’s contemporaries regarded memory, similar to their lack of 
confidence in language, some aspects of the treatment of memory in Grande’s work can 
be understood as illustrative of a more positive view which has significantly gained 
credence in contemporary studies on the phenomenon. Such a view is twofold. On the one 
hand, it points out that memory is crucially and centrally creative and adaptive. On the 
other, it argues that these traits, far from denoting unreliability or unfaithfulness, can be 
understood, more positively, as the means for constructing ways of better understanding 
the self and its relation to the world (Ruiz-Vargas 1997 and 2002). For if memory relates 
to events—often painful and disturbing—that cannot be changed, it can nevertheless deal 
with them in ways that reshape and modify our history and identity. As illustrated by 
poetry intimately linked to the Holocaust—of which Paul Celan is a remarkable 
example—memory works through extremely distressing experiences and it attempts to 
survive them (Middleton and Woods 2000: 11). 
In their underlining the autobiographical character of his work, one crucial aspect to 
which Grande’s critics have not paid enough attention is precisely the traumatic 
dimension readable in his poetry: “Soy un sobreviviente”, Grande (2001) repeats several 
times in Taranto, a work whose origin is his emotional affiliation with the Peruvian César 
Vallejo, a poet with a sensitivity similar to Grande’s: “Hasta donde mi memoria recuerde, 
siempre fui un sobreviviente. Tal vez nací siendo un sobreviviente. Y marcado, como las 
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reses en el lomo, para ser un sobreviviente (Grande 2001: 141).7 Grande explains what he 
means by defining himself as a “survivor”:8 
Quiero decir que vivo con la guerra civil marcada en el ojo del huracán de mis 
emociones, como las reses en el lomo. Es algo así como si una leyenda dijera, en letras 
irregulares de graffiti: <<Propiedad de la guerra civil>>. (2001: 143-44) 
In “Generación” from Taranto (49-51) we read a more detailed explanation of what 
being born a survivor means. The poem is an account of war, poverty and derangement 
caused by tragic historical events. The nourishment of a mother breastfeeding a child 
amidst a terrible war is lyrically transmuted into a destructive weapon for the child: 
Y después me ponía sus trágicos pezones en la boca, 
ebrios de obuses, apresurados de sobrevivencia casual, 
para que yo chupara mi destino 
y cojeara luego con la niñez sin tronos. (50) 
Grande’s work may have as a point of departure a wound, a psychic and historic 
wound rooted in the recalling of his own infancy, whose backdrop is that of the 
catastrophe brought upon Spain by the Civil War. If his infancy is a constant theme in his 
poetry, it is apparent that its evocation is painfully traumatic. What I am interested in 
exploring is whether such an injury, far from being a mere theme in his poetry, can 
                                                 
7 These words are reminiscent of Miguel Hernández’s following lines: “Como el toro he nacido 
para el luto/ y el dolor, como el toro estoy marcado/ por un hierro infernal en el costado” (1979: 
21).  
8 “Survivor” is also the term used in trauma theory, replacing the term “victim” which has more 
negative connotations than survivor.  
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actually be seen as constituting the psychic and emotional “truth content” from which his 
poetic configurations of memory develop.9 However, this “content” does not have an 
exact referent: we will never know for certain what it was that terrified him so early in 
life and has accompanied him since:10 
Crujió mi infancia y me encontré perdido, abandonado […] Descubrí […] que hay una 
relación maravillosa entre lo más profundo del corazón humano y el reino insólito de 
las palabras. (2001: 116) 
We can only attest to the existence of a wound that sets a particular kind of memory 
in motion. In this respect, Grande’s poem “Recuerdo de infancia” (182) from the 
collection Blanco spirituals (1966), in which the poetic voice remembers having seen 
animals being slaughtered and compares their slaughtering with the genocide suffered by 
whole communities, tells the story of a private memory and, more importantly, constitutes 
a specific way of remembering. Memories of catastrophe and massacre associated, among 
other things, with the Civil War leave an imprint of such magnitude on the poet that they 
will forever haunt his writing. Grande’s texts show that the “niñez” (infancy or 
childhood) is the period where something fundamental is lost. And the latter hypothesis 
can be regarded as a driving force behind Grande’s art: 
                                                 
9 Hannah Arendt explains that Walter Benjamin distinguishes between subject matter and the 
“truth content of a work of art”, the latter being a concealed dimension of the work of art, for 
which clarification a critique is required, rather than a commentary (1999:10). I believe that this is 
true of Grande’s work, in which different subject matters can be identified but which nevertheless 
redirect us to a “truth content” that necessitates a “global” critique.  
10 The Civil War cannot be said to be the “truth content” of Grande’s work, but a wound whose 
origin and meaning is rooted in this historical event (in ways that remain unknown to the poet), 
and which supersedes any historical (and biographical) context to configure a content of its own.  
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Pero llega un momento en que uno comprende como oficiante de las palabras, como 
escritor, como sirviente de las palabras, que sin la memoria no hubiera sido posible ser 
un escritor, que sin la recuperación a través de la memoria de acontecimientos 
originarios y de llagas originarias, de deslumbramientos originarios, no se podría haber 
acumulado esa cuenta corriente emocional sobre la que después te asientas para trabajar 
con las emociones, es decir, para trabajar con las palabras.11 
It often occurs with tragic poets—of which Grande is an example—that their writing 
begins with a loss in the period of infancy, one that might well be the loss of infancy 
itself.12 “Cómo hacer elegías a la niñez”, how to write an elegy to childhood, the poet 
posits this question in “Oda fría a una cajetilla de L & M” (183-185) from Blanco 
spirituals. Throughout all Grande’s collections, the bleeding of the poet’s own childhood 
does not merely represent a biographical detail; it is rather a reconstruction of catastrophe 
itself that encompasses reflections on the human condition: “el mundo continúa 
menstruando aún desde la prehistoria” (184).13 This latter trait should discourage 
interpretations of Grande’s poetry that see it as “merely” confessional.14  
As we will see further on, the articulation of trauma, an extremely difficult 
enterprise (if not an impossible one), points to a certain structure of writing, rather than a 
mere “theme” or “subject-matter”. My thesis will explore the ways in which the poetic 
                                                 
11 In conversation with Grande (1-2-2007). 
12 Idea Vilariño, for instance, remembers, in an interview with Mario Benedetti, the moment she 
probably became a poet: “A los once años me quedé mirando en un espejo mis ojos serios, 
adultos. Fue una conmoción profunda saber que yo estaba ahí –persona, no niña– como estoy 
hoy” (1981: 211). 
13 The metaphorical use of the term “menstruando” feminizes somehow human suffering, making 
it both cyclic and doomed. 
14 In my opinion, the (self) analytic dimention of his poetry has been underestimated. 
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voice re-enacts and struggles to understand this cognitive and emotional foundering. Yet 
memory in Grande’s work is not reducible to traumatic recalling, for his oeuvre is also a 
celebration of tradition and transmissibility. Yet his morality is that of the “weak”.15 His 
poetic voice’s point of view can be said to be “Benjaminian” in that it seeks identification 
with the perspective of the drowned, the humiliated, that is, it speaks with the voice of the 
vanquished, through the lenses of failure: 
Todo mi oficio se reduce a buscar sin piedad ni descanso la fórmula con que poder 
vociferar socorro y que parezca que es el siglo quien está aullando esa maravillosa 
palabra. Que salga esta derrota de lo más puro de mi corazón y llegue a los demás 
impregnada de siglo veinte y de universo, como un insulto espléndido cuyo esqueleto es 
de amor y de desgracia. Que adviertan que me puse entre los torcidos del mundo para 
ayudarles a zurcir y defendí a la vida con todo mi terror. Clamar socorro como el 
nombre de un dios.16 (270-271) 
The poetic voice aligns itself with those who constitute, to use Norberto Bobbio’s 
words, the non-history, the forgotten ones, its ethical attitude being very close to that 
described by Bobbio with the term “mite”—the powerless, the insignificant, the invisible, 
the impotent, he who leaves no trace in the archives of collective memory: 
                                                 
15 The term “weak” is not pejorative in my discourse. I am drawing here on Nietzsche’s ideas of 
strength and weakness, taking into account that “what Nietzsche calls 'strength' becomes, by his 
own criterion, a form of weakness and perhaps the other way around as well” (Olafson 1991: 
557). I also draw on Norberto Bobbio (1994) who makes a morality of the insignificant; and on 
Reyes Mate (1991 and 2008), who relying among others on Walter Benjamin, places memory 
before logos and reminds us that memory is the logos of the vanquished. Memory from this 
standpoint is a method of thinking, another “logos” to attain knowledge and understanding.   
16 In the Introduction to Reyes Mate 2008, Catherine Chalier explains how this choice of speaking 
on behalf of the ones who suffer is a profoundly ethical stance to take responsibility for the pain 
of others: “Se trata […] de velar por la vulnerabilidad del prójimo, aunque se incapaz de pedir 
auxilio, y de descrubrir cómo esa fragilidad del otro, fragilidad prometida a la muerte, liga a cada 
uno, con una fuerza que ella misma ignora, a una responsabilidad insustituible” (15). 
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La dolcezza e la mitezza […] sono proprie dell’uomo privato, dell’insignificante, 
dell’inapariscente, di colui che nella gerarchia sociale sta in basso, non detiene potere 
su alcuno, talora neppure su se stesso, di colui di cui nessuno si accorge, e non lascia 
alcuna traccia negli archivi in cui debbono essere conservate solo le memorie dei 
personaggi e dei fatti memorabili [...] queste virtù [...] caratterizzano quell’altra parte 
della società dove stanno gli umiliati e gli offesi, i poveri, i sudditi che non saranno mai 
sovrani, coloro che muoiono senza lasciare altro segno del loro passaggio su questa 
terra che una croce con nome e data in un cimitero, coloro di cui gli storici non si 
occupano perché non fanno storia, sono una storia diversa, con la s minuscola, la storia 
sommersa o meglio ancora la non-storia. (1994: 21-22) 
It sees history and tradition within the context of the remnants and ruins of 
successive civilizations:  
La cultura entera en la que mamas perplejidad ha de ser abolida por los siglos biznietos 
de los siglos que aplastaron a otras culturas, de las que ni penumbras quedan; no ya que 
el planeta en el que todo esto pasea su repentino señorío se apagará lo mismo que un 
cigarrillo consumido, no quedando de su exterminio ni siquiera la música de la 
interrogación. (397) 
Need, born out of fear and impotence, as well as trust and respect, are behind this 
obsession with keeping a record of disaster to preserve historical and emotional losses. 
Memory—as it occurs with language—is, on the one hand, the aggregating force capable 
of holding together the traces of ephemeral time. On the other hand, underlying the 
poetic’s voice fixation with memory and the superlative importance accorded to language 
there seems to be the question of a crisis of identity, the absence of identity or a blurring 
of identity, that leads to the inability of separating (or distinguishing enough) the internal 
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and the external. I will show how this problem is related to the poetic voice’s need for 
affiliations and how affiliations are often established between identity and negativity.17 I 
will be exploring the strategies employed for self-recogntion and self-fashioning in 
Grande’s work. I will discuss the splitting of the poetic voice as a self-analytic tool and, 
also, as the means for fleeing.  
The operation of constructing an “other” (where the external and the internal can 
ideally be integrated without pathological confusion), and that of self-analysis can only 
take place within the limits of language. I will address the question of how Grande’s view 
of language is largely opposed to the critique of language carried out by many of the 
poets of his and later generations. Grande relies upon a tradition of poets—especially Luis 
Rosales, César Vallejo, Federico García Lorca and Antonio Machado—whose texts show 
a different kind of relationality with language. They avoid the excessive criticism 
undertaken by the critique of language. Their formulations differ from an altogether 
negative vision thereof. 
Language, poetic remembrance and music, especially flamenco, constitute for 
Grande a means of healing a wounded self. His appreciation of flamenco, for instance, 
supports the idea that his poetry is worth studying from the perspective of traumatic 
memory, for the music of flamenco also presents inescapable connections with trauma. 
                                                 
17 Sánchez-Pardo (2004: 4) points to the fact that a tension always exists in the self between 
identity and non-identity, but she also observes that some sort of integration between the two is 
nevertheless necessary. Giving an account of oneself through the linguistic use of memory 
partakes of an experience in which a point of convergence between inside and outside is attained. 
Furthermore, she claims that “the problematization of the boundaries between inside and outside 
is a dilemma peculiar to all approaches to life and art that nonetheless gained a more acute 
impulse during modernism. Many modernist texts similarly stage a battle between mind and body, 
memory and desire, and the conflict between the need to remember and the longing to forget” 
(2004: 11).  
  
16
Flamenco, indeed, is the music of relentless pain which Federico García Lorca referred to 
as “sonidos negros”. There can be no doubt about the relationship between the traumatic 
nature of Grande’s texts and their emotional attachment to flamenco. He declares:  
La razón por la que entré en el palacio trágico del flamenco es otra […] Cuando uno 
tiene una llaga de la infancia que no se cierra, el hilo musical no basta, necesitas música 
desconsolada. Eso me recuerda una frase maravillosa de Saramago: los hombres son 
animales inconsolables. La amistad, la poesía, el amor, la familia y, entre las artes, la 
música, son lo que más hondamente ayuda a curar la llaga. (2004c: 40) 
Although memory is fundamentally manifested in and through language, it is also 
inextricably linked to music, especially traumatic memory, since trauma cannot be (fully) 
put into words. Grande’s poetic voice affirms: “Y nada/ puede recuperarse, excepto en 
forma/ de una gota de música” (91).18  
An attentive reading of Grande’s poetry reveals that the poetic voice is constantly 
seeking to construct a coherent identity amongst poetic remembrances of disruptive and 
devastating experiences through affiliations with language, memory and music.19 Seen 
this way, poetry seems to be more an enterprise for survival, rather than a mere 
                                                 
18 Jeffrey Gray has also noted the links between trauma and some Andalusian/Arab music. Their 
scales and rhythms, he writes, are “the musical symptom of the aftermath of trauma, which is also 
its memory, the continuity of a mournful Andalusian/Arab voice across the Mediterranean” 
(2000: 636). 
19 Whilst the instability of identity in literature can be seen as a positive subversive mechanism, 
this occurrence must be understood here as something very different. Grande’s texts do not seem 
to pursue instability as a deliberate literary technique but rather they call attention to the links 
between poetry and traumatic living. 
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contemplative exercise or a deliberate attempt to create beauty.20 Linking art and life 
makes it possible to conceive of poetry as “something” else, something that “takes art’s 
breath away”, poetry being the “interruption of art”—art understood as the uncanny. 
Poetry, rather than art understood as “artifice and the artificial”, would be an “event”, a 
“liberation”, “in the sense of free action” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1999: 44-45). 
Poetry and life or poetry and history are inextricably connected in the literary 
production of post-Civil War poets, especially when memory is the motif of study. This 
view is supported by other critics. For instance, Christine Arkinstall (1993: 6) has 
criticized the fact that these poets’ works have principally been approached according to a 
linguistic-structuralist paradigm, without alluding to other equally relevant factors, such 
as the context of their works and the poet’s motivations. In a similar vein, Andrew P. 
Debicki has claimed that for analysing the poetry of the 1950s and the 1960s “the use of 
'New Critical' techniques is of limited value” (1982: vii). Debicki also refers to the 
historical backdrop of these poets as fundamental in their literary formation:  
These poets […] born between 1929 and 1938, constitute precisely that generation 
which grew up during the war but reached adulthood after it. The traumas of the war 
and of the ten years following it were engraved upon them with the intensity of 
formative experiences, and formed a reservoir on which the poets drew in their later 
writings. (1982: 14) 
                                                 
20 Brotherston (1972) analyses Blanco spirituals as a strategy for overcoming the death drive. In 
establishing a link between art and life and talking about health and survival, I am indebted here 
to the work of Gilles Deleuze (1998).  
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It is important to situate Grande’s poetic elaborations of memory firmly within the 
context in spite of which he was creating: that of the “official” engineers of memory—
historians, ideologues and writers in favour of the Franco regime, whose works served to 
establish a dominant, biased and exclusive version of collective memory and national 
identity. For it would be unacceptable to ignore the fact that Grande, like many other 
poets and writers of his time, wrote the greater part of his work under the brutal 
conditions of the regime’s repression and censorship, and under the constrictions of its 
ideological apparatus, which also sought to control the private aspects of individuals’ 
lives. Las rubáiyátas de Horacio Martín (1970), for instance, can be taken as a cry of 
resistance against social repression. Such historical conditions condemned Grande to an 
inner exile, another issue worth investigating in connection with his poetic memory. His 
loss of the sense of belonging—at the core of any experience of exile, territorial or 
inner—and his painstaking quest for identity are visible throughout his poetry.  
According to Paul Ilie, who has written one of the most exhaustive works on exile, 
“Félix Grande is a case whose exile has been demonstrated but who is disqualified from 
that category by the fact of residing and publishing at home” (1980: 91). Ilie has referred 
to the “estrangement that led Grande away from his social reality and into a mental 
construct of his past and future” (1980: 91). Such a “mental construct” of the poet’s past 
and future might be understood as nothing but a labour of his memory and his 
imagination, a search for identity and the testimony of his struggle for survival through 
poetry. However, it is important to stress that testimony here is better conceived of not as 
communication of previous content, but as exploration of the void inherent in the psychic 
wound. In this sense, the poem can be said to be a testimony of its own making. Such an 
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exploration can be considered “performative” – also referred to as an “illocutionary act”; 
we mean by this “speech acts in which you do something by the very act of speaking” 
(Middleton and Woods 2000: 191). A poet’s witnessing to his own experiences 
constitutes also a testimony of his time. In this respect one of the things I will be 
discussing is how Grande’s personal testimony can be seen as a reflection on his 
historical time, precisely because, by attempting to take control over his own suffering, he 
ends up reflecting on that of the world in which he had to live. His poetry seeks for 
answers to the questions of death, suffering, and what it means to be human in 
catastrophic times 
To summarize, I intend to explore Grande’s poetry as: a) a performative act of 
remembrance, that is, an act of recuperation and reflection in relation to catastrophic 
memories, which re-enacts the past in the very same act of its recalling, that is, as 
performative testimony (a way of bearing witness to and mourning suffering, injustice 
and loss); b) as the medium for expressing the unnameable (both structural and historical 
trauma); c) as a way of pursuing the integrity and continuity of the poet’s self through 
language in the midst of disrupting experiences and depression; d) and, finally, as an 
ethical dialogue between his personal catastrophe and what he sees as the catastrophe of 
the world around him. Seen from this perspective, memory is revealed as both a creative 
mechanism for constructing meanings and the result of that mechanism, which is, 
actually, an accurate view of what memory, experts claim, really is, as we shall see.  
My reading of Grande’s poetry will also rely upon his literary context and the 
ideas of his contemporaries in order to stress his specific approach to the questions 
examined. This thesis will briefly touch upon the question of the relationship between 
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memory and the modern critique of language in order to show that the crisis of the word 
has contributed to forging pejorative ideas about memory. I will also argue that memory 
is crucial and central in literary creation and that one of its main functions is to construct 
and reshape perceptions of the self and the world surrounding it. From a theoretical 
perspective, I will draw on the works of  the philosopher José Antonio Marina, the 
psychologist José María Ruiz-Vargas, Henri Bergson, Pierre Janet and Paul Ricoeur, as 
well as relying on insights from authors who have reflected on the connections between 
literature and memory. I argue that the question of memory does not belong to literature 
alone but, also” “to the culture of experts, of medicine and of science” (Middleton and 
Woods 2000: 82). Moreover, I defend the power of writing and reading poetry to become 
potentially a “homeopathic remedy”, to use Middleton and Woods’ words (2000: 191).   
I would like to conclude this introduction by referring in passing to one question 
which is also crucially interwoven with my aims and choice of methodology. This 
question is reading, that is, interpreting. The much-vaunted post-modern self-sufficiency 
of the text has given rise to a superabundance of interpretations of a given text, however 
quaint and distant from each other. Against this, the literary critic and semiotician 
Umberto Eco declares that the act of reading must adhere to two principles: the principle 
of respect and the principle of economy. The principle of respect entails that the reader 
respects the intentio operis, that is, the author’s motivations, which are implicit in a text. 
We need to check the intentio operis, Eco claims, “against the text as a coherent whole” 
(1990: 59). David Robey explains what Eco means by this:  
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Interpretation is a dialectical or circular process whereby the empirical reader 
repeatedly tests and refines his conjectures (“abductions”) against the collection of 
signs that is the text and the intention implicit in it (intentio operis). (2000: 7) 
The principle of economy, in its turn, implies that we take into consideration the 
cultural and linguistic background of the author. Robey has quoted Eco as stating: “If I 
want to interpret Wordsworth’s text I must respect his cultural and linguistic background” 
(2000: 7). As Robey explains, Eco considers that: 
Every act of reading is a difficult transaction between the competence of the reader (the 
reader’s world knowledge) and the kind of competence that a given text postulates in 
order to be read in an economic way. (2000: 7) 
The latter means that interpretation is indefinite but not infinite.21 Thus the 
difference between interpreting a text and using it rests upon whether or not we apply the 
principles of respect and of economy. The so-called self-sufficiency of the text has led to 
views that overtly distort and deliberately misconstrue the intentio operis and that, by 
simply ignoring the context, do not take into consideration the competence postulated by 
the text by simply ignoring the con-text. Furthermore, Eco reminds us that the reader does 
not have to be accurate—in the sense of a naïve and absurd “scientific” objectivity—for 
                                                 
21 The Derridean notion of différance implies “an infinite number of sign-substitutions”. 
Language, for Derrida, is “a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental 
signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the 
transcendental signified extends the domain of and the play of signification infinitely” (2001a: 
354). That is, if the reference is differée à l'infini that means absence of reference altogether and 
the possibility of infinite significations. Eco attacks Derrida’s form of deconstruction as does 
Levinas, the latter by pointing out the “absurdity” and “isolation” that lies in “countless 
significations” and he poses the following question: “do the significations not require a unique 
sense from which they borrow their significance?” (2003: 24). 
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reading entails a difficult transaction—every reading is, to certain degree, misreading, 
even if we adhere to the mentioned principles.22 It means, rather, to be loyal, honest, 
respectful and compassionate. Genuine understanding involves this ethics of respect. For 
understanding implies to give respectful attention to whatever needs to be understood. 
And attention can adopt different modalities, as Marina recognizes: “Atiendo 
suspicazmente, desconfiadamente, esperando que el otro desbarre. Atiendo también 
pacientemente, con amor, con cuidado, con tenacidad” (1998: 292). That is the only way 
that one can be “objective”: becoming involved and being attentive in the second of 
                                                 
22 In this respect both French structuralism and Anglo-Saxon New Criticism have been equally 
naïve. The two sought to offer “objective” readings, the former by applying the scientific method 
to literature and the latter through its scientific-inspired seemingly objective prescription of a 
context-devoid reading. That New Criticism drew on some aspects of the Scientific Method was 
recognized from its outset: “The New Critics borrow their terms from the more general terms of 
science and thus, these critics can approximate the scientist’s tone of exactitude and accuracy”, 
Charles Moorman (1957: 182). The application of the Scientific Method in literature has led to 
overrating its formal aspect. As Bakhtin put is: “se trata de una tendencia de entender la forma 
artística como forma de una materia dada, nada más que como una combinación que tiene lugar 
en los límites de la materia, en su especificidad y regularidad impuestas por las ciencias naturales 
y la lingüística; eso daría a las consideraciones de los teóricos del arte la posibilidad de tener un 
carácter científicamente positivo, y, en algunos casos, se podría demostrar científicamente” (1995: 
18). Yet the formal does not suffice to interpret literature. As George Steiner states, “the 
absolutely decisive failing occurs when such approaches seek to formalize meaning, when they 
proceed upward from the phonetic, the lexical and the grammatic to the semantic and aesthetic. It 
is this progression which no analytic-linguistic technique, […] has even taken convincingly. […] 
None of these proposals persuades. No interpretative method has bridged the gap between 
linguistic analysis and linguistic theory properly defined on the one hand and the process of 
understanding on the other. No formalization or genetic description has related unequivocally or 
demonstrably the discrete phonetic-lexical-syntactic components of a sentence to the meaning, to 
the lives (the semantic whole) of that sentence […] A sentence always means more” (1989: 81 
and 82). Robert Eaglestone (1997) calls attention to the absence of ethics in a mode of reading 
that exclusively considers the words on the page. For Levinas, Eagleston explains, reading, 
conceived in that way, is an act of violence that separates thought from life. He proposes instead 
that the thinking taking place in every act of reading should engage with life and be committed to 
it. Similarly, Steiner argues that criticism must enter “into dialogue with the living”, that criticism 
“can connect” and that “literatures do not live in isolation, but in a manifold of linguistic and 
national encounters”; he proposes, then, a humane reading, that is, “to read as human beings” 
(1985: 8-11). For a further discussion, see also Steiner (1989: 80-86). Although these questions 
cannot be developed in greater detail in the framework of this thesis, it is important to 
schematically refer to them at least. 
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Marina’s formulations, at the same time as developing detachment through “looking very 
hard”, as the anthropologist Gregory Bateson shows in the following short dialogue:  
Daughter: What does “objective” mean? 
Father: Well. It means that you look very hard at those things which you choose to look 
at. (1972: 47) 
Thus the manner in which this thesis proceeds can be described as using the 
“Hebrew” way of interpretation. In the words of psychoanalyst Neville Symington: “The 
Hebrew way is to go round and round a subject, each time using different images to 
illuminate what is most profound” (1986: 11). This is of utter importance in the case of 
Grande. When we are confronted with testimonial poetry we soon realize that there is 
something that resists us from which interpretation must begin if we are to be loyal to the 
text: this is the Benjaminian “truth content” suggested further above. For Eco this is true 
of any text, testimonial or not: “I believe that there is something that opposes our 
interpretative process, enables it to be born, and it is to this we must finally return” (2000: 
195).  
As to the organization of chapters, chapter I will be devoted to introducing memory 
in the context of what it meant historically under the Franco regime. I will show how 
silence and terror were imposed on a great part of Spanish society, which had a bearing 
on the ways Grande wrote and thought about memory.  
Chapter II is aimed at establishing the theoretical basis on which this thesis hinges.  
It enquires into the question of memory from the perspectives of philosophy, cognitive 
psychology and literature. It offers an interdisciplinary overview of current knowledge on 
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the phenomenon. It shows that memory is a complex occurrence for the understanding of 
which it is necessary to combine forces from very different disciplines. The outline I 
present on the subject of memory is based on premises that can be said to be shared by a 
vast range of experts across many different fields. Then I continue to explore the relation 
of memory and trauma and their engagement with poetry. An exploration of memory and 
exile follows, in which I lay out the connections of memory with this experience of 
uprootedness.  
 In the following section I offer an overview of the Spanish crisis of the word and 
its implications for memory. The idea behind this research is to show how recurrent ideas 
on language, rooted in a long tradition but reformulated with modernism and 
postmodernism, were closely linked to general conceptualizations of memory at that time. 
Such an overview precedes a further discussion on the Spanish poetics of silence and 
upon the debate that preeminently dominated the Spanish poetry criticism of the second 
half of the twentieth century (the discourse over social/culturalist poetry). I argue that the 
discourse of the Spanish poetics of silence, by virtue of its domineering position, 
deflected attention and even excluded other similarly valid ways of understanding silence 
and its relation to poetics. Namely, that silence can be also defined by its origination in 
and confrontation with the inhuman and catastrophic events. I foreground the Holocaust 
and the poetry of Paul Celan to prove that a new perspective on the relationship between 
silence, poetry and history can be conceived of.  
 Since one of the implications of the Spanish crisis of the word and the poetics of 
silence, I argue, is its overlooking of the question of self-fashioning, the final section of 
chapter II is concerned with the exposition of how poetry opens up the space where the 
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self can recover and reshape its lost identity by claiming the void (silence) that 
necessarily inheres in it and by using language to give form to this void. In this section, I 
draw on different insights on the question of the limits of language and I highlight the role 
of language in self-construction.  
 The first part of chapter III offers an account of the importance of language in 
Grande’s work. It argues that in order to understand the role of language in it, attention 
must be paid to his conceptualizations of death and love—lack of language (silence) is 
identified with separation and death; words, as love, are regarded as a unifying force.  
 I continue to present Grande’s “theory” of memory and forgetting. This “theory” 
of memory consists in the “organic” view of a phenomenon that he also relates to 
practices, uses and abuses of the cognitive processes and emotions involved. It presents 
memory as a changeable and versatile “creature”, a living organism, whose main function 
is adaption and on which the condition of the possibility for ethics stands. 
 Chapter IV is occupied with the question of trauma. It deals with the ways in 
which the workings of traumatic memory are readable in Grande’s poetry. On the one 
hand, it recognizes trauma as a kind of bearing witness to an experience that cannot be 
fully named, that is, as unrecording witnessing. On the other hand, it attempts to “read”, 
nevertheless, this “unreadability” through recurrent patterns which are present throughout 
his work. These are, namely, haunting figures of silence which not only speak of death 
but, more importantly, from death; unrepresentable losses evoked through death tokens; 
the creation of a poetic voice unrecognizable (not present) to itself; phantasmagorical 
places where the poetic voice sets out to construct sites of memory, used as containers for 
a bleeding poetic self; hyperbolic expressions of pain and incurable melancholia. The 
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sections integrating this chapter are necessary divisions but they are so closely linked that 
they continuously make cross references to each other.  
 
    
1.2  Framing memory: its historical context under Francoism 
 
It seems crucial to make a lot of noise about those who have disappeared without a trace, 
it seems  important to mark that, to make the trace, to make a sound 
to disrupt that notion of the public sphere that would 
make certain kinds of images unseeable 
and certain kinds of noises inaudible 
certain kinds of words unsayable. 
(Judith Butler, talking about the disappeared in Chile) 
 
Quién restablecerá lo deshecho, levantará lo derribado, restaurará lo convertido en 
cenizas y en humo, la carne humana podrida sobre la tierra, qué se levantaría de ella si 
sonaran las trompetas de la resurrección; quién borrará las palabras que fueron dichas y 
escritas y alentaron el crimen y lo volvieron no sólo respetable y heroico, sino también 
necesario, fríamente legítimo.  
(Antonio Muñoz Molina, La noche de los tiempos) 
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“Lágrima miserable” addresses the ethical question of how pain can become the 
grounds on which whole communities are founded: 
Vosotros, los que habláis del beneficio de los sufrimientos ¿imagináis la humanidad 
reuniéndose en las calles cotejando sus cicatrices; hundiendo las cabezas y apretados 
unos con otros como un rebaño de animales pequeños bajo una tormenta de nieve? ¿O 
imagináis la humanidad errabunda por los ejidos, rumiando su dolor como una mala 
hierba umbría? ¿Y esas imágenes os parecen solemnes?  
Puedo ver como cada época descarga su impotencia en la siguiente y sospechar que esa 
es la causa de que aun no hayamos olvidado las antiguas cavernas. Puedo opinar que 
cuando dos se juntan para llorar rejuvenecen a la vejez de su miseria, cosechando con 
ello la calma de la claudicación. Puedo opinar que no se purifican, que se embriagan. 
No avanzan: se pasan uno a otro, monótonos, la antorcha que encendió la primera 
desgracia. No se ensanchan: se aíslan. Pues antes han corrido los visillos de la ventana. 
Algo hay cierto en el llanto: produce vergüenza a su autor. 
Sueño algo mejor que esa vergüenza para después de las cenizas de todos estos siglos 
descompuestos. Sueño seres futuros cuyos recuerdos no sean, de ningún modo, como 
los míos. Sueño en que un día los antropólogos redacten un informe sobre nosotros, 
comenzando con estas espléndidas palabras: “Qué espanto, qué espanto”. (269) 
In these imagined communities of the poem mourning never ends, as it would entail 
the loss of the very basis of the community’s existence. However, there must be some sort 
of revision and renovation of mourning for it to be genuinely so. Otherwise, a community 
becomes a culture in which the death drive prevails over the life drive. When carefully 
examined, Sánchez-Pardo’s explanation of the term “cultures of death drive” may be 
perfectly applied to post-Franco Spanish society. Here is her definition: 
Material historical processes, trends, forces, and regulations that through involution and 
the deadening movement of repetition, inertia and stasis force themselves upon 
  
28
individuals (or groups) and implement social and psychic exclusionary spaces 
encumbered and haunted by the physicality of their lost objects. These internal lost 
objects cannot be mourned and are instead clandestinely preserved inside the ego. 
(2004: 13) 
 These forces and trends of “involution”, “stasis”, and “inertia” determined post-Civil 
War dictatorial Spain, where “exclusionary spaces” were created (only some voices could 
be heard) and there were (and there are) spaces “haunted by the physicality of their lost 
objects”. These objects were not only “ideals” (as in the case of the failed Republican 
cause) but, also, assassinated people whose bodies were made to “disappear”. That 
Spanish society has not yet mourned all the losses attached to the Civil War and the 
dictatorship is scandalously evident. The exhumation of mass graves which has been 
recently taking place shows that Spanish society is still haunted by its lost objects, which 
are hitherto unmourned losses.23   
What is most relevant in Sánchez-Pardo’s statement is that she establishes an 
unequivocal association between historical processes and the individual sphere.  These 
historical processes, she claims, “forced themselves upon individuals” and preserved 
inside the ego. Butler makes the same statement but in reverse. She writes about loss “as 
constituting social, political, and aesthetic relations”, and not only belonging to “purely 
psychological or psychoanalytic discourses” (2003: 467).  My thesis aims to explore these 
                                                 
23 Julián Casanova (2010) calls attention to the fact that a great part of Spanish society not only 
listlessly disavows but also reviles civil and judicial initiatives to recover losses in order to mourn 
them appropriately: “Están los que se ríen de quienes 'remueven tierra buscando huesos', 
proponen pasar página, negar el recuerdo, cancelar el pasado”. Needless to say, that part of 
Spanish history cannot be resolved without proper mourning. On the importance and meaning of 
mass graves exhumations in Spain today, see Francisco Ferrándiz Martín.   
  
29
processes in the work of a single artist, for I believe that what is manifest at a social level 
can also be studied in conjunction with reflections of these historical forces onto the 
particular and the individual; in art as well, as one of the manifestations of individuality. 
Michael Richards asserts: “Spanish memories need all the more to be explored as both 
sociological and psychological (collectively and individually)” (2002: 4). In my overview 
of the subject, I refer to this double binding of the phenomenon of memory, in which the 
psychological and social cannot be disentangled. The two concepts—individual and 
collective memory—have been at the center of scientific scrutiny and cultural conflict. 
For Ruiz-Vargas:  
La memoria autobiográfica tiene un origen psicosocial porque se aprende de otros  […] 
El sistema de memoria autobiográfica se constituye en una memoria personal y social. 
Esta doble función permite no sólo proteger los recuerdos privados, sino también 
compartirlos con los demás, así como construir y recordar historias compartidas. (Ruiz-
Vargas 2002: 64). 
Middleton and Woods also call attention to this fact:  
It is more fruitful to argue […] that we would do well to direct more attention to the 
degree to which the workings of both individual and social memory rely on such 
collectively-shared expectations about how memory works and what it can provide. 
(2000: 91) 
On the commonest practices of collective memory under Francoism, Ruiz-Vargas 
observes that they involved institutionalized politics of terror and silence: 
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La España del terror legal e institucionalizado en la que hubieron de elaborar su derrota 
moral los perdedores –donde el rencor, la venganza, el espionaje y la delación, el acoso 
de todo tipo, la humillación y el escarnio se convirtieron en el lenguaje preferido de 
gran parte de los “adictos al régimen”– no sólo no proporcionó las condiciones mínimas 
para facilitar la recomposición de sus vidas, sino que, al estar profundamente 
impregnada en la mente de todos los españoles de un significado fratricida, conformó el 
peor de los escenarios para tal fin. Un ambiente así, que rezumaba odio y rencor por 
todos sus poros, sólo podía garantizar una cosa: la cronificación del sufrimiento. 
Además, esa perversa dinámica social estaba inserta en un país castigado por la 
pobreza, el hambre, las cartillas de racionamiento, la escasez de recursos sanitarios y 
médicos, unos índices de mortalidad muy altos y un clima general de miedo y silencio. 
Todo parecía diseñado, en fin, para mantener abiertas perpetuamente en los derrotados 
sus heridas y un sentimiento de humillación y vergüenza, y en los vencedores la 
sensación permanente de estar librando a la patria de “las fuerzas satánicas que anidan 
en la especie humana”. (2006: 29; my emphasis) 
In an article significantly titled “Culpabilidad, miedo y silencio histórico”, Vicenç 
Navarro claims that: 
El terror que la dictadura instauró fue enorme y alcanzó un nivel de crueldad con pocos 
equivalentes en Europa, y se establecieron no sólo campos de concentración, sino 
también de exterminio, todavía desconocidos en España. (2005: 3) 
All this terror was a project of violence in order to impose silence on the defeated by 
way of extirpating their memory: “Collective memory in Spain has been formed through 
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an attempt by the dictatorship to extirpate the sense of history once possessed by those 
who became 'the defeated'” (Richards 1998: 2). 
A general atmosphere of fear and silence can be shared by a whole society. Marina 
(2006) has pointed out that it can even become a social illness and that it is, in fact, a 
socially lived emotion.24 Trauma, an individual experience, can nevertheless affect a 
whole society. As Ruiz-Vargas states: 
La Guerra civil española, además de a los ciudadanos, dejó traumatizada y enferma a 
toda la sociedad española. La política de terror y silencio impuesta durante la dictadura 
creó el escenario capaz de generar una verdadera epidemia de estrés postraumático. 
(2006: 3) 
 Terror, one of the dominant features of Franco’s Spain, was the result of an 
effective policy of extermination. Silence, in turn, be it psychological or sociological, can 
be understood in two ways. In the first place, as a void lying at the heart of traumatic 
memory. And, second, as political repression. Added to the silence inherent in post-Civil 
War traumas, there was an imposed silence, equally traumatic and traumatizing, which 
consisted of the cancellation of any signs of inflicted damage. As a consequence, the 
memory of the Civil War and its dramatic consequences were not elaborated in an equal 
manner to all parts, which resulted in trauma persisting throughout the dictatorship. 
Therefore, many victims were stripped of the possibility of healing, as Ruiz-Vargas notes: 
                                                 
24 There are important contemporary thinkers that have written about social “pathologies”. An 
universally known precedent is Freud (1930). Another example is Erich Fromm (1956). Foucault 
(1971) has also written on madness and other issues from a social perspective. Ricoeur calls 
attention to the problems that inhere in the application of “categories forged in the analytical 
colloquy to collective memory” (2006: 69).   
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Porque aquellas víctimas derrotadas, a diferencia de los vencedores, que usaron e 
incluso abusaron de su derecho a llorar y a honrar a sus “caídos”, se vieron obligadas a 
tragar sus lágrimas y su dolor, a ocultar o renegar de sus ideas, a sentir vergüenza de su 
condición ideológica, a autoimponerse el más férreo de los silencios; en definitiva, a 
ahogar su propia memoria y con ella toda posibilidad de elaboración, duelo y 
superación de los horrores de la guerra. (2006: 6) 
As a result of this imposition of silence on the vanquished side, “[…] the civil war 
of the 1930s and its repressive aftermath have not yet been effectively absorbed and 
understood as a collective experience”. What is more, “mourning […] was consequently 
mostly very privately” (Richards 2006: 4 and 101). 
 Even if Ruiz-Vargas and Richards see the possibility of mourning, at least in 
regard to the case of the Spanish “losses”, other thinkers, such as Butler are, generally 
speaking, more skeptical that this process can be carried out in relation to the dead who 
are victims of violence: 
There is something else that one cannot “get over,” one cannot “work through,” which 
is the deliberate act of violence against a collectivity, humans who have been rendered 
anonymous for violence and whose death recapitulates an anonymity for memory. Such 
violence cannot be “thought,” constitutes an assault on thinking, negates thinking in the 
mode of recollection and recovery. (2003: 468) 
If thought is impossible, as Butler claims, or extremely difficult to articulate under 
traumatic circumstances, censorship only problematizes the situation further. According 
to Octavio Paz, all societies and cultures (the two are not necessarily coincident) have at 
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all times imposed, tacitly or violently, a particular set of constrictions—some of them are 
social, some are political—when it comes to freedom of speech, and such a thing is, he 
asserts, ineluctably connected with poetry: 
En toda sociedad funciona un sistema de prohibiciones y autorizaciones […] lo que se 
puede decir y lo que no se puede decir. […] El sistema de autorizaciones y 
prohibiciones implícitas ejerce su influencia sobre los autores a través de los lectores. 
Un autor no leído es un autor víctima de la peor censura. […] La poesía, cualquiera que 
sea el contenido manifiesto del poema, es siempre una trasgresión de la racionalidad y 
la moralidad de la sociedad burguesa […] la poesía es, por naturaleza, extemporánea. 
(1983: 15-16) 
The extemporaneity of poetry, its conveying that which is displaced in time (which 
is also to say the state of not having an adequate audience or interlocutors that would 
listen to and respond to poets who speak of and to an era), is a striking feature of the 
literature produced in certain societies at very specific times, and post-Civil War Spain is 
one of these particular cases. The sense of uprootedness or groundlessness, at the core of 
any experience of exile, conditioned not only those poets and writers who abandoned 
Spain due to the Civil War; for exiled are also the things or the people that cannot be 
represented or given a place in collective memory. The writer Suso de Toro recognized 
that having to live under the censorial aegis of a dictatorship led to an unhealthy attitude 
toward the past: “aceptamos la prohibición de saber” and, therefore, the human rights to 
search for historical truth and to mourn were withdrawn. Prohibited knowledge is that 
which lacks socially sanctioned forms of comprehension and representation, that which 
cannot be named and, let alone, known and explained. Literature speaks what is most 
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unspeakable: “Y, después de todo, ya que aceptamos la prohibición de saber, les 
corresponde a los personajes literarios decir lo que nos está prohibido” (2006: 16).  
 
2. Theoretical frameworks 
2.1 Towards a definition of memory: cognitive, philosophic and literary views 
 
En todas estas actividades [el arte, la moral, la ciencia] creadoras buscamos,  
descubrimos, inventamos, construimos desde la memoria. 
(Marina, Teoría de la inteligencia creadora)   
Le role de la mémoire dans la creation artistique est généralment sous-estimé.  
(Tzvetan Todorov, Les abus de la mémoire) 
 
In literature memory has often been identified with mere recalling. Accordingly, 
only genres with a strong referential background, such as the historical novel and the 
genre of memoir, have been regarded as epitomizing “the literature of memory”.25 
However, such a conception of memory tends to rigidify it by identifying memory with a 
mere theme.26 To be sure, it is one thing to fictionalize any historical or autobiographical 
events of the past; an altogether different matter, and one with which this thesis is 
concerned is the recognition that literary creation would be impossible without the 
                                                 
25 A great deal of modern critical theory of narrative has reacted to this mixture of history and 
fiction by establishing a neat boundary between them. From the optic of testimonial memory, the 
fictional and the non-fictional are somehow entwined, the boundary between them is blurred. 
26 This is the case with Paloma Lapuerta Amigo’s (1994) work on Félix Grande’s poetry. 
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intervention of memory, as many authors themselves recognize. Antonio Muñoz Molina, 
for instance, has declared that: “La literatura está hecha de memoria […] y digo que está 
hecha de, y no que tiene que ver con o trata de la memoria” (1997: 57).  
However, memory has only (relatively) recently received attention. Moreover, the 
complexity of the phenomenon has often generated controversy. According to Ruiz-
Vargas: 
Al igual que aceptar ingenuamente que todo el mundo sabe lo que es la atención no 
garantiza (como ha demostrado la investigación) que se sepa lo que de verdad es la 
atención, que todo el mundo sepa lo que es la memoria no permite asumir ni que 
sepamos lo que es realmente la memoria ni que la palabra memoria signifique lo mismo 
para todo el mundo. (1997a: 9)  
In his opinion, to be able to say something meaningful about memory we need an 
interdisciplinary approach: 
El conocimiento de los todavía enigmáticos mecanismos de la memoria así como de su 
funcionamiento sólo será posible haciendo converger programas de investigación de 
distintos niveles de análisis y opiniones e ideas procedentes del más amplio abanico 
científico y cultural […] Las claves –en una palabra— que sobre la memoria nos brinda 
el neurobiólogo, el filósofo, el novelista, el psicólogo social, el psicólogo experimental 
o el experto en teoría literaria. (1997: 12-13) 
This lack of understanding of memory has led to incorrect assumptions, according to 
contemporary research, on what memory is and the role it occupies in our mental 
processes. Memory’s underestimation has remote roots. Todorov reminds us that 
  
36
Descartes claimed that memory was not necessary for the progress of science (1995a: 21). 
Memory only began to be examined seriously at the end of the ninetieth century, from the 
point of view of its pathological aspects by French experimental psychologists. It was at 
that time that memory was also gaining attention as a metaphysical issue due to a debate 
initiated by the philosopher Henri Bergson and the psychiatrist Pierre Janet. Besides, 
some studies were being carried out in Germany by Hermann Ebbinghaus, and in 
America the psychologist William James was doing significant research on memory.  
Bergson, Janet and James explored what experimental psychologists refused to 
address, since they were absorbed in the pragmatic approach of figuring out what memory 
is and how it works under normal conditions. They explored, among other things, the 
links between memory and consciousness and the relationship between conscious and 
unconscious memory. But the genuine interest in memory came in the second half of the 
twentieth century, when memory studies flourished. Today memory is generating more 
attention than ever, including in literature, where a diverse range of perspectives are being 
used to approach the theme. Suzanne Nalbantian’s books (1994 and 2003), for instance, 
have aroused increasing attention with her findings regarding the relation of memory’s 
manifestations in works of art and neuroscience. This interest in exploring memory from 
different perspectives has become the norm.27 An increasing number of literary critics are 
                                                 
27 I claim that memory in literature can be approached from different viewpoints. One of these 
perspectives is “intertextuality”. But intertextuality, literary history and its tradition are not to be 
confused with a phenomenon that includes these forms of memory but which is nevertheless 
vaster and more complex. Umberto Eco (1992) has also coined the expression “memoria 
vegetale” to allude to the same idea and to distinguish it from other kinds of memory. On some 
occasions, as illustrated by Eco’s terminology, memory is understood exclusively in that way. 
Pérez Parejo, after declaring that “muchos escritores contemporáneos reconocen que la 
intertextualidad es una clave compositiva de primer orden en la creación”, quotes the critic 
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realizing that in order to approach memory in literature the knowledge about memory 
gained from “extra-literary” disciplines can prove very useful. In relation to textual 
memory, Middleton and Woods have declared that: 
Cognitive psychology has always treated memory as a central feature of mental activity 
[…] Literary theory has, mistakenly in our view, treated cognitive psychology with 
indifference or contempt probably based on both ignorance and misunderstanding of its 
aims and achievements. […] Our argument is that cognitive psychology, as much as 
psychoanalysis, is based on the extensive observation of individual and social practices 
of memory and, therefore, provides a useful source of material on the recent history of 
memory for the study of contemporary literary texts. (Middleton and Woods 2000: 84-
45)  
In this section I will offer a brief overview of what memory is and what it implies in 
the light of insights from the disciplines of cognitive psychology and philosophy, whilst 
                                                                                                                                                  
Senabre as saying that “el poeta es, antes que poeta, lector de poesía”, and that “todo poeta se 
inserta en una tradición, y sobre este fondo de sus lecturas comienza a elaborar sus obras, por lo 
que bien puede afirmarse que la poesía es, en buena medida, un producto de la memoria” (2002: 
139). Pérez Parejo furthermore discusses memory in the poetry of Gil de Biedma in the poet’s use 
of intertextuality (2002: 424). Senabre’s conclusion, that poetry is a product of memory, seems 
correct, but not only for the reasons he suggests. There is more to an author’s creative process 
than his “textual” memories. Poetry may also emerge from memories other than literary 
memories. Intertextuality does not offer a full understanding of what memory is and of how it 
works in literary texts. Categories other than the textual are involved. Some critics tend readily to 
forget that there is a consciousness behind the act of writing. Questions of agency and signature 
should not therefore be withdrawn. With respect to this, Middleton and Woods go as far as 
suggesting that intertextuality “steals” from other texts: given the demonstrated link between 
memory and identity, it would constitute, in their opinion, a “robbery” of someone else’s identity 
(2000: 93). I would not necessarily endorse such an opinion, but I agree with them that the study 
of memory in literature does not always have to be intertextual and that it can benefit from the 
insights of “extra-literary” disciplines. 
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supporting and illustrating my points with comments by literary critics and writers. My 
aim is to present an outline of widely-shared knowledge on the subject that will serve as a 
point of departure for the successive topics discussed, and for subsequent analyses of 
memory in the work of Grande.  
Current research has demonstrated that memory, be it artistic or not, is a question of 
reconstruction and transfiguration of reality, inner or exterior. As contemporary research 
stresses, memory not only emerges when it passively recalls the past: 
Tulving argues that the subjective conviction that memory is simply a system of 
retrieving impressions of the past is a poor basis for theorising a mechanism of memory 
retrieval. (Middleton and Woods 2000: 90-91) 
More importantly, memory actively re-constructs the past, according to criteria 
which have to do with an author’s readings as much as they have with his lived 
experience. Experts have noted that memory is not merely a passive receptacle of 
information (Marina 1998: 118-133). Its function as a storage system is certainly one of 
its fundamental tasks, but not the sole one. Three main processes can be distinguished in 
the workings of memory: encoding, storage and recalling (Ricoeur 2000: 150). These 
processes are also known as encoding, consolidation and retrieval (Schooler and Eich 
2000: 388). Thus the obsolete idea that identifies memory with capacity of retention has 
been left aside to allow for a more dynamic and accurate view of it, which is also 
connected with a much debatable literary vision of memory as a theme. 
When we leave aside an idea of memory that amounts to merely storage capacity, 
we can actually begin to relate it to intelligence. Marina puts it in no uncertain terms: 
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“Creo que no es posible decir nada sensato de la memoria humana sin situarlo dentro de 
una teoría general de la inteligencia” (1997: 34). But he insists that intelligence and 
memory are better understood as dynamic processes or functions, rather than objects 
(1998: 118-133).  This distinction is important because besides being a concrete 
representation, memory is also a set of dynamic mechanisms which create 
representations. More specifically:  
Memory involves a remarkable amalgamation of distinct processes that are 
differentially elicited as a function of the specific circumstances surrounding event 
encoding, consolidation and retrieval. (Schooler and Eich 2000: 388) 
Thus, memory as a mental function (“recordar”) is to be distinguished from its 
product (“recuerdo”), as Antonio Machado accurately and intuitively indicates in the 
following four lines: 
Cuando recordar no pueda, 
¿dónde mi recuerdo irá? 
Una cosa es el recuerdo 
y otra cosa recordar. (2003: 139) 
To be sure, memory is not only the product, what we remember, the content, that is, 
the memories, but, more significantly, our memory is how we remember and this “how” 
is constituted by the influence that a varying array of circumstances exert on the processes 
of encoding, consolidation and retrieval mentioned above.  
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Memory is, thus, a set of cognitive processes that in its most developed form (that is, 
in its narrative form; memory is, in fact, a kind of narration, as will be seen) is very 
closely linked with intelligence.28  Its functions intersect with those commonly attributed 
to thought and the act of narrating: selecting information and interpreting it according to 
diverse criteria, as shown by Todorov’s definition of memory:  
La mémoire ne s’oppose nullement à l’oubli. Les deux termes qui forment contraste 
sont l’effacement et la conservation. La mémoire est toujours et nécessairement, une 
interaction des deux. La mémoire est forcément une sélection. […] Tout travail sur le 
passé, ne consiste jamais seulement à établir des faits, mais aussi à choisir certains 
d’entre eux comme étant plus saillants et plus significatifs que d’autres, à les mettre 
ensuite en relation entre eux. (1995: 50) 
Umberto Eco reflects on the functions of memory and reinforces Todorov’s point: 
La memoria ha due funzioni. Una, ed è quella a cui tutti pensano, è quella di trattenere 
nel ricordo i dati della nostra esperienza precedente; ma l’altra è anche quella di 
filtrarli, di lasciarne cadere alcuni e di conservare altri. (1992: 9) 
 Some critics claim that the politics of memory are opposed to the politics of 
forgetting. However, the categories in opposition are not memory and forgetting but 
conservation and cancellation. To be more precise, re-enacting must not be confused with 
forgetting. Acting out is a process of remembrance associated with trauma whereby an 
                                                 
28 Although in special circumstances, as in trauma, as will be seen further on, memory does not 
involve cognition, but, rather, inhibits it. When the origins of historical and personal catastrophe 
are so remote that it is almost impossible to find them, knowledge derived from logical reasoning 
in the form of historical or philosophical logos is barren, giving way to another ways of 
alternative knowledge: the arts.  
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event or sets of events have not yet entered into the stream of memory. Strictly speaking, 
forgetting is still related to memory, for we cannot forget that which has not been first 
constituted as memory, that is, stored (Ruiz-Vargas 2002). One cannot “forget” trauma, in 
the same way that one forgets a memory.29  
Let us see now how memory processes find their correlates in artistic processes. For 
instance, this is Antonio Muñoz Molina’s opinion. On being asked about his craft, his 
explanation of what the act of narration entails coincides with Eco’s and Todorov’s 
statements above as to how memory functions. Muñoz Molina associates perception, 
selection and retrieval (all processes of memory) with literary creation: 
Escribir es primero el arte de mirar [perception] y luego de seleccionar [where stored 
memory intervenes], en su tercer paso, el definitivo, es un arte combinatorio [this is 
where the explanatory and interpretative power of narrative memory takes place]. 
(1997: 24)  
The shared vision of Todorov, Eco and Muñoz Molina merits a comment. They all 
affirm that memory is founded on selection. It is in this sense that we must take 
Todorov’s insistence that memory is not to be used in opposition to oblivion but to 
conservation. Oblivion refers us to memory as well, for where there is oblivion there is 
also memory. This is a fundamental finding by Saint Augustine: “When at least we 
                                                 
29 This is the reason behind Pierre Nora’s observation that too much memory amounts to no 
memory at all (1998: I, 7). Excessive recalling of the same event or set of events might be a sign 
of trauma. Cancellation, along with the fixation on certain memories, is to be associated with 
especial mechanisms of memory occurring in specific circumstances, as in the case of trauma. 
“One of the common paradoxes of characterizations of traumatic memories–why they are 
sometimes retrieved excessively and other times not recalled at all” (Schooler and Eich 2000: 
388).  
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remember ourselves to have forgotten, we have not totally forgotten. But if we have 
completely forgotten, we cannot even search for what has been lost” (1991: 196), and one 
which the poet Luis Cernuda rediscovers in his poetry (“el recuerdo de un olvido” [1993: 
199] ). 
What does not seem to be very clear is how the selection process takes place. 
According to contemporary research, and as observed by Muñoz Molina above in regard 
to literary creation, it is known that memory and perception are inextricably connected.  
We also know that selection occurs at two different levels: at the level of perception 
(memory is, then, forming itself) and at the retrieval of memory. On the one hand, 
memory intervenes at the moment of perception, which means that new information is 
integrated and interpreted by previous information (semantic nets or structures which 
constitute the very basics of memory; some of which are innate to human beings, making 
it possible to assimilate new information. These are also called “schemes” in 
psychological terminology).30 Without these previous semantic structures nothing could 
signify. And it seems that these structures are susceptible to being modified. In fact they 
are modifiable by the incorporation of new information, that is, they cannot be regarded 
as fixed structures (Marina 1998: 132).  
On the other hand, memory selects when it remembers, according to different 
criteria and guiding principles, amongst which, as shall be seen, are attention, desire, 
                                                 
30 Marina calls these structures or semantic nets (1997: 39). Middleton and Woods similarly argue 
that there are no neutral memories, they are always associated to something else: “memory 
derives its contents, its informational ingredients, not only from the traces (engrams) but from the 
retrieval cue as interpreted by the semantic system and the general cognitive environment in 
which the retrieval occurs” (2000: 21). 
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habit, and so on. Thus perceiving could be said to be a sort of remembering and 
remembering a kind of perceiving of the past. As Bergson states, “Your perception, 
however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable multitude of remembered 
elements; in truth, every perception is already memory” (1988: 150). Perceptions and 
recollections are only different in their degree of intensity (Bergson 1988: 236). 
What is interesting to note is that, either at the level of the formation of memory 
or at the level of its retrieval, both the content and the nature of these memory structures 
seem to decide what pieces of information or facts are “les plus saillants et plus 
significatifs” (to use Todorov’s words) in order for them to be stored (in the formation of 
memory, at the act of perception) or remembered (in the retrieval of memory). Just as 
memory in some way decides what will be perceived (that which will constitute the centre 
of attention, what we “see”), it also decides that which will be remembered. This is of 
utmost importance as it entails that memory is not only retrospective but also prospective. 
Further on, this point will be illustrated with a passage taken from one of Valente’s short 
essays on memory. Here, suffice it to say that if it is true that memory structures influence 
perception and remembering, it is also fair to point out that according to some memory 
studies, stimuli set selection into motion. The latter, however, is not always regarded as a 
plausible theory. As Marina puts it: 
Los estudiosos de la memoria pecan de ingenuos al hablar de temas como el 
“reconocimiento” o “la búsqueda de la memoria”.  Les parece evidente que un estímulo 
activa las estructuras, las redes semánticas, o como quiera llamárselas, que constituyen 
la memoria. Debo de ser muy torpe, porque no comparto esas claridades. Se dice que un 
estímulo es comprendido utilizando información de más alto nivel. ¿Cómo se hace 
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esto? ¿Va el estímulo en busca del recuerdo oportuno? Eso es concebible en un 
ordenador, donde toda información lleva un puntero que la dirige hacia la memoria 
correspondiente. Si la memoria espera y el estímulo –aún sin interpretar- busca, me 
resulta imposible explicar el encuentro. […] no es el nuevo input quien va en busca de 
la memoria, sino la memoria quien va en busca del estímulo. (1997: 38) 
Muñoz Molina’s experience as a writer confirms Marina’s words: 
Uno tiende a ver no lo que tiene delante de los ojos, sino aquello que está dispuesto a 
ver y adiestrado para distinguir. Uno suele encontrar los recuerdos que previamente 
buscaba y creyendo ser un memorialista está actuando como un fabulador. (1997: 62) 
With “aquello que está dispuesto a ver y adiestrado para distinguir” Molina appears 
to be suggesting that the elements seen (perceived) and what is remembered are equally 
determined by desire, interest and habit, all of which engage with inner memory 
structures. Todorov similarly argues that selection does not occur arbitrarily by external 
stimuli. On the contrary, he declares, it is linked to internal principles which guide it: will, 
reason, creativity, and so on. (1995: 25). In fact, this seems to be the case: memory is not 
always capricious as in the spontaneous recollection of Proust’s involuntary memory. 
Bergson had this in mind when he distinguished between “pure memory” (mémoir-
souvenir) and “habit memory” (mémoire-habitude). Ricoeur also referred (2000: 144) to 
“labored recall”, the result of a conscious effort of memory.31 Thus from the perspective 
                                                 
31 “Another pair of terms concerns the relation between spontaneous recollection and more or less 
labored recall: one pole is represented by Proust’s involuntary memory; the other by an effort of 
memory, which is a type of intellectual effort and which reduces neither to the association of 
empiricist tradition nor to calculation. This effort involves what Bergson and Merleau-Ponty call a 
  
45
of how memories are generated we can talk about different types of memory. Or, more 
precisely, memory equally engages with unconscious and conscious elements, with willed 
and involuntary influences.  
There are also different kinds of memory according to their level of evolution. In 
relation to memory evolution, Janet distinguishes between “description”, an elementary 
type of memory and “narration”, the linguistic and most developed process of memory 
whereby selected elements are put into relation with one another. He asserts that 
descriptive and narrative memories are not capricious, but that they are connected with 
something else—what he calls “la question” precedes them (1928: 245): 
[Le sujet adulte] a dépassé depuis longtemps le commencement de la mémoire. Il nous 
présente une mémoire éduquée, métamorphosée par toutes les opérations de croyance, 
de raissonnement qui s’y son superpostes. (1928: 258)   
It seems, then, that memory is subordinated to beliefs and particular ways of 
reasoning. Seen in this light, the exercise of memory can be exchanged with the practice 
of a worldview.  Internal stimuli are really powerful. It must be noted that many of the 
external stimuli that trigger the mechanism of memory are internalized, becoming inner 
stimuli.32  
                                                                                                                                                  
'dynamic schema' capable of directing memory searches by discarding inappropriate candidates 
and and recognizing the 'right' memory” (2000: 144). 
32 Changeux talks of “traces of history and culture internalized in our encephalon” (in Ricoeur 
2000: 136-137). 
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Memory is, thus, as much guided by reason and beliefs as it is driven by irrationality 
and emotion. Emotional components embedded in memories are central to the way we 
remember: 
Memories are in fact often associated with emotional markers: memory traces are 
evaluated as a function of the pleasure, happiness, our unhappiness, or suffering that the 
subject anticipates. (Ricoeur 2000: 14) 
The fact that memory is linked to our variable emotions has led artists of all kinds to 
consider memory as an unreliable source for the seeking of truth. Yet as Orhan Pamuk 
observes in the following passage, that memory changes according to emotion, does not 
necessarily mean it is false: 
I remember how troubled I was the first time I looked at this same view [of Istambul] 
from the same angle and notice how different the view looks now. It’s not my memory 
that’s false – the view looked troubled then because I myself was troubled. I poured my 
soul in the city’s streets and there it still resides. (2005: 313) 
This association of memory with emotion links memory to the body: 
It is a self of flesh and blood that we remember, with its moments of pleasure and 
suffering, its status, its actions, its feelings. (Ricoeur 2000: 145) 
The governance of memory by emotions also supports the already mentioned idea 
that memory is not only retrospective but also prospective, in the sense that emotion can 
turn into a guiding principle of poetic writing and remembering. Still, the kind of memory 
encoded in sensations or perceptions is still a less developed (but not less important) form 
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of memory if compared to narrative memory.33 We must admit thus that sensations, 
perceptions, feeling, suffering are forms of memory and therefore types of intelligence, 
that is, methods of knowledge.  
The processes of memory and those of literary creation are especially akin to each 
other. Expanding on this argument, a series of authors’ predicaments show how the 
processes of non-literary memory and those of literary creation converge. What 
theorists—philosophers and psychologists—have demonstrated, has also been intuitively 
apprehended by writers.34 Therefore, it is worth quoting a poet who has clearly seen that 
the processes of memory and those of creation tend to coincide. In the following passage 
Valente comments on how memory imbricates with the process of poetic creation:  
El descenso hacia los fondos de la memoria por las capas infinitas en que se va 
abriendo la interioridad de la palabra constituye la operación fundamental de la poesía, 
a la que tampoco es ajena, desde sus orígenes, la filosofía misma. Me parece importante 
señalar a este propósito que la memoria es, justamente, el vasto territorio de lo que aún 
no recordamos. (2004: 163) 
Such a statement constitutes a lucid vision not only of how poetic creation is 
supposed to work; it also offers a precise and rigorous account of how memory is 
configured. The allusion to “fondos”, which could be rendered in English as “layers”, for 
                                                 
33 I will be using, along with Kristeva (1994: 281), the concepts of perception and sensation as 
interchangeable. 
34 Some critics indeed blur the distinction between theory and literature. Christine Boheemen-Saff 
proposes to “turn theory into a form of literature”, she finds that important because she “wants to 
reclaim the importance of literature as a socially necessary source of knowledge, especially in its 
affective demand to witness literature’s occasion” (1999: 10). Conversely, literature can be 
thought as developing its own particular body of “theory” even if theory is not its purpose.  
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“fondos” is a term that in the plural alludes to multiple levels of deepness, is extremely 
pertinent here in relation to both memory and words. It has been demonstrated that 
memory consists of various levels or layers, in the same way as words possess different 
layers or connotations. Ruiz-Vargas (2002: 60-66) explains that experts have widely 
recognized four levels or layers of memory, namely, phylogenetic, semantic, 
autobiographic and cultural. They correspond to different phases in the constitution of our 
memory. The deepest or least developed layer of memory, phylogenetic, affects the more 
superficial or developed levels, although these cannot influence the phylogenetic layer but 
only attempt to “reach” it. 
This is important because memories recorded in the least superficial levels of 
memory such as, for instance, unconscious traumatic memories, can end up interfering 
with linguistically elaborated conscious memories. Furthermore, it proves that memory 
can also be non-linguistic, although, paradoxically, language can be a means for hinting at 
non-linguistic memories (Ruiz-Vargas 2002: 62-64). The latter, scientifically 
demonstrated, is also suggested in Valente’s passage. The first sentence of the above 
passage points out that our immediate access to the different layers of memory takes place 
through language. The poetic word opens up so its interiority can be displayed. This 
interiority, according to the poet, constitutes memory itself. Valente also hints at the idea 
that underlying the word’s surface there is a less conscious, a more obscure realm of 
memory which poetry in its making displays. This can be understood in two ways which 
are, perhaps, inseparable. On the one hand, it can be understood from the perspective of 
psychoanalysis, for which poetry could be conceived of, and according to Valente’s 
passage above, as the unfolding of unconscious memory welling up progressively 
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uncensored and unbidden. For Freud unconscious or buried memory is connected with the 
repressed elements of our psyche. Similarly, Henri Bergson referred to the spontaneous 
images that memory brings out: “images-éclairs qui traversent l’esprit tout d’un coup par 
association d’idées et qui ne se rattachent pas à ce que nous faisons” (Janet 1928: 242). 
Yet, more significantly, the passage above may be taken as referring to genuine 
imaginative creation. Not creation as a surrogate function to let repressed feelings 
emerge, but as the fundamental operation of literature. Valente’s sentence “Me parece 
importante señalar […] que la memoria es, justamente, el vasto territorio de lo que aún no 
recordamos” as well as his observation that “preñada está de olvido la memoria que, a su 
vez, sólo de él ha nacido” (2004: 125), is a paradoxical as well as illuminating recognition 
of literature’s attempts to overcome silence and oblivion. From this perspective the 
function of poetry consists in descending to the vast territory of oblivion. Yet oblivion is 
alluded to here indirectly in terms of memory (“lo que aún no recordamos”). In other 
words, there is a subtle nuance between what we do not remember and what we do not yet 
remember. 
The question to be posed is how memory might conquer that which is not already 
remembered but is bound to be remembered. The answer could lie in the idea that 
memory is the possibility of creating sense among senseless and scattered elements, 
oblivion being a kind of pre-memory, that is, a possibility to be created anew. Conversely, 
it can be said that all memory is a kind of oblivion, for the very act of remembering is a 
re-construction that resists accurate seizure of the thing past. Ruiz-Vargas reminds us that 
oblivion can only be understood in two ways: forgetfulness, that is, loss of conscious 
seizure of stored information (this is the psychoanalytic aspect of oblivion) and creation, 
  
50
that is, the distortion of existing memory traces adding something new or creating anew 
memories. Thus perceptions not stored in the long-run memory cannot be properly 
considered oblivion. 
Valente’s words can be taken as suggesting that memory through poetic language 
does not invent or create ex-nihilo but discovers new possibilities and nuances which 
hitherto remain undiscovered or unnoticed. He refers to literature as the conquest of 
oblivion via the creation of memory and to the distortion and re-interpretation embedded 
in its exercise. Such a paradox can nevertheless illuminate the complex and ambivalent 
reality of the phenomenon of memory.  
A more straightforward but nevertheless subtle example of the relation of memory 
and creation is produced by Muñoz Molina.  In regard to the intertwining of the processes 
of memory and creation he states: 
En el acto de escribir, como en la conciencia diaria de cualquiera, inventar y recordar 
son tareas que se parecen mucho y de vez en cuando se confunden entre sí. La memoria 
está inventando de manera incesante nuestro pasado, según los principios de selección y 
de combinación. (1992: 30)  
As the selective and associative tasks of memory have already been explained, the 
paragraph above does not need further explanation. Yet the parallelism Molina establishes 
between the act of remembering and that of creation is significant. His description of his 
experience as a writer also displays how the unconscious levels of memory might become 
not only enriching and creative but also enormously revelatory of his own life experience. 
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That is, experience may be graspable more appropriately through fiction. He has referred 
to the:  
Hallazgo de una revelación súbita e instintiva que salve del olvido, restituya el pasado 
al presente y permita una comprensión limpia, apasionada y exacta de la propia vida. 
(1997: 62)  
Inspirational as they might be, the upsurge of these images and instinctive 
revelations is not all that can be said to constitute creation. Creative memory can be 
mainly involuntary and unconscious, as in the Recherche by Marcel Proust. In the same 
vein mourning, a concept which will be addressed in the second part of this thesis, sets 
into motion involuntary memory and the melancholic type of attachment to the lost object 
of trauma perpetuates it instead of confronting it.35   
 Nevertheless, as Muñoz Molina observes: “La memoria cree antes de que el 
conocimiento recuerde” (1997: 66). There is a voluntary side to memory. For Toni 
Morrison, for instance, memory is a form of willed creation (1996: 213).  
To summarize, memory is a set of complex cognitive processes. There are various 
modalities of memory, the most developed of which are linguistic and closely linked to 
intelligence and perception. Memory directs the artist’s vision of the artistic object he is 
creating according to certain criteria, which either are related to inner stimuli or external 
stimuli. Finally, memory processes and those of literary creation are interwoven and that 
                                                 
35 This is what has prompted Alessia Riciardi to affirm that the Recherche is a “failure” in terms 
of mourning due to its lack of coming to terms with the pain of loss (2003: 119). 
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memory implies conscious and unconscious states, that is, involuntary and willed 
elements. 
 
2.2 Trauma and its relation to memory and literature (especially poetry) 
 
All memory works through trauma […] All memory is generated by traumas of varying 
force.  
(Middleton and Woods, Literatures of Memory) 
 
There is an inextricable connection between memory and trauma. Still, one should 
be able to distinguish between memory as a set of cognitive functions, known as 
“working memory”, and the “special” memory whose distinctive processes necessarily 
spring from the condition of trauma. In the first case memory should be specifically 
understood, as explained in 2.1, as a set of cognitive functions proper to intelligence 
which involve perception, selection, assimilation and retrieval. It is important to insist 
that memory under “normal” circumstances implies production of meaning, because in 
trauma what occurs precisely is exactly the opposite: the display of no meaning.  
Trauma is defined as a psychic wound—although its Greek etymon alludes to a 
physical wound—originating from certain experiences of the self which have not been 
integrated into consciousness, and which, as a result, haunt the self as a ghost or absence 
whose meaning cannot be deciphered in normal processes of cognition. As Cathy Caruth 
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argues, trauma involves much suffering, patterns of repetition and belatedness in the 
grasping of the event’s meaning: 
Trauma is described as the response to an unexpected or overwhelming violent event or 
events that are not fully grasped as they occur, but return later in repeated flashbacks, 
nightmares, and other repetitive phenomena. Traumatic experience, beyond the 
psychological dimension of suffering it involves, suggests a certain paradox: that the 
most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that 
immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness. The repetition of the 
traumatic event […] thus suggests a larger relation to the event that extends beyond 
what can simply be seen or what can be known. (1996: 92) 
As Caruth observes in the last lines of her statement, the fact that a traumatic event 
is not fully assimilated does not imply, as a non-traumatic functioning of memory would 
suggest, that the event lacks relevance for the individual who has experienced it, for 
memory selects that which is most significant for a given individual. It rather means the 
opposite: that the event or sets of events have impacted on the individual to such a great 
extent that a kind of short circuit in cognition has taken place, leaving the event outside 
the stream of consciousness and preventing its assimilation into memory. Thus the event 
(or events) are not interpreted and absorbed as meaning.  As a consequence, trauma does 
not cease to return as something fixed, unmodifiable, and excluded from the eventual 
possibility of being elaborated as meaning. In other words, the event returns as mere 
repetition but not as memory proper. According to Anne Whitehead, “trauma emerges as 
that which, at the very moment of its reception, registers as a non-experience, causing 
conventional epistemologies to falter” (2004: 5). In Ann Kaplan’s words, trauma is not a 
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cognitive experience; it only produces emotions because the affect that it provokes “is too 
much to be registered cognitively in the brain” (2004: 34).  
Trauma is, therefore, a “special” kind of memory without semantic meaning, 
characterized either by dissociative and belated repetition or by repression.36 As observed 
in the Introduction, Pierre Janet showed the difference between memory and repetition by 
distinguishing four different phases in the psychological evolution of human memory. 
These phases are, from the most primitive to the most developed, repetition, recitation, 
description and narration. “Narrative memory” is the maximum degree of development 
achieved by memory, whilst repetition is the stage in which something is merely stored as 
“raw” information, and, therefore, cannot be recalled in the context of a narrative. 
Repetition is, thus, deprivation of a “context”, of a narrative framework. Hence trauma 
cannot be thematized, that is, it is not easily reducible to an event or a set of events, for if 
it were to be thematized, it would be put into narrative terms, opening up the possibility 
of its (extremely difficult) overcoming. 
The presence of trauma can be traced not only in the occurrence of traumatic 
memories; it is precisely the absence of them which more appropriately reveals it. 
Described as a gap or breach in consciousness, it is nevertheless readable as a structure or 
                                                 
36 Some critics have seen problems in defining trauma as a dissociative process and have asked 
whether the unconscious has a place in trauma. Due to the latter, Ann Kaplan (2005), for instance, 
criticizes Caruth’s assumption that dissociation is central to trauma. Nevertheless, Caruth clearly 
states in her work that traumatic memories can be either dissociated or repressed. So, it seems that 
in trauma dissociation and the unconscious may co-exist. LaCapra (2001) warns that we should 
distinguish between the loss associated with historically-rooted trauma and the ontological 
absence linked to the unconscious. In Grande’s work both historical loss and ontological absence 
occur. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that there is a small group of researchers who do not 
consider traumatic memory to have special mechanisms. However, given the unique nature of 
trauma, School and Erich argue that the latter is unlikely (2000: 387). 
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pattern whereby a certain sort of “experience” is conveyed (even if it is that of absence of 
sense). That is, trauma emerges as that which is inapprehensible, and whose 
ungraspability can nevertheless be tracked down through language. If one is to be 
rigorous it cannot be asserted that traumatic memory falsifies meaning or distorts history; 
for trauma constitutes the history itself, telling its own truth. As Caruth puts it: “The 
traumatized, we might say, carry an impossible history within them, or they become 
themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess” (1995: 5). In other 
words, trauma is the experience attached to history that history misses; it is that which 
history cannot absorb: “if trauma is at all susceptible to narrative formulation, then it 
requires a literary form which departs from conventional linear sequence” (Anne 
Whitehead 2004: 7).  
With respect to this Todorov (1995II) asks: “Doit-on conclure, […] que la mémoire 
individuelle est inutilisable pour la connaissance?” Todorov poses the question as to 
whether it makes sense to consider the epistemological value of individual recollection. In 
other words, he makes us reflect on the validity of testifying to trauma. What traumatic 
memories lay bare is precisely how they can only be “told” within the context of a sole 
narrative: the narrative of pain: “c'est dans la souffrance, au contraire, qu'advient le 
souvenir” (1995II). 
Todorov claims that knowledge of the past is produced differently in history and 
memory, for these two different fields of knowledge touch upon two different segments 
of experience. The realm of human experience covered by history is quantifiable and 
factual, whereas memory is occupied with the traces of history in the human spirit. 
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However, Todorov reminds us that “Celles-ci [the registering of the past in the psyche] 
n’existent pas moins que les faits matériels” (1995II).  
Thus traumatic memory can neither be falsification of history or a mere fictional 
recourse, for two reasons. Namely, that assimilation into narrative memory is exactly that 
which has not been produced at the level of the traumatized individual (or society). The 
unresolved experience of trauma is configured as a breach in cognition. Secondly, trauma 
is less a matter of what it is said than how it is said. This is why literature is so well 
equipped to register and deal with trauma. For if trauma cannot be fully put into the 
words of reason, in order to produce understanding, a catastrophic situation surely can be 
registered as silence and death. Many critics and artists, Grande himself, defend the 
appropriateness of approaching literature from the perspective of trauma by observing 
that imagination can contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon. According to 
Grande, poets develop in their works extremely intensive and pre-logical emotions whose 
apprehension would be difficult to achieve through logic and reason: 
La razón y la lógica suelen fingir una seguridad que, en rigor, no disponen. Es ese 
fingimiento lo que rechaza el conocimiento poético. El artista se sabe balbuceante, 
perplejo, asombrado y, en el fondo, habitando en la inocencia de aquel a quien el 
mundo sobrecoge y deslumbra. Lo que el artista desarrolla es, en fin, una sabia forma 
de infancia. Sus emociones prelógicas y generalmente intensísimas, como son las del 
niño –el niño que todos hemos sido y que, en mayor o menor medida, según sea mayor 
o menor el arrojo con que acertamos a vivir nuestra intimidad, solemos conservar los 
adultos. […] Es iluso aspirar a conocer la realidad en todo su misterio; mas, sin 
embargo, es posible estrenarla. El poeta nos ayuda a que la realidad sea, también para 
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nosotros, un estreno. Claro está que eso únicamente es posible cuando el poeta 
desconfía del autoritarismo de la lógica, cuando asume que las certidumbres de la razón 
comportan fingimiento —es decir, insinceridad— y cuando, aconsejado por el coraje y 
la inocencia de su caudal de infancia, resuelve comprometer su vida entera con la 
aventura misteriosa del conocimiento poético. (cited in Verónique Briaut 1988: 293-
294) 
In the same vein, Gaston Bachelard observes that “poetry is a commitment of the 
soul […] Forces are manifested in poems that do not pass through the circuits of 
knowledge” (1994: xxi). Valente made a statement that sheds light on the relation 
between poetry and the experience of trauma—although we presume his was not a 
reflection on trauma but a general view on poetry: “la palabra poética empieza justamente 
donde el decir es imposible” (2002: 96). Poetry can certainly be considered as that which 
registers experiences of incompleteness and impossibility and which nevertheless 
attempts to unveil these intricate realities. Hence its connections with trauma—an 
experience that will never be fully told—in seeking to achieve meaning and elaborate 
understanding, an exacting and endless movement toward gauging a void. In this sense, 
poetry would not only manifest and work through trauma; taken as an object, poetry is 
often in itself proof of trauma.  
By the same token, Dominick LaCapra has remarked: “[…] certain forms of 
literature or art may provide a more expansive space for exploring modalities of 
responding to trauma” (2001: 185). He draws on Cathy Caruth’s reflection that “literature 
in its very excess can somehow get at trauma in a manner unavailable to theory” (cited in 
LaCapra 2001: 183). Poetry seeks to pass through the deepest layers of reality, in the 
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same fashion as bearing with trauma involves going beyond apparent reality: “[…] the 
recognition of realities that most of us have not begun to face” (Caruth 1995: vii).  
 
2.3 Trauma and exile  
 
Trauma shares with the experience of exile a common ground: they both tell the 
story of a displacement. Trauma is, moreover, as much exilic as exile is traumatic. 
Grande’s poetry can be seen as exilic in his implicit creation of an ethical system that 
accounts for and is grounded on loss. This consideration would lead us to deem exile not 
as an exclusively social phenomenon—but, also, as a psychological condition. Exile is 
central to literature, not necessarily because the life of an exiled writer resembles fiction, 
a thesis that Michael Ugarte presents in his (1989) work on Spanish Civil-War exile 
literature, but, rather, because literature gives form to and works through the absence and 
fragmentation which characterize any experience of exile.  
In subtle contraposition to Ugarte’s idea of exile being merely fiction, Cristina Peri Rossi 
claims that: “Si el exilio no fuera una terrible experiencia humana, sería un género 
literario. O ambas cosas” (2003: 7). 
Neither trauma nor exile can be localized in terms of a place or setting. However, it 
is germane to note that there is a crucial difference between the sense of displacement 
provoked by trauma and exile, and the repression carried out by the unconscious. After 
all, the unconscious, although hidden, is still a place. Trauma is fundamentally 
dissociative whilst memory operates by association. Traumatic memories do not have 
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access to consciousness; they do not have a place in it; often, they do not even have a 
place in the unconscious. Therefore, they cannot be conceived of as merely extra-textual 
reality, a referent, although they certainly derive from a poet’s life experiences: “Trauma 
cannot be localized in terms of a discrete, dated experience” (LaCapra 2001: 186). The 
latter does not imply that the referent does not exist but, rather, that the referent is being 
continually deferred, with absence and silence occupying its “place”. To be sure, just as 
the exile cannot be geographically localized, given his nomadic condition, by the same 
token trauma lacks a mental place. In fact, there is an inextricable relationship between 
trauma, exile and silence, the three concepts being intimately bound together.  
The condition of exile has been generally applied to the individual who has been 
forced to leave his homeland. Nevertheless, exile is not always territorial but also a 
mental condition emerging from situations of intense cultural conflict. Paul Ilie (1980) 
has studied the condition of inner exile and its consequences for Spanish literature 
between 1939 and 1975. Ilie points out that much of the literature produced within the 
territory of Spain during that period is exilic in many aspects. Yet, in order to consider the 
literature of this period as exilic it is necessary to refute the idea that “exile, in its most 
basic sense, is a social phenomenon” (Ugarte 1986: 326). According to Ilie, “la falta de 
 atención dirigida al exilio interior entre los críticos, la explico  como un ejemplo de la 
dificultad inherente a la lectura psicológico-exegética frente a la investigación histórico-
crítica”.37 In effect, the Spanish literature of exile is often known and studied as a social 
phenomenon associated with the mass Republican expatriation after the Civil War. Little 
                                                 
37 In a letter addressed to me (24-1-2007). 
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attention has been paid to the exilic condition of poets who inside Spain suffered the 
repression of Francoism. These writers, among whom Grande is an example, did not 
emigrate, but they endured “internal dislocation”, to use Ilie’s word (1980: 91). Ilie sees 
exile as a “psychomoral phenomenon” (1980: 91).38 What is more, inner exile can be 
considered to be even more dramatic: “As the example of Grande shows, it is never 
possible to grow accustomed to spiritual exile in residence as long as the cultural medium 
exerts an alienating power” (Ilie 1980: 92).  
 Central to this discussion is the question as to why memory is inextricably 
connected with the condition of exile. In the case of the exiled Luis Cernuda, memory has 
been described as “a rootless and seductive force which gradually disrupts rather than 
unifies his sense of self” (Logan 2006: 298). Such a definition is interesting on its own, 
irrespective of its applicability to the Spanish poet. As an associative mechanism, 
memory can restore some coherence to the disintegrating experience of exile. In this 
sense, the opposite might be argued of memory: that far from disrupting, it constitutes the 
means for bringing together the pieces of a broken self. Exile prompts the fragmentation 
of the self, as Claudio Guillén observes: 
La persona se desangra. El yo siente como rota o fragmentada su propia naturaleza 
psicosocial, y su participación en los sistemas de signos en que descansa la vida 
cotidiana. (1995: 14) 
To reconnect with itself and society the exilic self needs the thread of memory: 
                                                 
38 On exile seen from this perspective, apart from the work of Ilie, see Christine Arkinstall (1993). 
Also interesting are the works of Susana Riviera (1990) and José Ignacio Álvarez Fernández 
(2007). 
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For survivors who have been separated and exiled from a ravaged World, memory is 
necessarily an act not only of recall, but also of mourning, a mourning often inflected 
by anger, rage, and despair. (Hirsch 1996: 659)  
And this is where the link with literature is unavoidable. Michael Ugarte proposes 
what he calls a “poetics of exile” (1986: 326), by which he means that exile is the 
condition inherent in all writers. He refers to an “exile’s voice, regardless of a specific 
culture, its language, its conceits, its motivations” (1986: 236). Even if I would generally 
agree with Ugarte’s way of understanding exile, his conclusion that exile relates to 
literature due to the fictional nature of the exilic experience is, however, debatable: 
Exile intensifies the tenuousness of the relationship between language and reality, for 
the life of exile is, in many ways, the life of fiction. Nothing is apprehended without the 
grid of memory and comparison; naming and re-naming are constant activities. (1986: 
237) 
To identify exile with fictional memory seems reductive, especially if it does not 
take into account the fact that exilic poetry does not only create fiction but it also 
expresses trauma. Exile is an experience whose dramatic psychological and sociological 
consequences are “real” and they are protruding in literary works. It is a complex 
phenomenon which is not limited to fiction. As Claudio Guillén claims, “lo propio de 
nuestro tiempo es la variedad referencial de la palabra exilio, es decir, la diversidad de 
realidades que denota” (1995: 145). Exile is not only about what is said (the fictional 
story, or the theme of the poem) but “how” it is said, and the how tells us more, it is more 
important, than the content itself. If it is true that in some cases the relationship between 
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language and reality becomes tenuous, it can also be argued, as Ilie does, that the exiled 
writer, especially the “realistic émigré” (in contrast to the “resident writer”), “has 
confidence in the faculty of memory, and in its nonaberrational processes”, and considers 
time a “pure vehicle for understanding and judgment” (1980: 67).39 An illustrative case of 
the latter is that of Rafael Alberti. His reliance on memory was unequivocal: 
Qué consuelo sin nombre no perder la memoria,  
tener llenos los ojos de los tiempos pasados,  
de las noches aquéllas en que el amor ardía,  
como el único dios que habitaba en los bosques. (2006: 334)  
The “exile” way of understanding memory is congruent with an idea presented in 
the Introduction to this thesis, that memory is a pre-requisite for achieving genuine 
understanding. In other words, it may be said to be an extreme posture to assume 
categorically that memory does not intervene in the apprehension of things, or that 
memory intervenes by distorting reality. Memory Studies suggest that the statement that 
“nothing is apprehended without the grid of memory” tells a general truth about the 
question of knowledge acquisition, rather than being exclusively a characteristic of exile. 
The relationship between literature and the experience of exile might thus be approached 
not necessarily from the perspective of a disrupting memory, but from a vision of 
memory which trusts in its ability to reconstructs some coherence where before there was 
none. Or, at least, to tell the story of a displacement which is the history of trauma.  
                                                 
39 It can be said that Alberti holds a happy view of memory. In Grande’s work, notwithstanding 
his positive view of it, this joy associated with memory found in Alberti’s poetry is somehow 
toned down. 
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2.4 The Spanish crisis of the word and its implications for memory   
 
Words failing, memory, which is their confine, breaks also 
[…] 
Everything forgets. But not a language 
(George Steiner, Language and Silence:  Essays on Language, Literature and the 
Inhuman)  
 
The modern critique of language can be rendered in Spanish as “la crisis de la 
palabra”. Steiner has called it with acumen “the retreat from the word” (1982: 12-35).40 It 
is difficult to ascertain when this crisis begins. Clodagh J. Brook distinguishes among two 
trends in this phenomenon: 
The rhetorical-literary and the mystical-religious. The first of these, the rhetorical-
literary, represents a secular use of the topos which either indicates the speaker’s self-
confessed inadequacy and modesty, or is employed to laud a creature who is beyond 
words. […] The mystical-religious tradition of ineffability, on the other hand, is 
associated with religious experience, and its adherents hold that God cannot be 
expressed because he exists beyond the limits of human reason and language. (2002: 2) 
                                                 
40 The expression “the critique of language” is often associated with feminist thinking and with 
deconstruction and poststructuralist thinking. Here suffice it to say that whereas in feminism the 
critique of language seems to have played an important role, the Spanish crisis to which I will 
refer has more to do with a nihilist attitude toward language than with the dismantling of 
oppression. The critique of language in feminism entails a critique of the Law of the Father 
implicit in the construction of language, an idea that is absent in my discourse. 
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Dante is an example of the rhetorical-literary device (Brook makes it clear that this 
is a literary device). For him, language was neither capable of wholly explaining the 
divine nor of expressing the phenomenal beauty of Beatrice. Although writers such as 
Dante commented in their works on the difficulties of conveying certain concepts, in the 
Middle Ages there was still confidence in language: “language is assumed to be in a 
position to express something of the divine” (Brook 2002: 3). According to Brook, 
literary modernism rethought the issue “with regard to the new social and intellectual 
climate” (2002: 2).  
However, there is nevertheless a third trend in this crisis, one that is initiated with 
modernism and postmodernism and characterized by its association with what remains at 
the margins of knowledge, because it is repressed and, also, culturally (and politically) 
silenced.  This trend coincides with the discovery of the unconscious. Shoshana Felman 
situates it in “the age of psychiatry”: 
Modernity at large (including postmodernity) can be defined, I argue, by its relation to 
the age of psychiatry. What, precisely, is the age of psychiatry—the age of the 
establishment of the hegemony of psychiatric discourse […] Psychiatry derives 
according to Foucault, from the age of reason, the age that casts madness outside 
civilization and outside society by physically confining it, by locking it up within the 
walls of mental institutions […] Madness becomes the symptom of a culture, but the 
symptom is incorporated in a silenced body (and a silenced soul) whose suffering 
cannot say itself. (2003: 3)  
This psychiatric way of thinking the relation between silence and language is the 
most interesting one for this thesis. For Grande’s work represents a case study of it. While 
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the literary issue of inexpressibility with regard to the Spanish poetry of the second half 
of the twentieth century was mainly incarnated in the poetics of silence, on the one hand, 
and in the discussion about social/culturalist poetry, on the other, the “psychiatric” silence 
in Grande’s work instantiates a new perspective on the Spanish crisis of language. Silence 
is also madness, “since the phenomenon of madness, being in its essence silence, cannot 
be rendered, said through logos” (Felman 2003: 46). This new vision of an “old” 
problematic has not received enough attention by Spanish criticism of poetry.  Yet the 
supposely inexpressiveness of language transcends “the literary” or, rather, it 
reformulates it so as to give us a view of the “literary thing” as something far more 
complex and with ramifications in broader cultural discourses. Ultimately, this thesis 
seeks to decipher such a crisis of the word in its relation to the psychiatric aspects of 
Grande’s work.  
In the following two sections I set out to discuss the crisis of the word and to revisit 
the Spanish poetics of silence. I will show how this concept of poetry and of poetry 
criticism implicit in the poetics of silence is of very limited value when interpretation of a 
psychoanalytic dimension of silence is needed (the psychic aspect of silence is often 
found in poetry, but it is also overwhelmingly overlooked by critics). Highlighting the 
deficiencies that underpin the poetics of silence’s theoretical grounds is necessary, in 
order to show the differences with respect to my own vantage point. Finally, I will deal 
with the implications of the crisis and how it degraded the view poets held of memory. 
The crisis of the word entails the generalized conviction that language could not 
express reality. This premise was taken to a dubious extreme by the creation of what was 
to be known as the “poética del silencio”. By the latter it was meant not only that 
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language points to silence, void and nothingness; it was also seen as a desirable end to be 
pursued. For many poets of the 1950s and 1960s, reality named by language becomes 
mere illusion. “Simulacro” is a crucial word to understand their attitude toward anything 
language is supposed to allude to. Let me illustrate this with a few examples. José 
Antonio Muñoz Rojas is a Spanish poet of the 1960s. In his “Paso de Dios” he writes:  
 Esto es largo y oscuro. 
 La palabra no sirve. La palabra se quiebra. 
 A veces te balbuce la lengua y queda todo 
 en silencio y tiniebla. (cited in Barón Palma 1996: 62) 
 Similarly, Francisco Brines poeticizes the impossibility of speech in “El porqué de 
las palabras”: 
No tuve amor a las palabras; 
[…] 
Así uní a las palabras para quemar la noche,  
hacer un falso día hermoso […] 
No tuve amor a las palabras, 
¿Cómo tener amor a vagos signos […] 
Las palabras separan de las cosas 
la luz que cae en ellas y la cáscara extinta […] 
Todos son gestos, muertes, son residuos. (1984: 204-205; my emphasis)  
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The words in italics are the ones that seem to show most effectively this modern 
critique of language. Words have turned into empty husks. They are “false”, “vague 
signs”, mere “gestures”, that is, external and superficial signs, unable to access the reality 
of the objects or concepts they seek to name. For Brines, words are, indeed, dead.41 This 
conception of the linguistic sign refers us to a Saussurean vision of language as an 
abstract code or system, as opposed to an idea of language as utterance, for which the 
sign is “alive” in the natural pluriaccentuation of the users of language, according to the 
Russian critic Mijail Bakhtin. Saussure’s arbitrariness principle lurks in this poem. That 
the linguistic sign is arbitrary—fundamental to Saussure’s linguistics—seems the premise 
that lie behind the following lines: 
[Las palabras] no supieron separar la lágrima o la risa,  
[…] 
y valieron igual sonrisa, indiferencia.  
Todos son gestos, muertes, son residuos. (1984: 205) 
                                                 
41 This view of language is proper to times of profound historical crisis, where the very same 
concept of civilization drowns, times which would require even more confidence and reliance on 
language. Note how Arthur Adamov’s words are similar to Brines’: “Worn, threadbare, filed 
down, words have become the carcass of words, phantom words” (cited in Steiner 1982: 52). 
However, Adamov was writing “during the political crisis of the 1938” and when war came, and 
what he asked himself was “whether the thought of being a writer was not an untimely joke, 
whether the writer would ever again, in European civilization, have a living, humane idiom with 
which to work” (Steiner 1982: 51), which is radically different from a pointless criticism of 
language. I draw this parallel because, although there were reasons to be critical of Spanish 
language’s contamination under the dictatorship, what it can nevertheless be objected to is the 
listlessness with which these questions have been avoided by criticism. 
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It is also worth reproducing Chilean poet Enrique Lihn’s poem “La realidad no es 
verbal” in its entirety, for it contains all the elements encompassing the critique of 
language, demonstrating that the latter is a phenomenon beyond geographical barriers:  
Hablar cansa: es indecible lo que es 
Como se sabe: la realidad no es verbal 
(cansa el cansancio de decir esto mismo) 
De las palabras se retira el ser 
como de la crecida inminente del río 
los animales que, realmente, lo saben 
a diferencia de los orilleros humanos 
Somos las víctimas de una falsa ciencia 
los practicantes de una superstición: 
la palabra: este río a cuya orilla 
como el famoso camarón nos dormimos 
virtualmente ahogados en la nada torrencial 
Incapaces, incluso, de saber qué corriente 
y hacia dónde nos lleva 
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si todavía cabe pensar en un sujeto 
el verbo ir y como complemento 
un lugar que no hay –aunque se diga– 
en el adverbio donde y el hacia qué denota 
en el hablar de nada (siempre se habla de nada) 
-lo dice la gramática- la dirección del movimiento 
reducido, también, a un simulacro. 
Tú y yo hablamos del amor. (1997: 20) 
What Lihn objects to in language is precisely its lack of objectivity. Language is a 
“false science”, he asserts, mere superstition. Language cannot claim to achieve any 
knowledge of “reality”, for linguistic elaborations are feigned appearances. Words are 
incapable of telling anything about the self (“de las palabras se retira el ser/ como de la 
crecida inminente del río/ los animales”). Lihn thus sees language as simulacrum and 
superstition.  
There are countless examples of this modern critique of language. However, as the 
poet Luis García Montero points out: “detrás de las críticas a las imposibilidades de la 
representación o del lenguaje late el ilusionado deseo de otorgarle a la realidad una 
existencia transcendente” (1993: 163). He, furthermore, argues:  
La destrucción de un simulacro no comporta la llegada a un paraíso anterior sino una 
extensión plana donde construir otro simulacro […] Reconocer que vivimos en un 
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simulacro debe significar que tenemos el derecho a construir el simulacro que más nos 
convenga. (1993: 164) 
What the critique of language implies is a crisis of realism, a breach in the previous 
confidence in the representational and mimetic power of language. According to Lanz, 
Gil de Biedma is the Spanish poet to have embodied this modern Spanish crisis of 
realism. On the topic of “reality” in relation to the poetry of Jaime Gil de Biedma, Lanz 
states: 
La generación del cincuenta […] nace con una clara conciencia realista […] Pero, a lo 
largo de los años, los poetas de aquella generación se van dando cuenta de la 
imposibilidad de retratar la realidad tal cual es. (1990: 48) 
Gil de Biedma, as an initiator of this modern Spanish crisis of the word, “resulta una 
figura de referencia fundamental para los jóvenes de la generación poética de 1968” 
(Lanz 1990: 52). Eventually, this loss of confidence in language ends up in the poet’s 
utter negation of reality: “De la educación en el ejercicio de la irrealidad se derivará, de 
modo directo, el rechazo explícito de la realidad propiamente dicha” (Lanz 1990: 49). By 
“educación en el ejercicio de la irrealidad” is meant, on the one hand, Gil de Biedma’s 
increasing realization of his “false conscioussness”, owing to his experience of belonging 
to a bourgeois family and his reading of Marxist theory, to which he was introduced by 
the critic Castellet (Lanz 1990: 49). On the other hand, his education in the “unreal” has 
fundamentally to do with artistic imagination. (With respect to this, T. S. Eliot was to 
play an important role in Gil de Biedma’s poetic formation.)  
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The critique of language which led to the appraisal of the word as pointing to plain 
“unreality”, had also as a result, perhaps inevitably, a discrediting and even rejection of 
memory: 
Por tanto, a la desvirtuación en la percepción de la realidad que supone, en el caso de 
Gil de Biedma, su educación burguesa en el ejercicio de la irrealidad, hay que añadir un 
nuevo elemento perturbador, antes del paso al poema: la memoria. El poeta es 
consciente de la deformación que supone la memoria […] El pasado, así captado por la 
memoria, se percibe como un caos, fuente de duda y de irrealidad. (Lanz 1990: 49) 
I have cited Lanz at length because what is said in the passage above is opposed to 
Grande’s views of memory, as I will show in the section in which I explain his “theory” 
of memory and forgetting.42 It is not the mechanism of memory that distorts reality but, 
rather, the use of memory and the fact that it is sometimes governed by specific 
interests.43  
Biedma’s view of memory could have also been influenced by that of T.S. Eliot, 
given that Eliot was a referential figure for the Spanish poet (Barón de Palma: 1996). 
According to Campbell, what T. S. Eliot thought of memory was that it is 
“unregenerative, incoherent, arbitrary and banal” (2000: 99). Eliot’s vision of memory 
                                                 
42 A clarification is needed here about my use of the word “theory”. I am aware of the problems 
that the term presents. See, for instance, Culler (1997). Hence, the inverted commas intend to 
suggest that I employ the word to claim that Grande develops his own original set of ideas about 
the subject which make up a relatively coherent system structuring his work. 
43 Miguel Dalmau’s (2004) hypothesis on Gil de Biedma’s relationship with language is that it 
was “convenient” for the poet to claim that everything in language is unreal, for he was fearful of 
showing in his poetry his homosexuality. By maintaining that poetry is fiction the poet would 
have been saved from being a victim of homophobia. 
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appears to have been derived from his vision of poetic language. In the following passage 
he explains how he sees the poetic function of language: 
It is a function of poetry both to fix and make more conscious and precise emotions and 
feelings in which most people participate in their own experience and to draw within 
the orbit of feeling and sense what had existed only in thought. (Eliot 1993: 51)  
Thus T. S. Eliot argued that the function of poetry was to make experience “more 
conscious and precise”. Yet as his poem’s stanza shows below, he realised that language 
fails to do the task, as memory which he conceived of as “incoherent” and “arbitrary”, 
would fail too: 
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
Because one has only learnt to get the better words 
For the thing one no longer has to say. (2004: 182)  
 Eliot’s influence stretched throughout Spanish poetry of the twentieth century. His 
ascendancy over Luis Cernuda, for instance, is widely known.44 Similar to the discussion 
above about Gil de Biedma, it is plausible to argue that Eliot influenced Cernuda in his 
ideas on memory too. According to Michael Ugarte, for Cernuda, “memory fills the 
vacuum of oblivion with imperfect copies in writing of what was once real” (1986: 333). 
It is said that Cernuda was as obsessed with precision and accuracy as was his “master”. 
                                                 
44 For further information on T.S. Eliot’s influence on Luis Cernuda and the Spanish lyrics of the 
time, see Barón Palma (1996). 
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When asked what he thought of Eliot, he answered: “es sin duda el más grande de todos 
[…] ¡Qué exactitud y qué precisión en el concepto!” (Barón Palma 1996: 40). 
That memory is a mechanism incapable of precision and accuracy, incapable of 
delivering copies, became a generalized view in the poetry of Spanish poets of the 
postwar generations.45 Gómez Toré, the author of a study on memory in the work of 
Brines, concludes that: “nuestro viaje por las imágenes de la memoria y de la escritura 
nos ha ofrecido un saldo más negativo que positivo” (2002: 283). According to the thesis 
of Pérez Parejo (2002), what Toré writes of Brines’ treatment of memory can be perfectly 
applied to poetry written in the postwar. Yet, arguably, this negative view of memory 
probably drew on assumptions that relate memory with a certain conception of realism. In 
fact, realism was a dominant current in Spanish poetry until the middle sixties, when a 
crisis in this conception of art occurred. Those who began to criticize realism called 
attention to the limits of language and the impossibility of memory to access the reality of 
the past. That is, they somehow yielded to the critique of language. As Barón Palma 
observes, this literary trend, which can be encompassed in the poetical phenomenon 
                                                 
45 See the work of Ramón Pérez (2002: 417-464). In it, Pérez analyses and shows well what he 
calls “la desconfianza en la actividad de la memoria”. He also supports the view that such 
“desconfianza” stems from certain literary ideas and mentions T.S. Eliot. Pérez draws on 
Derrida’s postulates, among other thinkers, in his search for philosophical support to the crisis of 
the word. Besides, Ilie (1980), when reflecting on “inner exile”, distinguishes between two 
attitudes toward memory; that of the poets who suffered territorial exile is characterised by 
reliability and trust, whilst inner exiled writers treated memory with suspicion and doubt. He also 
suggests that although the view of memory shared by inner exiled poets was generally negative, 
the treatment of memory by some of them was more akin to the poets of the territorial exile, as is 
precisely the case of Grande. What Ilie’s arguments imply then is that the ideas that the poets held 
on memory were to do with literary currents but, also, with historical circumstances.  
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called “culturalismo”, rested upon T.S. Eliot’s ideas on language to support the crisis of 
confidence in the word.46  
However, what lies behind critiques of language and memory is a naïve vision of 
realism as “copy” rather than “construction”. Against this assumption it can be argued 
that memory is both a construct and a creative mechanism to produce psychological and 
cultural constructs. Furthermore, the crisis of the word underpins the dissociation of 
memory and language and even encourages the disavowal of memory. If we undermine 
language and memory, both the concept of the self and the notion of culture are 
significantly diminished as a result. However, without linguistic elaborations of memory 
it is difficult to see how fashioning the self would be possible or how any idea of culture 
could be configured .47 Words are neither innocent nor neutral; they are embedded within 
memory, which is usually a history of struggle, of different voices seeking to impose their 
own nuances and accentuations (this is the social aspect of memory), according to 
Bakhtin and Voloshinov (1977: 44). Thus memory is largely configured linguistically and 
language contains the history of our culture.  
                                                 
46 Barón Palma (1996: 61-62) refers particularly to Jaime Gil de Biedma, who had an enormous 
influence on the poets that undertook a linguistic renovation of the Spanish lyrics, and, also, to the 
ones related to Cántico, a literary publication. Cántico welcomed the “revolution of language” 
carried out by T.S. Eliot, and defended a vision of poetry akin to the English poet. José Lanz 
(2000: 472-473) reminds us that the controversy that divided the “culturalistas” and “realistas” 
was above all a discussion on the ability of language to express. In relation to this, Barón Palma 
writes, “Gil de Biedma entra en la polémica con ayuda de las citas de Eliot” (1996: 76). The 
influence on Biedma of The poetry of experience by Langbaum is not to be underestimated either. 
See Carme Riera (1998). About the literary interests and influences of Biedma and what has been 
called “la escuela de Barcelona”, Riera states: “la lírica castellana les interesa menos, aunque 
salen diversos maestros […] [Cernuda] que la inglesa (Eliot, Auden, Spencer…)” (1998: 8). 
47 According to Middleton and Wood, “it is now widely believed that memory is the foundation of 
personal identity, and that anything that damages it will threaten the self, a belief that has become 
of central importance to the hegemonic mode of poetry, the autobiographic lyric” (2000: 92-93). 
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That this one-sided negativism toward memory was often readily displayed 
without enough reflection on the subject is something that the case of T.S. Eliot proves. 
Whilst Eliot argues against memory, a contemporary of his, the French philosopher Henri 
Bergson, whose interest and dedication to the study of memory overwhelmingly exceeds 
Eliot’s, declared that “memories constitute the human soul and thereby transfigure the 
quotidian self” (Campbell 2000: 99). T.S. Eliot, in fact, heaped criticism on Bergson’s 
ideas on memory. His “Rhapsody on a windy night” has been considered a veiled 
criticism of the Bergsonian ideal –pure memory. For instance, Gertrude Patterson writes: 
“Clearly, 'memory' in this poem only serves to make the present more sordid, more 
meaningless; this is the only 'illumination' which it can offer: it can urge the observer to 
no meaningful activity since its contents are useless to him” (1991: 475). 
Bergson, however, placed more confidence in memory and carefully studied the 
phenomenon, and did not conceive of memory as defective. Contemporary research 
utterly denies that the mechanisms of “normal” memory, that is, standard memory 
mechanisms, are faulty.  
It was Bergson who first established a link that contemporary research has come to 
demonstrate: the inextricable connection between memory and identity. He writes:  
[…] our character, always present in all our decisions, is indeed the actual synthesis of 
all our past status. […] our previous psychical life exists for us even more than the 
external world, of which we never perceive more than a very small part, whereas, on 
the contrary, we use the whole of our lived experience. (1988: 146) 
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Bergson also disputes the idea that memories are supposed to be always capricious 
by arguing that memory’s function is adaptive, justifying the dialectics of memory and 
forgetting as well as the “intelligence” of memory: 
[…] our former perceptions, […] seem to us to have completely disappeared or to 
appear again only at the bidding of their caprice. But this semblance of complete 
destruction or of capricious revival is due merely to the fact that actual consciousness 
accepts at each moment the useful and rejects in the same breath the superfluous. 
(1988: 146) 
By the same token, the most authoritative Spanish expert on memory, Ruiz-Vargas, 
explains: 
La memoria no es un guardián neutral del pasado. La memoria es un sistema dinámico 
que recoge, guarda, moldea, cambia, transforma y nos devuelve la realidad íntima y la 
realidad compartida tras ser destiladas en los interminables vericuetos del alambique de 
nuestra propia identidad. […] La memoria no es sólo la esencia de nuestra identidad 
personal sino también el alma y el motor de la cultura. (1997: 11) 
However, it would not be reasonable to explain away the issue of the generalized 
negative view of memory by virtue of its relation to the critique of language. The 
connection of the critique of language with depreciative connotations imposed on 
memory is remarkable, but it might not be the only explanation. There is yet another 
possible historical link. The state of amnesia to which the Franco regime condemned a 
great part of the country cannot be said to be the most appropriate environment for the 
flourishing and appreciation of memory. This politics of disremembering extended its 
  
77
tentacles beyond the dictatorship and crystallized in the transitional “Pacto de olvido”. 
Thus the Spanish transition to democracy is increasingly being seen as epitomizing 
amnesia, except that in this case it is voluntary amnesia. Artists in general might have had 
their own reasons for the erasure or loathing of memory. Gil de Biedma, for instance, 
came to despise his own social background—he was born to a well-off, bourgeois family. 
His poem “De vita beata” shows my point well: 
 En un viejo país ineficiente, 
algo así como España entre dos guerras 
civiles, en un pueblo junto al mar, 
poseer una casa y poca hacienda 
y memoria ninguna. No leer, 
no sufrir, no escribir, no pagar cuentas, 
y vivir como un noble arruinado 
entre las ruinas de mi inteligencia. (Gil de Biedma 2005: 185)  
Vilarós asks about this poem: “¿Qué ha pasado en España o qué le ha pasado al 
poeta que le ha determinado a cometer tal suicidio escritural, tal renuncia a la memoria?” 
(1998: 30). She answers this question within the question itself, rhetorically, by alluding 
to history: “reflejo a su vez de la renuncia y desencanto de toda una generación 
comprometida políticamente” (1998: 30). She adds: “Después de la experiencia de Franco 
no hay escapatoria, no hay una vita beata a la que podamos retirarnos a no ser que pase 
por la destrucción de la memoria” (1998: 30). 
  
78
 
2.5 Beyond the “social/culturalist” poetry debate 
 
Debicki has described the notion of “social poetry” in the following terms:  
Un «poema social», en el sentido más amplio del término: un texto que con su lenguaje, 
su tono y sus recursos capta la experiencia compleja de la vida del escritor español. 
(1989: 102) 
For Debicki social poetry is not in contradiction with a careful use of language. He 
considers that social poets such as Ángel González make an intelligent use of rhetorical 
devices and literary techniques, so that they are capable of expressing complex 
experiences through a masterful employment of language.  
On the whole, I agree with Debicki on this. However, criticism of the poetry written 
after the Civil War has often been reductively focused on this single debate and presented 
in dichotomic terms. It is difficult not to stumble upon the debate over social poetry when 
one reads literary criticism on Spanish post-Civil War poetry.48 Critics tend to argue 
about whether a specific poet belongs to the category of “social poetry”, or that of 
“culturalist poetry”. In this section I bring forward the limitations of this analytical 
approach which call into question its validity as a predominant method of poetry 
criticism. Firstly, it is problematic to divide poets into different groups on the grounds of 
vague criteria that are not even shared by all critics. Secondly, poets regarded as “social” 
                                                 
48 For an exhaustive account of the social/culturalist debate, see Lanz (2000). 
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such as González seem to have lost their faith in words at some point or another. In 
“Preámbulo a un silencio” from Tratado de urbanismo, González states: “uno tiene 
conciencia/ de la inutilidad de todas las palabras” (1967: 44). Does this lack of confidence 
in words make González a culturalist? Adding to this confusion, Grande, who is 
considered to be another social poet, has nowadays been referred to as a culturalist.49  
The social and culturalist discourses need not necessarily enter into conflict, as they 
often do, but can rather be seen as complementing each other. One-sided readings would 
always pose some problems. For instance, what “social poets”, along with their “social 
critics”, overlooked was precisely the constructive dimension of language, that is, its 
ability to create anew. They departed from a view of language that was rather poor. Social 
poets tended to regard language as a conduit through which extra-linguistic “realities” 
that lay “outside” language were to be conveyed. One of the premises assumed by social 
poetry is that there was a previously defined content which the poem served to 
communicate.50 However, sometimes the form carries with it the message.  
Culturalist poets, on their part, went as far as suggesting that language did not refer 
to anything other than to itself. The social poets were very clear about attaching purposes 
to poetry, whereas the non-social poets tended to dismiss the considerable impact of 
history on art. Then there were the questions as to the fictionality of language. From the 
perspective of literary renderings of trauma, such a question is relatively relevant, as 
                                                 
49 Rico (1998) defends the thesis that Blanco spirituals is a culturalist work.   
50 See Bousoño’s thesis (1956) on the communicability of poetry. 
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trauma tells the story of the unnameable.51 Something which is unknown cannot be said 
to be fictional or true, although the experience of trauma is, evidently, “real”. So, a self-
sufficient vision of language underestimates the role it plays in elaborating positions of 
the self. 
Even when the topic of discussion is memory, Spanish critics find it difficult not to 
use the notion of social poetry as a critical category. For instance, Juan Miguel López 
Merino, in a recent article on the subject of “historical memory” in the poetry of the 
1950s, writes about the poets who: “han mantenido un pie –o ambos– en lo «ético» y en 
«lo social», requisitos sine qua non para escribir desde una conciencia histórica que no 
haga caso omiso de la memoria y el dolor colectivos” (2008: 269).  
Is an ethically expressed concern about social issues a condition sine qua non to be 
able to talk about memory in poetry? I claim it is not. Although memory often tends to be 
confused with the fictional writing of past events, and identified with an ethical stance, 
memory in literature goes beyond the imprecise notion of “historical memory”. Memory 
does not necessarily imply a moral position nor does it always “use” history (biographical 
or collective) as its theme. It is neither a theme nor has to be concerned par force with a 
writer’s political views, as many critics would have us believe. The temporal dimension 
of individuals manifests itself in ways that go beyond these two premises.  
Lapuerta Amigo (1994), in her doctoral thesis on the poetry of Grande, makes this 
debatable association between memory and a kind of poetry that reflects history as a 
                                                 
51 From a Lacanian point of view, the unnameable is the Real, that to which we cannot have 
access. The Real is the transhistorical trauma inherent to the self. To question the 
psychoanalytical “Real” in terms of fictionality seems problematic. 
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theme. Apart from the concept of social poetry, she mentions other distinctions that have 
been made with regard to Spanish poetry of the second half of the twentieth century, 
namely the categories of “political poetry” and “civil poetry”. However, classifications 
into well-defined compartments, far from facilitating comprehension, tend to limit it. I 
claim that poetry should speak for itself, freed from categories that stifle its being alive 
and open to interpretation in its encounter with the reader. When criticism is reduced to a 
pre-determined type of reading, its task can be compared to the dissection of a dead 
corpse. My argument is that we should be using alternative analytical approaches in 
which patterns of criticism are not established a priori. The approach of social poetry has 
given its most and, arguably, is no longer fully productive. 
The perspective of trauma represents an alternative way of looking at poetry, outside 
the frame of the social/culturalist debate, beyond stereotypes and common places. 
Reading trauma in a text has more to do with texture than with anything else. Trauma is 
concerned with the moulding of language into hitherto unformed “experiences”. It is an 
intricate phenomenon which manifests itself in language’s structure and in its limits to 
express itself fully. It partly precedes language, but it needs language to register the 
linguistic fracture. The focus of trauma draws on a view of art that emphasizes the 
structure of language, without being strictly formalist. For reading trauma also consists in 
acknowledging that the poet is constructing his own experiences in and through the poem, 
and in so doing he becomes a witness of an event he never quite owned.  
The kind of knowledge that may be achieved through writing trauma is not strictly 
speaking “social” or “historical”. It differs from the rational cognitive way of thinking. 
The poet becomes both an active agent and a receiver of a special kind of knowledge. In 
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the best of cases, traumatic forms of narrative create anew the meaning or meanings of 
events whose significance is nevertheless only partly available. In the production of the 
poem, a process is set in motion whereby integration into consciousness of the 
experience-to-be takes place, opening up a possibility for healing. Ultimately, the creation 
of poetry itself alleviates the hitherto cognitively unresolved emotional conflict. However, 
there will always be the question whether or not re-living the trauma through writing 
paradoxically contributes to maintaining the wound.  
The importance of reading trauma, thus, resides in the necessity of identifying the 
uniqueness of the survivor’s experience. The truth of that experience lies at the heart of 
the meaning the poet struggles to communicate, a pursuit partly doomed to fail.  
Trauma, ignored as an approach in the criticism of the Spanish poetry of the post-
Civil War—with a few exceptions, among which the work of Christine Arkinstall stands 
out—rethinks the complex and subtle relations between history and the memory of the 
poet. History impacts on the poet in ways which are difficult to convey. What is 
significant about the traumatic experience is precisely the difficulty of its 
communicability, given that the poet has not fully come to terms with a belated story. 
This is not to say that poetry does not communicate, as those critical of social poetry were 
eager to assume. The singularity and seeming incommunicability of the poem does not 
prevent us from finding iterations, repetitive patterns that open the poem to 
understanding. According to Ulrich Baer: 
Without opening itself [the poem] to understanding, the very claim for singularity 
would remain unnoticed. The “absolute poem”, as Celan emphasizes, which would be 
the poem that is truly singular, “das absolute Gedicht—nein, das gibt es gewiss nicht, 
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das kann es nicht geben! [the absolute poem—no, it certainly does not exist, it cannot 
exist”]. (2000: 11) 
But, in order to signify, a work has first to be made. The significations or emotions 
associated with it only occur at the level of reading: 
It is the reader who reads the sense, it is the reader who grants or recognizes in an 
object, place or event a certain possible readability; it is the reader who must attribute 
meaning to a system of signs, and then decipher it. (Manguel 1997: 7) 
History is only knowable in poetry through particular assimilations of itself 
manifested in the poem. The internalization of time in the poem takes place in ways that 
are beyond will. The impact of History on the poet is difficult to predict. Absence of a 
clear reference does not exclude its influence either. As Ilie observes, “political 
oppression encourages nonreferential writing” (1985: 227).  
Furthermore, such an impact must necessarily incorporate terms of conflict. If conflict 
is not present, the poem may become a container for propaganda. The dialectics of this 
tension between the individual and the social occurs at the level of individualized 
assimilation of history. Criticism then results from what is implicit in the conflicting 
relation of the poet with history, which is readable in a crisis manifested in language.  
Grande’s poetry is not critical only by disposition, as stated by Manuel Rico (1998). 
Disposition somehow implies will and deliberation. Some social poetry might be 
deliberately critical, but the relationship between history and poetry cannot be reduced to 
mere will. There are aspects to such a relationship that do not include deliberate 
intentions. 
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 It is in this sense that interpretations inscribed within the framework of “social 
poetry” are bound to set aside much of the significance of Grande’s poetry. In fact, critics 
of Grande make homogenising readings of his work, which they overtly regard as a 
“social work” (see my bibliography on Grande’s work). However, contrary to this view, 
the relation of Grande’s poetry to history can neither be envisaged as explicitly alluding 
to historical and cultural referents, nor as transmitting certain preconceived ideologies. 
Rico (1998) writes of Grande’s work as expressing a “cosmovisión de una época” 
through the poem. And yet this aspect of the relationship between poetry and history 
might be seen rather as a troubled and problematic interiorization of history. Such 
assimilation takes place in unpredictable forms, which are often far from apparent.  
Therefore, as opposed to what the non-social poets tended to think, there is indeed 
an influence of history upon poetry, but this influence is to be seen as displaced in the 
poet in a manner a poet cannot foresee. Gamoneda refers to the relationship between 
“hechos interiorizados” and his poetry and calls attention to the fact that they are 
interiorized, not internal, which is a pertinent distinction: 
Mi poesía, aun siendo prioritariamente autorreferente, adquiere su completo sentido 
cuando comporta un discurso inseparable de hechos interiorizados (he dicho 
interiorizados”, no “interiores”) que han proporcionado cuerpo y carácter a mi vida.52 
(cited in Casado 2004: 577) 
                                                 
52 Casado comments on Gamoneda’s vision of his poetry: “como se ve, la perífrasis no oculta el 
difícil contrapeso entre la autonomía de la escritura y su unión inseparable con los hechos de la 
vida” (2004: 577; his emphasis). 
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Cited by Jean Starobinski, for Pierre Jan Jouve historical time is compressed at the 
level of the personal experience: “contrazione del tempo storico nel tempo personale”. 
Starobinski observes that genunine poetry assimilates history:  
In caso di catastrofe, occorre che avvenga ciò che Pierre Jean Jouve chiama, a proposito 
di Rimbaud, 'contrazione del tempo storico nel tempo personale' [...] la responsabilitá 
del poeta è piuttosto di conferire all’evento storico la qualità di evento interiore, di 
esprimerlo nella lingua lirica del sentimento piuttosto che in quella del giudizio e 
dell’esortazione [...] La vera poesia interiorizza la storia. (cited in Cortellessa 2006: 46) 
This has been also observed by Middleton and Woods a propos of Eavan Boland, 
whom they quote as saying that “if a poet does not tell the truth about time, his or her 
work will not survive it” (cited in 2000: 188). But this “truth”, as Ulrich Baer observes, is 
one that has to do with interiorized time: “poetry exposes a truth not bound by history but 
by the lived experience of time” (2000: 23). Middleton and Woods also claim that 
“personal memories of loss are likely to be the best form in which tribute to the traumatic 
histories of the public past should be paid” (2000: 192). Yet the veracity of a poet’s 
interiorized time is a private truth that, nevertheless, can paradoxically presuppose more 
fidelity to history than mere factual accuracy. Here we engage with a conception of time 
as lived experience, just as Ricoeur understood it. He saw time as mediated through 
narrative. It means that time is not apprehensible through mere facts. Facts and events on 
their own do not account for the past. It is, on the contrary, their mise en récit that turns 
them into historical knowledge.  
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Even if trauma is lived individually, it may originate in collective experiences. In 
Blanco spirituals, as opposed to Las piedras, we find the poetic voice reflecting, enacting 
and working through collective trauma. And it is here that the concept of social poetry 
can prove more useful. For what the social poets were trying to achieve is a response to 
historical circumstances of the collective. The critique that may be levelled at them is 
their conviction that this response could be pre-determined, that is, prior to the moment 
the poem is being written. Conversely, those who opposed social poetry and centered 
their efforts on a self-referential writing failed to see that: 
Graphocentrism accomplishes through its freedom from referentiality what 
dictatorships most desire: to deflect critical attention from matters historical, social, 
moral and personal. (Ilie 1985: 246) 
 
2.6 The Spanish poetics of silence revisited  
 
The relationship between silence and poetry has been interpreted and approached 
by Grande’s contemporaries in ways distinctive from Grande’s view of silence. This 
thesis defends the idea that the concept of silence represents both a sociological 
phenomenon and a psychological trait specific to the particular time of the history of 
Spain, which has been assimilated into poetry in dissimilar ways. Yet the topic of poetic 
silence has not been fully explored from this particular perspective and within the context 
of that historical time. In order to address it, one needs to reconsider in the first place the 
fundamental phenomenon that has cast a shadow over other ways of understanding the 
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relationship between poetry and silence—the so-called “poética del silencio” (hereafter 
called the poetics of silence). José Ángel Valente was, in the Spanish case and for the 
second half of the twentieth century, the poet to whom the beginning and the 
development of a discourse upon the relation of literature and muteness has been mostly 
attributed.  
Although silence in the work of Valente can be studied as a literary phenomenon 
or even considered as an aspect of his craft, it can also be put into perspective, compared 
with how silence manifests itself in the work of other poets, and, above all, valued in the 
context of what silence represents for the literature produced in the light of concrete 
historical circumstances. Ultimately, the question of silence as well as its relation to 
poetry is subject to criticism and it can be perfectly qualified and nuanced, especially in 
relation to a period whose “desmemoria” is being currently questioned in many academic 
works.53 I shall analyze now what Valente’s poetics of silence entails from the 
perspective of the imposed political and sociological silence upon which Ruiz-Vargas 
commented before. 
Relevant to the question of silence is its close association with memory’s 
underestimation. Where language is minimal or nonexistent, memory is also inhibited. In 
the poem “Criptomemorias” from the collection Interior con figuras, José Ángel Valente 
writes: 
Debiéramos tal vez […]  
borrar de nuestros rostros en el álbum materno 
                                                 
53 See, for instance, Álvarez Fernández (2007).  
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toda noticia de nosotros mismos.[…] 
O por toda memoria, […] 
   Nada. 
De ser posible, nada. (1985: 57) 
 I would like to remark that in Valente’s work the discrediting of memory, when 
not an altogether relinquishing of it, frequently operates as veiled criticism of an imposed 
official memory, for memory is connected with different ideological layers that function 
as masks. What Valente seems to be putting forward is also a desperate response to the 
absurd lack of freedom under Francoism. In other words, the poet, being deprived of his 
personal use of memory, a personal view on things, is forced to adopt a unifying 
discourse. In the face of it, to opt for silence even appears as the reasonable choice, as 
Juan Ramón Jiménez put it: “el poeta, en puridad, no debiera escribir, puesto que su 
mundo, lo inefable, le condena al silencio” (cited in Mas 1986: 27).   
In Poemas a Lázaro, allegedly Valente’s most socially minded work, we find lines 
expressing the poetic voice’s decisiveness to renounce its own memory for the benefit of 
collective remembering, which is in accordance with the tenets of social poetry:  
Mi historia ha de ser olvidada 
mezclada en la suma total 
que la hará verdadera. (1981: 46) 
            Leaving aside the social orientation of this work, for Valente silence represents a 
constant search. But his was a “programa estético” (Bonald 2001: 86), in which his quest 
for supposedly “genuine essences” somehow left out the links of silence and history. This 
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is a choice the poet was entitled to make. But silence is also embedded in history. There 
are more sides to the relationship between poetry and silence than the one represented by 
the work of Valente.54 In the light of what silence represented sociologically in Spain, it 
can be argued that it has enjoyed a reputation that it did not deserve. It is subject to 
criticism on several fronts. The poetics of silence became a sort of conceptualization of 
poetry with a first clear consequence that contradicts its initial intentions: to set poetry 
free of ideological burdens. Poesía del silencio’s implicit criticism of the so-called 
“poesía social” is problematized by the fact the poetics of silence turned into a sort of 
poetry-making model through its deliberate association of creation with certain pre-
determined criteria. Hence the poetic creation of silence incurred in what it purportedly 
attempted to avoid, the use of tenets guiding the artistic process.  
However, what remains of the influence of “poética del silencio” seems to be an 
idea of poetic creation as purification, or poetry understood from a minimalist approach. 
María José Flores understands Valente’s “poética del silencio” as a rhetorical technique 
leading to the elimination of “unnecessary” elements in the poem, as in the “poesía pura” 
of Juan Ramón Jiménez.55 José Manuel Caballero Bonald agrees with Flores, but he is 
more critical of the poetics of silence: 
Lo de la “poética del silencio” me suena ya un poco a lo de la “pintura invisible” de 
Rothko, esa entelequia consistente en la eliminación de todos los obstáculos expresivos 
                                                 
54 A different approach is that of Túa Blesa (1998), which is concerned with the textualization of 
silence in the work of poets such as José-Miguel Ullán. Blesa makes it clear that his exploration 
of silence shies away from a “mystical” perspective (an indirect reference to Valente’s “poética 
del silencio”). 
55 In conversation with the poet and Professor of Spanish Literature at Università dell’Aquila, 
Italy. 
  
90
que impidan llegar a la “esencia de lo esencial”. De ahí a la impotencia creadora no hay 
más distancia que un cuadro vacío o un poema en blanco. Qué patológica peligrosidad 
la del pensamiento artístico que supera con mucho a su canalización o sólo consiste en 
una inoperante concordancia entre el yo del escritor y el sujeto de su obra. (2001: 86)  
In the passage above Caballero Bonald establishes clearly two things. First, that the 
poetics of silence implies the erasure of expressive remora hindering expression of the 
essential. This, as Flores also observes, is a characteristic of the “poesía pura” of Juan 
Ramón Jiménez. Second, he criticizes the excessive thinking that precedes the creation of 
the poem. Such a trait can be found in realist poetry as much as in non-mimetic poetry, as 
the poetics of silence, according to him, demonstrates.  
Hence Valente’s belief that the absolute principle of all creation is the creation of 
nothingness can be said to be problematic: “La creación de la nada es el principio 
absoluto de toda creación” (2004: 208). A poet may deliberately seek out the creation of 
silence by reenacting its void through techniques such as fragmentation or minimalism or 
obscure symbolism. But these techniques, by the very fact of their employment, are 
already pointing to the existence of a previous aim or purpose (the creation of nothingness 
is in itself a purpose and it is not empty of ideological value, since it might be accused of 
being complicit with the political imposition of silence).56 Conversely, creation of silence 
may be a way of avoiding complicity. This happens, for instance, in film criticism. It is 
                                                 
56 For Engelson Marson, Valente deliberately creates this confusion by using “un lenguaje duro e 
hiriente, lleno de adjetivaciones violentas y símbolos de difícil captación, para que el lector 
reaccione, piense y, últimamente, alcance a conocer las realidades esenciales de una existencia 
común” (1992: 119). Yet it is difficult to see how a language difficult to grasp could result in a 
better understanding of our shared existence and not lead to a deeper cognitive darkness.  
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frequent to comment on cinematic techniques that call attention to themselves to produce 
an effect, namely, to subvert an established order, or to reverse a stereotype or a common 
place, to dismantle, perhaps, our unquestioned ways of seeing. Another way of seeing 
silence is through the lenses of conflict. For instance, Jean Franco has noted Vallejo’s 
constant calling attention to language through the use of various techniques, yet, as the 
critic recognizes in her prologue “There was […] a real conflict of values between Vallejo 
as a poet and the society in which he lived, a conflict sublimated into literature” (1976: 
15). It is intelligible that this conflict was enacted and lived out in Vallejo’s poetry, yet in 
this case we have the use of a technique with an aim that goes beyond the use of silence 
for the sake of creating more silence. 
Other poets talk about silence and poetry in a more nuanced way. Jean-Baptiste Para 
sees the creation of poetry as coming from a suffering silence (“dolente mutismo”). And 
yet the mission of poetry would consist in finding a way out of silence, as he explains: 
Colui che avverte la propria irrilevanza è preparato meglio di ogni altro a tentare 
l’impresa del poema. Convertirà il proprio dolente mutismo in un silenzio in cui saprà 
incarnarsi la parola. Una parola dove dietro ogni vocabolo è l’intero linguaggio che 
tenta una sortita. Perché il poema è una venuta al mondo.  […] Ma se il poema è nascita 
al mondo, esso è anche nascita del mondo. (2007: 35) 
For Para, poetry attempts to deal with the unknown, since poetry is “un modo di 
intentare una scomessa con l’ignoto” (2007: 35). However, one thing is to admit to the 
unknown, to acknowledge its inevitable presence in the form of silence, which involves 
pain as Para observed above, and an altogether different matter is to consider art as a 
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means for perpetuating silence. In order words, whilst for Para silence is already there, 
without us intervening, Valente seems to be indulging in it. For Para, silence is a constant 
struggle. Valente sees it with complacency: “Lo importante es mirar y dejar en libertad la 
mirada. Yo vería hoy la poesía como un inconocimiento” (cited in García 2001: 97). 
“Inconocimiento” may be the thrust behind the making of poetry, but the latter does not 
necessarily have as an end the further creation of “inconocimiento”, that is, more than the 
one already lurking in it par force. This is how Antonio Domínguez Rey sees Valente’s 
search for silence:  
Valente nos abre el resquicio de lo oculto indeterminado […] De hecho toda poesía 
válida tiende a la estructuración simbólica de sus ejes dinámicos. Se aboca a lo Otro 
inmanente, la pantalla proyectiva de las conformaciones no lógicas manipuladas por un 
grado de conciencia vigilante. El contenido va en busca de su fuente. (1992: 141) 
The unconscious is indeed situated in the realm of the transhistorical. But if we are 
to believe the author of the passage above about what Valente’s poetry implies, the 
argument taken a priori contains its own invalidation. A vigilant conscience would, 
opening up the unconscious’s process, either exist on an unconscious level or not exist at 
all. Furthermore, this quotation passes judgment on what poetry should be (“toda poesía 
válida”), conflating the contingent with the necessary and in so doing it forecloses a 
complex phenomenon, poetry, that cannot be explained away so easily. 
Grande qualifies this aim of creation as supreme illiteracy and as a rapid dismissal of 
the raison d’être of language. He argues: 
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Ahora, los más apresurados identifican esa experiencia de supremo analfabetismo, de 
clamorosa e impúdica ignorancia, con la conciencia de la muerte y con un nuevo orden 
donde reina la nada. Pero los más humildes, muy trabajosamente, muy lentamente, 
corazón, muy despacio, inician, con cuidado conmovedor, la reconquista del lenguaje. 
(1996: 188) 
Silence can be said to be partially constitutive of human nature and the reason for a 
constant search for ways to replace it. However, Grande does not employ rhetorical 
devices to produce silence deliberately. It is palpable throughout his work by the poetic 
voice’s painful self-questioning about the origin of silence. The painstaking effort he puts 
into deciphering the reason behind the inaccessibility of silence is remarkable, as is his 
overwhelmingly frequent inability to make light out of silencing experiences. But this 
latter kind of silence is a traumatic one, very different from the sort of silence which 
Valente attempted to conquer. Valente advocated that poetry be carried to “punto cero”, 
his poetry not only had “punto cero” as a “starting point”; his poetry was, moreover, a 
“quest for punto cero” (García 2001: 101).57 Thus silence appears to be for Valente a 
deliberate aim, a thoroughly thought-out poetic project.    
However, we need to ask about different understandings of the relation between 
poetry and silence. And such a question touches the core of what literature is. Literature 
not only deals with structural absence, which is central to it, but, more precisely, it 
                                                 
57 Irrespective of whether we understand the quest for “punto cero” as that utopian place of 
language in which language disappears or as “la infinita disponibilidad del lenguaje” (Mas 1992: 
309), we need to bear in mind when talking about language what Emmanuel Levinas warns about 
the “absurdity” and “isolation” that lies in “countless significations” (2003: 24). 
 
  
94
accounts for the distinct ways in which the silence that is inherent in historical losses 
might be confronted. To clarify this point let me put forward a statement by Antonio 
Gamoneda on the nature of poetry:  
La poesía no es literatura […] La literatura está en la ficción, que puede ser 
maravillosa, pero la poesía es una realidad en sí misma. La poesía no es literatura. 
Contiene nuestros goces y nuestros sufrimientos, y esa relación con la existencia le da 
un carácter que va más allá de los géneros. Por eso también hay poetas literatos y 
novelistas poetas. (2007: 52)  
Gamoneda’s statement raises questions about the way we look at and talk about 
poetry. Valente’s self-awareness of his poetic process might be more connected with the 
task of criticism than with creation itself.  It is not to be denied that creation can be 
connected to criticism, but creation does not take criticism as a pre-requisite. Sometimes, 
poetic creativity can be compromised and hindered by the pre-existence of an “end”, 
regardless of whether this end might be “literary” in contraposition to “political” or 
“social”. According to Deleuze, genuine literature is, more often than not, free from these 
pre-fixed conditioning elements that demonstrate too much self-awareness of the act of 
writing: 
To those who ask what literature is, Virginia Woolf responds: To whom are you 
speaking of writing? The writer does not speak about it, but is concerned with 
something else. If we consider these criteria, we can see that, among all those who 
make books with a literary intent, even among the mad, there are very few who can call 
themselves writers. (1998: 6) 
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Now, Steiner acutely presents us with a vision of silence that is altogether 
different from the one implicit in the Spanish poetics of silence. Steiner relates silence to 
the crisis of the word, but at the same time refers to the historical conditions that made it 
possible for silence to emerge: 
An estrangement from language was, presumably, a part of a more general 
abandonment of confidence in the stabilities and expressive authority of central 
European civilization. (1982: 51) 
He links the crisis of the word to the appearance of the inhuman as represented by 
the Nazi genocide: “But this sense of death in language, of the failure of the word in the 
face of the inhuman, is by no means limited to German” (1957: 51). Indeed. Grande’s 
poetry, as that of many other poets of his time, attests to this. In this respect it is 
surprising that Valente calls attention to Celan’s work to support his thesis on silence. In 
Valente’s interpretation of Paul Celan’s poetry, which for Valente was the embodiment of 
silence (“Paul Celan trabajó muy hondamente su palabra” [2004: 210]) he overlooks 
Celan’s struggle with the inhuman. His experiences are difficult to articulate for reasons 
other than an intentional search for silence.  Thus the aspect of Celan’s work that Valente 
misses is the German poet’s use of language to deal with his experience of the Holocaust. 
Celan’s writing cannot be said to be deliberately deconstructive or postmodern in that he 
did not deliberately force language to draw attention to its own limitations and silences. 
Silence in his work is not a rhetorical technique. As Steiner observes: “The poetry of 
Celan is to be included with the very greatest in Western literature … [because it] altered 
the scope of poetry” (cited in Baer 2000: 15). I agree with Baer in his opposition to those 
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who assert Celan was a postmodern. Convoluted writing in Celan is not a rhetorical 
technique. On the contrary, what he finds difficult to communicate is his unresolved 
experience of the Holocaust. Trauma, in fact, unites poets coming from very different 
times and backgrounds, as Baer demonstrates: 
We have seen how Baudelaire is confronted with the task of accounting for experiences 
that lack both empirical or conceptual horizons. Celan has to respond to the loss of a 
horizon for experience that goes beyond anything Baudelaire had imagined. This loss of 
a horizon for experience, or of a way of making sense of experience, is a loss that 
occurred in language itself. Celan has to testify to this loss within language by relying 
on language to express it. (2000:169; my emphasis) 
  It is precisely the unnameability of Celan’s experience, the silence haunting his 
poetry, that he so desperately attempts to overcome through language. He relied on 
language as the means for releasing himself from the prison that silence represents for 
him (impossibility of making sense of his experience): 
Because a meaningful account of this interruptor or breakdown of a horizon for 
experience within language depends on language, Celan must at once note the 
interruption by relying on nonbroken language and, at the same time, suggest this 
breakdown in his verse. He must turn language, as it were, against itself. […] Celan’s 
efforts of turning language against itself, however, results not in a celebration of 
negativity but opens onto a poetic experience comparable to that in Baudelaire’s verse. 
(2000: 172; my emphasis) 
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The latter differs greatly from what a critic describes as “la escritura como 
negatividad” referring to Valente’s “punto cero” (Mas 1992: 310). On this dual aspect of 
art Geoffrey Hartman comments by making a distinction between affirmative art and the 
kind of art which embarks exclusively on a “labour of the negative”—which implies, 
according to Geoffrey Hartman, a “cerebral, demystifying, deconstructive” task (1997: 
43). This distinction is fundamental, for it indicates that there are things only expressible 
in art. The philosopher Badiou states: “The sole task of an exclusively affirmative art is 
the effort to render visible all that which, from the perspective of the establishment, is 
invisible or nonexistent” (cited in Hallward 2003: 195). And where he writes 
“establishment” one can also think of historical forces or psychic forces rooted in 
historical events. 
Valente, in contradistinction to this, over-emphasizes the impossibility of the word 
(“palabra […] que sólo en su imposibilidad encuentra su posible”), (1991: 253). As 
Jonathan Mayhew states (2006: 75), “Valente’s view of the phenomenon of 'poetry' 
became single-minded and intransigent”. It is difficult not to see that behind Valente’s 
intransigence there was an idea of poetry as that which can be defined according to 
certain immanent criteria. One of these immanent criteria is the difficulty of modern 
poetry, a sort of hermetism which can be considered the other side to silence: “Valente 
conceives the difficulty of modern poetry as essential rather than accidental” (Mayhew 
2006: 81). However, as Baer demonstrates, modern poetry confronts “experiences that 
lack both empirical or conceptual horizons” (2000: 169), which may account for such a 
difficulty. That is, its obscurity, rather than being intrinsic, responds to historical 
circumstances. 
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Valente believed that “la creación de la nada es el principio absoluto de toda 
creación” (2004: 208). In this affirmation he privileges the absolute over the accidental. 
What is worse, he excludes the possibility that alternative principles might guide the 
creative process. According to Barrow: 
Creation out of Nothing is one of the by-products of the early Christian Church’s 
disputes with the ideas of Greek philosophy. […] Even if you wish to conceive of a 
moment before which the material world did not exist, the eternal forms still exist. 
Complete Nothingness is inconceivable. […] We can perhaps imagine that no material 
universe exists, maybe even that no laws of Nature exist, but nothing at all is 
unimaginable for us because it would mean no facts could exist – not even a fact like 
the statement that nothing exists, in fact”. (2001: 297).  
Barrow goes to the core of the question that needs stressing with regard to Valente’s 
poetics of silence. His idea that absolute Nothingness is behind creation is contradicted by 
the very same uttering of such a statement. Rather than nothingness, it is his idea that 
nothingness guides creation that drives his writing. Such an idea has been conceived and 
imagined and it is already “something” other than nothingness.  In Poucel’s words: 
Representing nothingness linguistically is therefore difficult, for it addresses an 
epistemological problem. Although nothingness may exist—and mourning in love may 
indeed be a phenomenological experience that contextualizes nothingness—its 
expression in the matter of language, because rendered complete in that medium, 
remains unrepresentable. […] While nothingness is real, it is strictly unknowable, 
undefinable, and consequently not able to be represented. (2006: 189) 
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Therefore, nothingness could not have possibly directed Valente’s writing; rather, 
his writing was directed by his ideas on nothingness, which were also, to a great extent, 
borrowed. He, who had so strongly attacked the use of themes in poetry, made 
nothingness and silence into mere themes. Mayhew states “Valente's poetry is suffused 
with identifiable Heideggerian themes” (2006: 79). 
Another troubling aspect of Valente’s poetics of silence is the question of poetry 
and communication. Valente advocated the concept of “comunicabilidad”, instead of 
what he sees as “vulgar communication”, defining the earlier as the perfectioning of the 
“acto jeroglífico de la escritura” (2004: 210). This “acto jeroglífico” is, to put it 
differently, the incommunicability of the poem, as Mayhew states: “'communicability' is a 
paradoxical concept, in that it entails the negation of 'communication' itself” (2006: 80).  
Let us remember here that “poesía es comunicación” is the shibboleth of realist 
poetry of the time and that Valente’s poetics of silence is supposedly a reaction against it. 
The origin of the controversy goes back to Bousoño’s theory of poetry, which argues that 
communication is a function of the poetic.58  Barral answered Bousoño with his article 
“Poesía no es comunicación”, published in Laye in 1953, and answered by Bousoño in 
1956. However, the presence of silence in poetry does not foreclose communication, as 
the cases of Celan and Grande himself show. They aimed at emerging from darkness 
through language. They struggle for the word not to be sunken, but for it to emerge to the 
surface from the invisible profundities whence unbearable pain comes. 
                                                 
58 Bousoño defines poetry as follows: “la transmisión puramente verbal de una compleja realidad 
anímica previamente conocida por el espíritu como formando un todo, una síntesis a la que se 
añade secundariamente una cierta dosis de placer” (cited in Bonet 1988: 150). Note how Bousoño 
believes in the pre-existence of “contents” to which the poet will give form, as the social poets 
believed too. 
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Valente was correct when thinking that through the work of art we have access to 
the part of reality that remains concealed, invisible: “sólo entendida como invención o 
hallazgo de la realidad encubierta cobra la actividad poética su verdadero sentido e 
impone la razón profunda de su necesidad” (cited in Mas 1986: 26). That said, it is 
difficult to see how this can be reconciled with the fact of having a poetic “formula”: 
“pero la palabra poética sólo se cumple o se sustancia en ese borde extremo del silencio 
último que ella integra y en el que ella se disuelve” (1991:240). Valente does not believe 
in the experience of the poet, in the existence of any referent. He thinks the self is 
banished, disappears in the poem:  
[…] la disolución de la forma, donde el lenguaje queda en suspenso […] detenido o 
deslumbrado por lo que en él se manifiesta, y donde, junto con el lenguaje, entran en su 
disolución […] las nociones de espacio y de tiempo o la noción del sí mismo o del yo. 
Tal es la experiencia extrema del lenguaje en la que el poeta y el místico concurren. 
(1991: 241) 
Valente sees the relationship between experience and language as non-existent: 
Por eso el tiro del crítico yerra cuando en vez de dirigirse al poema se dirige a la 
supuesta experiencia que lo ha motivado, buscando en ésta la explicación de aquella, 
porque tal experiencia, en cuanto susceptible de ser conocida, no existe más que en el 
poema y no fuera de él. (1986: 26-27) 
In contraposition, note what Derrida writes on the act of creation in Celan. The 
philosopher claims that Celan leaves a mark on the German language and this mark can 
be tracked down to him, it is an act he perpetrates, it belongs to him: 
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It seems to me he touches the German language both by respecting the idiomatic spirit 
of that language and in the sense that he displaces it, in the sense that he leaves upon it 
a sort of Scar, a mark, a wound. (2005: 99-100)  
Derrida, furthermore, states: 
It is difficult not to think of [Celan’s lines “No one/bear witness for the/ witness”] as 
also referring, according to an essential reference, to dates and events, to the existence 
or experience of Celan. These “things” that are not only “words”: the poet is the only 
one who can bear witness to them. (67) 
Perhaps one of the critics whose opinions are among the clearest about Celan’s 
lack of premeditated intentions to create silence is Jean Bollack. Bollack even goes as far 
as attributing to Celan’s poetry a social role, which is at the antipodes of Valente’s 
opinion on Celan: “Celan était convaincu jusqu’à la fin que son art avait une mission 
sociale” (2001: 279): 
Je ne pense pas qu’il se trouve des poétiques programmatiques, au sens où on l’entend, 
dans les poèmes de Celan. Ce sont des “experiences”, plutôt, personnelles et donc 
linguistiques. (2001: 282) 
In fact, in a letter to Enrich Einhor, Celan claims that nothing but his own 
experience is behind his poetry and that his intention is to be “realist” in his own way: 
“Non ho mai scritto una riga che non abbia avuto che fare con la mia esistenza – io sono, 
come vedi, realista a mio modo” (2001: 451). Bollack states that in Celan’s poetry there is 
no such a thing as “l’abolition du réel dans un ordre absolu” (2001: 282). Celan knows 
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what Barrow observed earlier with regard to nothingness:  “Das absolute Gedicht—nein 
das gibt es gewiss nicht, das kann es nicht geben” (the absolute poem does not exist, it 
cannot exist) (cited in Baer 2000: 11). Therefore, he does not believe in total singularity, 
and if we think that “singularity is silence” (Derrida, 2005: 8), he thus cannot believe in 
that kind of silence. Words are autonomous but not detached from experience: “les mots 
[…] ne se sont pas détachés, dans leur autonomie, de l’événement et de l’histoire” 
(Bollack 2001: 283). The latter is in opposition to Valente’s aforementioned effort to 
“problematize communication even further by cultivating a deliberately difficult mode of 
writing” (Mayhew 2006: 81).  
Valente sees creation (language) as an act of dissolution of the self, but a 
premeditated one. However, sometimes historical circumstances (exile, trauma) force the 
self into its own disintegration, as in the case of Celan, without the intervention of his or 
her will. This is also the case with Grande, who summons up words to avoid dissolution.59 
Valente’s failure to see certain aspects of this kind of silence can be levelled as a critique 
of his poetic thinking (more than of his poetry). The first criticism that can be directed at 
Valente’s thought on the topic is theoretical: his poetics of silence is undermined by 
contradictions and, more importantly, he misconstrued to a great extent what silence 
meant for a poet he admired and sought to follow.60  
The second criticism that can be levelled is ethical. For he did not take into 
consideration in his reflections on silence the question of ethics and power relations. Part 
                                                 
59 In “Otra figura del insomnio” Grande’s poetic voice says of words: “las palabras de amor o 
gratitude que dije o escuché como barricadas solemnes contra el ejército de la disolución” (284). 
60 An example of a contradiction is Valente’s following statement, which, also, shows how he 
considered ineffability to be a topos: “¿No se convertirá el tópico de la inefabilidad […] en tópico 
de la eficacia radical del decir?” (cited in Mas 1986: 27).  
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of that relationship is embedded in the political repression of the speechless Other. The 
question to be posed is how Valente, who wrote during the long night of silence of the 
dictatorial state, who we know was completely critical of the regime, could have 
defended silence to such a great extent. Spanish fascism meant the negation of the Other, 
its deliberate silencing, within the context of a “diseased state”, to use Deleuze’s words. 
This silence of the Other interrupted the process of becoming of individual lives.61 In the 
face of this, literature, according to Deleuze, plays an important role:   
There is always the risk that a diseased state will interrupt the process of becoming […] 
the constant risk that a delirium of domination will be mixed with a bastard delirium, 
pushing literature toward a larval fascism, the disease against which it fights […] The 
ultimate aim of literature is to set free, in the delirium, this creation of a health or this 
invention of a people, that is, the possibility of life. To write for this people who are 
missing… (“for” means less “in the place of” than “for the benefit of”). (1998: 4) 
This delirium of domination silences the voice of the Other. To write for a people 
who are missing, not in the place of but for the benefit of, has much to do with testimonial 
literature. In his study of some testimonial literature produced during Francoism, Álvarez 
Fernández asserts: 
Los testimonios aquí tratados, además de recuperar no sólo toda una herencia política 
que tuvo por bandera la lucha contra el fascismo y la consecución de una sociedad más 
justa y libre, denuncian y se rebelan contra esa política onerosa del 
silencio/consenso/impunidad. (2007: 25) 
                                                 
61 See section on the fashioning of the self for a definition of the concept of “becoming”. 
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Teresa Vilarós (1998) refers to the erasure of memory perpetrated during the 
Spanish transition to democracy by the “Pacto de olvido” (Pact of Forgetting), also called 
the “Pacto de silencio”. This erasure of memory is a continuation of the same 
“assassination” of memory that occurred under Francoism. It is curious, to say the least, 
that she uses Valente’s expression of “punto Cero” to put across the cancellation of 
memory: 
En la cartografía del imaginario colectivo se inscribe el período transicional como un 
“Punto Cero” que, aunque se presenta en lo político como reforma, en el inconsciente 
colectivo y en la práctica social se escribe sobre todo como ruptura. (1998: 15). 
The word “ruptura” means here severance with the memory of the Civil War and 
Franco’s repression, what Vilarós describes as a “ruptura psíquica con la historia 
reciente” and “eliminación súbita de toda referencia al pasado inmediato franquista” 
(1998: 16).  
A silenced memory is a traumatized memory over which he who speaks exerts 
control. Edward Said already saw this problem with regard to the relation between the 
West and the Orient. Said asserts that the West uses language, writes, which means 
establishes realities, creates truths (even if they are lies) about an Orient that remains “in 
the dimensionless silence”:  
I call such a relation between Western writing (and its consequences) and Oriental 
silence the result of and the sign of the West’s great cultural strength, its will to power 
over the Orient. (1978: 94) 
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Speaking for an Other who is deprived of its own voice means that the Other is 
powerlessly muted in the face of a dominating discourse which, because it exists 
unchallenged by any other discourse, is automatically suffused with “meaning, 
intelligibility, and reality” (Said 1978: 95). 
 Although Valente was preoccupied with the creation of a mode of writing that 
would transcend a trite and public use of it, he approached it from an alienated 
perspective. His concern with the public or the repressive state’s misuses and abuses of 
language was not attached to what Said observed above, that is, to the problem of the 
absence of the Other. On the contrary, his conceptualization of poetry encouraged silence, 
not as a reaction to the historical circumstances; rather, it was somehow detached from 
those circumstances to constitute another different endeavour. Valente’s concern remains 
somewhat abstract and strictly limited to a literary trend: “the Utopian quest for an 
authentic language […] is part of this modern mode of poetic writing” (García 2001: 
101). However, this modern mode of poetic writing does not necessarily have to be 
limited to the literary. Other poets chose to reflect on their historical backdrops too. Note 
how Steiner describes the difficulties that Celan and other exiled German writers found in 
having to use the German language and how he carefully avoids presenting the matter in 
strictly literary terms by alluding to History and linking language and soul: 
Languages have great reserves of life. They can absorb masses of hysteria, illiteracy 
and cheapness. […] But there comes a breaking point. Use a language to conceive, 
organize, and justify Belsen; use it to make out specifications for gas ovens; use it to 
dehumanize man during twelve years of calculated bestiality. Something will happen to 
it. Make of words what Hitler and Goebbels and the hundred thousand 
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Untersturmführer made: conveyors of terror and falsehood. Something will happen to 
the words. Something of the lies and sadism will settle in the marrow of the language. 
[…] The cancer will begin, and the deep-set destruction. The language will no longer 
grow and freshen. It will no longer perform, quite as well as it used to, its two principal 
functions: the conveyance of humane order which we call law, and the communication 
of the quick of the human spirit we call grace. In an anguished note in his diary for 
1940, Klaus Mann observed that he could no longer read new German books: “Can it 
be that Hitler has polluted the language of Nietzsche and Hölderlin?” It can. But what 
happened to those who are the guardians of a language, the keepers of its conscience? 
What happened to the German writers? […] the major writers went into exile. This 
exodus is of first importance if we are to understand what has happened to the German 
language and to the soul of which it is the voice. Some of these writers fled for their 
lives […] But many could have stayed […] But [Thomas] Mann would not stay. And 
the reason was that he knew exactly what was being done to the German language and 
that he felt that only in exile might that language be kept from final ruin. (1967: 101-
102) 
This quotation shows well the issues involved in the relationship between history, 
language and silence. Silence is here, in a very catastrophic way, attached to a set of 
events which cannot escape their linguistic dimension. The reflection on silence, thus, 
assumes for the German writers a humane side, it constitutes a desperately impossible 
stance in the face of barbarity and it becomes an ethical imperative, a question of 
responsibility, all of which can hardly have been justified or explained on grounds of 
mere rhetoric. Thomas Mann explains it thus: 
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The mystery of language is a great one; the responsibility for a language and for its 
purity is of a symbolic and spiritual kind; this responsibility does not have merely an 
aesthetic sense. The responsibility for language is human responsibility […] Should a 
German writer, made responsible through his habitual use of language, remain silent, 
quite silent, in the face of all the irreparable evil which has been committed daily, and is 
being committed in my country, against body, soul and spirit, against justice and truth, 
against men and man? (cited in Steiner 1982: 102) 
Silence engages with “responsibility” and the latter “does not have merely an 
aesthetic sense”. And yet poets such as Celan found a way in which aesthetics and 
responsibility could not be disentangled. It might be said that similar circumstances did 
not bring about a similar level of aesthetic reflection or aesthetic production in Spanish 
letters. This discourse of the role of aesthetics in the face of the inhuman had already 
taken place among the Spanish poets who were involved or chose not to be during the 
Spanish Civil War. And it continued during the post-War. Many of the writers who left 
Spain could have stayed and, yet, they did not. In exile many of those Republican writers 
felt that their language was safe from contamination. Ilie, as seen before, ultimately 
agrees with Steiner that in exile language is better preserved.  Such a preoccupation with 
regard to words that had been necessarily contaminated by an oppressive and brutal 
regime was shared by the politically committed poets of the fifties. However, instead of a 
proper reflection upon aesthetics and responsibility in the vein of that pointed to by 
Steiner above, it resulted in the production of silence. According to Vilarós: 
En la España “unificada”  de la dictadura también los intelectuales de las viejas 
generaciones necesitaban a los entonces más jóvenes, a los de la generación de los años 
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cincuenta, para que éstos cantaran, en una lengua nueva y no contaminada, los hechos 
impuros […] de un Caudillo. Así lo hicieron éstos, y vimos como consecuencia el 
florecimiento de toda la literatura social española de posguerra. El canto y la palabra de 
esta generación debió ser, desde la esperanza de los que perdieron la guerra, el 
pararrayos absorbente del estallido franquista, el sujeto catártico que haría posible la 
restauración de un estado anterior de bonanza. (1998: 31) 
Vilarós further on observes that some poets, among them Gil de Biedma and Gabriel 
Ferrater, did not believe in this cathartic process that the poets of the fifties thought 
language could produce: “tuvo que morir Franco para que la mayoría de los intelectuales 
se dieran cuenta de ello, la 'impureza franquista', el legado franquista, iba tornándose 
parte de ellos mismos, día a día, semana a semana y año tras año”; hence these poets 
relinquished the task of creating “la utópica lengua del futuro, fresca y sin impurezas” 
(1998: 32). According to Vilarós, the unsatisfactory mood that the latter brings about 
leads to a type of poetry where: 
Palabra y sentido, gesto y sentido, signo y sentido se encuentran en una gélida región 
del silencio, porque se ha reconocido ya que no hay nada que entender, nada que 
esperar, nada que pueda asegurar recompensa una vez diferida la satisfacción del deseo. 
(1998: 32) 
This nothingness and silence, which according to Vilarós culminates in the 
transition (“agujero negro” 1998: 41) and its cultural and artistic consequences, are very 
unproductive: “no han quedado tras ella, desde luego, 'grandes obras', precisely because 
those years are “la historia de un vacío […] la historia de 'nada'” (1998: 34). It is the 
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practice of a “poetics” of the time—and Vilarós understands “poetics” in a wide sense 
that encompasses different manifestations of art, from literature to cinema—that is 
“abocada irremediablemente a su propia destrucción” (1998: 55).  
In the Spanish poetry of the second half of the twentieth century, two poets who see 
this well are Antonio Gamoneda and Félix Grande. Gamoneda and Grande are two 
remarkable examples of poets who made of their works a reflection on the political, 
sociological and ethical implications of silence, although not in a deliberate manner. 
Gamoneda’s Descripción de la mentira is structured around the subject of silence. Yet, 
silence in Gamoneda’s work has diverse connotations in comparison to the meaning 
Valente attributed to it: “Ciertamente es una historia horrible el silencio” (Gamoneda 
2004: 181). Blues castellano, which had been censored, clarifies further the kind of 
silence to which he generally refers, a historically informed constellation of 
interconnected elements: trauma, violence, death, censorship, meekness and 
mendaciousness. Furthermore, both in Blues castellano and in Descripción de la mentira, 
there is an implicit allusion to silence as oblivion, willed oblivion due to resignation, but, 
also, the kind of oblivion which political repression forced and which can be equated with 
a lack of voice. Thus silence can signify the desperation—“la desesperación que no 
habla”—and the disgrace attached to repression: 
Amo las bolsas de las madres. 
Veo: 
No hay dignidad sobre la tierra 
como el cansancio sin pagar, 
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el rostro 
aplastado 
la desesperación que no habla. (2004: 97) 
  For Gamoneda, as for Grande, memory is a surveillant that keeps consciousness 
awake. In Descripción de la mentira he recurrently refers to attempts to keep oblivion at 
bay (“vigilar el olvido”). One of the lines in “¿Ocultar esto?”, from Blues castellano 
associates this state of alertness with consciousness: “Pero si cierra el vigilante, cierra/ la 
dentadura sobre la conciencia” (2004: 108). Silence is also a kind of non-linguistic and 
suffering type of memory that is ingrained in the body. That occurs when psychic 
inflicted damage exists as an experience still not articulated in words, and which can only 
prompt the verification of suffering in the flesh. He quotes Simone Weil: “La desgracia 
de los otros entró en mi carne” (2004: 93). This idea of suffering made flesh accrues in a 
kind of writing with origins in the material conditions of pain. Gamoneda has recently 
stated that his poetry is dependent on what he calls the “cultura de la pobreza”, which can 
be perfectly applied to Grande too (2007: 52). Both poets link the physical conditions of 
poverty to a source of poetical writing. Such a materialism of the flesh, which shares 
nothing with the well-being and hedonism of the body, but which is, rather, an indigent 
condition imposed on the body, is to be found in Grande and in one of the main 
influences on Grande, César Vallejo. 
I have shown that silence does not necessarily have to be understood in the way that 
it was interpreted by the “poética del silencio”. Silence can be seen as much more than a 
literary technique, embracing matters inextricably attached to it, such as trauma, memory, 
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violence, censorship, exile, poverty, etc. The complexity of the topic makes it necessary 
to criticize of the reductive interpretation that silence has received in Spanish literary 
criticism. José Ángel Valente is a central figure of such a criticism, both as a poet and as a 
literary critic. Although his work is eminently valuable in its examination of the topic of 
silence and its relation to poetry, there are a few charges that can be levelled at his poetic 
thinking and these are, first, not having paid careful attention to all the questions involved 
in silence, to have written of it in a rather dogmatic way that excluded other views on the 
topic and, finally, to have placed too much emphasis on the inexpressibility of the word. 
Silence is central and haunts much of the Spanish poetry of the second half of the 
twentieth century. In order to discuss it, we need to address questions such as the 
imbrications of silence with memory and trauma. 
 
2.7 Silence in language and the fashioning of the self 
 
Ahora se sabe que la identidad personal es una torre demasiado frágil para sostenerse 
por sí sola, sin testigos cercanos que la certifiquen ni miradas que la reconozcan.  
(Antonio Muñoz Molina, La noche de los tiempos) 
 
In this section I will discuss three interwoven aspects regarding the formation of 
the self: language, memory and nothingness. Theories that completely deprive the self of 
its autonomy will be revisited. Some clarification about how the self is construed is 
needed if we are to understand the topic of Grande’s poetic self. It is necessary to rethink 
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several postulates about the self and language. On the one hand, the notion that language 
only points to nothingness will need revision. Some of the questions to be answered in 
this respect are: Can we consider nothingness as precisely the raison d’être of language? 
Furthermore, is nothingness the foundational void of the self? Can we consider language 
as a complete failure because it fails to transcend nothingness entirely?   
On the other hand, I shall explore the relationship between language and the 
fictional.  The questions to be posed are: If reality is founded on language, does it hold to 
continue to talk about the unreality of the real? Does not language imply something other 
than words? And, finally, I will address the question as to whether the self ought to be 
thought of as merely a cultural effect. Despite the fact that culture makes up a great part 
of what we call the self, can we attribute to the self some form of agency that can alter its 
subordination to culture? Can we think of the self in terms other than culture? Can we 
assign the self a zone of indeterminacy or nothingness? Does the self have access to this 
zone?  
Ultimately, my aim is to reconcile two opposing conceptions of the self—the self 
as nothingness and the self as culture—which do not necessarily have to be mutually 
exclusive but, rather, can be seen in combination in order to achieve a better 
understanding of the particular entity of the self. The thesis I will defend here is that we 
need a theory of the self that includes yet is not reduced to nothingness if we are to 
resolve the impasse created by postmodern theories that regard the self as a linguistic or 
cultural effect, or by those theories that deny the self altogether. Yet we also need to 
rethink the concept of nothingness. In other words, nothingness should be understood not 
as the denial of the self but—although this might seem paradoxical—as an essential 
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component, along with culture, in the formation of the self. Similarly, as will be seen, the 
power of culture upon the self will have to be limited. I am drawing here on Edgar 
Morin’s definition of culture.62 I will also take into account the idea that culture fluctuates 
between its conservation and evolution.63   
Furthermore, I defend the idea that free uses of language and memory are the 
means for enabling the self to create itself by resisting two kinds of subordination that can 
be creative but may also constitute impediments to creation. I will also argue in favour of 
attributing agency to the self, even if limited by subjection.  
I will begin by pinpointing the problems arising from considering the self a 
linguistic effect. The excessive importance given to a certain conception of language —
language understood as external and autonomous—in the fashioning of the self has 
tended to cast aside the fact that the self is not only passively constructed by language 
but, also, that it inhabits a zone of indeterminacy, left to its own fashioning through 
conscious and unconscious linguistic and memory uses. Roland Barthes’ famous 
statement that “le sujet n’est qu’un effet de langage” is scarcely reconcilable with the idea 
of agency behind any process of creation. Adriana Cavarero remarks:  
Siamo in un ambito di riflessione che privilegia la centralità del testo inaugurata da 
Roland Barthes e resta in continua tensione con la formula per cui il sé è soltanto un 
                                                 
62 “La cultura, lo ripeto è costituita dall’insieme di abitudini, costumi, pratiche, saper fare, saperi, 
regole, norme, divieti, strategie, credenze, idee, valori, miti, che si perpetua di generazione in 
generazione, si riproduce in ciascun individuo, genera e rigenera la complessità sociale” (2002: 
16).   
63 “In ogni società, la cultura è protetta, nutrita, mantenuta, rigenerata, senza che essa sia 
minacciata di estinzione, di dilapidazione, di distruzione” (Morin 2002: 16). 
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effetto di linguaggio. La questione del auto-bio-grafia è dunque pregiudizialmente 
focalizzata sul graphein a discapito sia del bios sia dell’auto. (2001: 92; my emphasis) 
The second charge that can be levelled at the view of the self as a “linguistic effect” 
is that the subject remains vulnerable and lost among different conceptions of language. 
Thus the self is subordinated, as if it were a puppet, to two fundamental ideas about 
language: a) the formalist view of language, that is, language seen as black marks on a 
page—this view often leads to the assumption that language ultimately points to 
nothingness; and b) the subjective view of language—language seen as a subjective 
cultural discourse. Heidegger argued that we are not in control of language but that, 
rather, language “thinks us”. What is at stake in any of these two conceptions of language 
mentioned above is precisely the notion of agency. 
It is not to be denied that the self attempts its own definition to a great degree only 
within the framework of the moulds provided by language and culture. This is what Kant 
called the “phenomenal sphere” of the self, in other words, that which is “causality-
determined”, that is, the temporal dimension of the self (Žižek 2000: 25-26).64 Certainly, 
the question of self-comprehension and self-definition takes place within certain schemes 
of comprehension (Kavolis 1984: 16). Such an idea is not controversial. Luis Rosales 
wrote that language “nace en una fuente remota del sentir colectivo” (1989: 9). And 
Valente is aware of the usufruct of the “palabras de la tribu” in any poetic employment of 
language: “Se escribe desde muy hondos posos, desde muy sumergidos ritmos de la 
lengua, que se nos imponen o hablan en nosotros” (cited in López de Castro 1999: 9).  
                                                 
64 Žižek also declares that “at this level, human beings are empirical entities whose behaviour can 
be explained by different sets of causal links” (2000: 27).  
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Furthermore, Bakhtin theorized the idea that literary genres were no other than the 
different collectively shared frames within which self-comprehension was attempted. 
Similarly, the idea that culture is necessary for existence is not controversial. Butler 
observes that “social categories signify subordination and existence at once” (1997: 20) 
and Edgar Morin states: “Il principale capitale umano è la cultura. L’essere umano 
sarebbe senza di essa un primate del più basso rango” (2002: 16).  
Notwithstanding the above, what remains, however, a “quandary”, to use Butler’s 
word, is the question of the autonomy, agency or consciousness of the self. According to 
Butler, the self is endowed with agency but this agency paradoxically emerges from its 
subordination. She uses the word “power” to refer to that which is not only subordination 
but, also, the condition of the possibility for agency. While Butler argues that any idea of 
the self must be grounded on subordination to pre-existing conditions that she calls 
“power”, she also recognizes that the self’s appropriation of those conditions for 
becoming a subject “may involve an alteration of power” (1997: 13).65 In this sense, 
culture as a form of power which reproduces itself in each individual—“si riproduce in 
ciascun individuo” (Morin 2002: 15)—does not have to be necessarily regarded as an 
insurmountable obstacle for individual self-creation, given that the self, even if radically 
conditioned, can alter power. It remains, nevertheless, a paradox that the self needs 
culture and at the same time autonomy from culture, to define itself, or, in other words, 
the self takes its autonomy from subordination to culture, understood as a form of power. 
However, although Butler’s definition of power is flexible, she seems to be limiting her 
                                                 
65 Butler defines power as follows: “Power is, as subordination, a set of conditions that precedes 
the subject, effecting and subordinating the subject from the outside” (1997: 13). 
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discussion to the temporal dimension of the self, as she refers to power as “not static 
structures, but temporalized—active and productive” (1997: 16). What is more 
problematical is her situation of power as preceding the self, “effecting and subordinating 
the subject from the outside” (1997: 13). Is this not in contradiction with her recognition 
above that the subject can alter power? Besides, does not power in effect become 
“internal” when it is interiorized by the self? Can one really say power is always external? 
If the subject can alter power and, therefore, contributes to the forming of power in some 
sense, does power really precede the subject? On another occasion Butler illustrates this 
contradiction when she claims that “the subject is neither fully determined by power nor 
fully determining of power” (1997: 17). Is she, thus, conceding the active role of the self 
in the configuration of power? It seems so.  
Thus what I am proposing here is an argument that seems to be less problematical 
than just considering the self a mere linguistic or cultural effect: culture and language and 
the self interface and feed back to one another and both culture and language equally 
allow for and condition the autonomy of the self.  
In order to see how culture and language can allow for the possibility for agency 
in the self we need to introduce another dimension in the discussion of agency: 
nothingness. Introducing nothingness in the debate not only avoids mechanical views of 
subordination but, also, offers, in my opinion, a full account of the notion of agency. 
Nothingness, as opposed to the temporal dimension of power to which Butler referred 
above as “not static”, would appear to be, instead, unchangeable and, still, elicit change. 
Blanchot speaks of a “crack”: “a fissure which would be constitutive of the self, or would 
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reconstitute itself as the self, but not as a cracked self” (1995: 78). Nothingness should be 
understood as the “condition of the possibility for creation”. I am using the expression 
employed by Butler with regard to power, since it can be equally applied to nothingness. 
Butler argues that the self maintains an ambivalent relation with the forces or powers that 
act as pre-conditions to its own becoming, and that this relation is marked by necessary 
subordination and resistance to them (Butler 1997: 13).  She states that: “the subject is 
itself a site of ambivalence in which the subject emerges both as the effect of a prior 
power and as the condition of possibility for a radically conditioned form of agency” 
(1997: 15). I believe that Butler’s view of the relationship between agency and power, 
which she limits to the temporal dimension of being, can be applied to nothingness, which 
can be regarded as another kind of power, which is not simply temporal or temporalized, 
because it is linked to the eternal: death. Thus, rephrasing my quotation of Butler above, it 
can be equally argued that the self maintains an ambivalent relation to nothingness which 
acts as a pre-condition to its own becoming—Bachelard in a similar vein refers to the 
void as “being the raw material of possibility of being” (1994: 218) and that this relation 
is marked by necessary subordination and resistance to nothingness, which is, ultimately, 
subordination and resistance to death.  
It should be noted that death and nothingness are not exactly the same thing and, 
yet, nothingness can be taken as deriving from the experience of the most impenetrable 
nothingness, which is death. Nothingness is also that which we do not know and yet we 
could discover. Many of the mysteries surrounding the self have been dissipated and yet, 
death will always remain an opaque nothingness, without the possibility of being fully 
illuminated.  
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If the self is not merely a cultural effect and should be considered also as agency, 
Cavarero’s “sé narrabile” (narrative self), this is precisely because culture fails to explain 
the self away insofar as there will always remain a region of silence or nothingness that 
inhabits it. This principle of nothingness–death–which is behind all creation, acts on the 
self and it is the origin of self-reflexivity and self-creation. Culture does not liberate the 
self from death. Both culture and the self are grounded on the foundational problem of 
death. It is the consciousness of death that elicits creation: “La formidabile breccia che la 
coscienza della morte apre al proprio interno ha fatto sorgere le più grandiose mitologie 
che la occultano, ma senza farla sparire” (Morin 2002: 27). Hence, creation is 
subordinated to death as much as it needs to transcend and resist it. Morin indicates here 
that human mythology, created to overcome death, has not managed to “make it 
disappear”. This is because death is the foundational nothingness of culture and of the self 
at the same time as the condition of preserving its existence. Paradoxically, we need the 
notions of nothingness and death in order to keep the human process of creation going. It 
is precisely their overcoming that elicits in the self an ontological need to leave behind 
itself, before its demise, a unique story, its story, which notwithstanding lacunae and 
instability in the unity of its account, is unique insofar as “è diversa da tutte le altre 
proprio perché con molte altre è costitutivamente intrecciata” (Cavarero 2001: 95). 
The fact that culture does not, cannot, transcend death causes antagonism between 
the human mind and culture. According to Edgar Morin:  
La cultura riempie un vuoto lasciato […] dalla incompiutezza biologiche. In questo 
vuoto se instaurano le sue norme, i suoi principi e i suoi programmi. [...] La cultura è 
ciò che permette di apprendere e di conoscere, ma è anche ciò che impedisce di 
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apprendere e di conoscere fuori dai suoi imperativi e dalle sue norme, ciò che provoca 
antagonismo tra la mente umana e la sua cultura. (2002: 16) 
The contingency and arbitrariness that culture also presupposes in the definition of 
the self, because it cannot contain the self entirely (“the subject exceeds precisely that to 
which it is bound” [Butler 1997: 17]) and the fact that the self can immerse itself in 
different types of subordination, reflect on these subordinations and, up to a point, choose 
them, can account for the ontological role of death in its creation, in combination with the 
formative role of culture. The self can escape a specific culture, give up a language and 
become trained in the mental structures of another language—to clarify, it cannot escape 
being immersed in culture and language but it can adopt an active and reflexive attitude 
toward them—yet the self cannot escape nor change death. And it is the relationship of 
the self with the absolute nothingness of death that ultimately elicits its self-creation, 
because it is the self’s consciousness of its own death that leads to self-consciousness or 
self-reflexivity—self-reflexivity that the self will also apply to its temporal 
subordinations, allowing it to alter them—which is at the core of human subjectivity. To 
be more precise, the contradiction of death at the center of the self’s conscience elicits 
creation: 
È la coscienza realista della morte che suscita il mito: provoca un tale orrore che si 
nega, si devia e si supera nei miti in cui l’individuo o sopravvive come spettro o come 
doppio (la vita primaria – unicellulare, cellula – utilizza lo sdoppiamento, e così lotta 
contro la morte. Il tema universale del doppio, non ha forse questa lontana origine?), o 
rinasce come umano o animale. [...] La morte come idea dell’annientamente di sè 
introduce la contraddizione, la desolazione e l’orrore nel cuore del soggetto, essere 
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egocentrico che è tutto per se stesso, ma che sa di essere nello stesso tempo un essere 
per la morte, cioè votato al nulla; questa contradizione tra il tutto e il nulla diviene la 
fonte più profonda dell’angoscia umana [...] Ma questa contraddizione diviene nello 
stesso tempo la fonte più profonda della mitologia umana. (Morin 2002: 27-28) 
The self’s objectifying of death is at the core of its becoming a “subject”; it is a 
formative experience:  
L’estrema oggettivazione della morte, decomposizione e annientamento, va di pari 
passo con la sua estrema soggettivazione poiché è il soggetto che si trova annientato. 
[...] La morte è l’unione dell’oggettivazione e della soggettivazione assolute. (Morin 
2002: 60) 
Yet becoming a subject involves the self becoming an “object” for itself, as will be 
seen in the case of Grande’s poetic self when some of his poems are analyzed: 
 È a partire di questa capacità che l’individuo umano ha preso coscienza per la prima 
volta di sè oggettivandosi nel suo “doppio”, poichè lo spirito umano ha potuto auto-
esaminarsi, praticare l’introspezione, l’autoanalisi, il dialogo con se stesso. Paradosso: 
l’oggettività non può venire che da un soggetto. Idea incredibile per coloro che hanno 
soggettivamente negato ogni esistenza al soggetto. (Morin 2002: 59-60)  
Thus both nothingness and culture are necessary for creation: nothingness, 
understood as that which does not exist but that can exist because it is conceivable, that is, 
understood as the possibility of coming into existence, on the one hand; and, on the other 
hand, culture. The two are conditions of possibility for agency, above all, nothingness, 
without which invention could not be. I claim that these two views of the self are not 
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exclusive but equally necessary. Nothingness prevents the self from merely reinstating or 
reproducing power, as shall be seen further on in this section, and culture permits the self 
not to remain an emptiness condemned to silence. 
In her examination regarding the status of the question of agency in autobiography 
today, as to whether the self is capable of self-representing, Molero de la Iglesia states: 
En toda reflexión sobre la textualización de la subjetividad está presente el papel 
deformante del lenguaje […] tampoco hay dudas sobre el origen cultural de la 
identidad, cuyos modelos dependen de los códigos y convenciones que en cada 
momento estructuran el pensamiento […] Pero el hecho de que el yo escrito tome su 
forma de la cultura, y en especial de aquellos discursos narrativos que, por considerarse 
prototípicos, se erigen en autoridad, no niega la capacidad biográfica de la 
autobiografía, puesto que también el vivir se ajusta a esos modelos. (2000: 24) 
Now, this practice of making subjectivity textual to which Molero de la Iglesia was 
referring, can be illustrated by the practices of intertextuality and deconstruction. 
Intertextuality does not take into account the existence of an agency, capable of 
elaborating images of itself and the world around it through its literary imagination. The 
idea of the inability of the self to represent itself has been questioned by literary critics 
and to a great extent it has been surmounted or nuanced. Some critics have acknowledged 
that the practice of deconstruction makes it also very difficult or even excludes altogether 
the possibility of discussing the very same idea of the self, as Punday (2000) observes: 
One of the principal charges leveled at deconstruction is that it allows the individual no 
room to act against the discursive systems that function within the culture, since the 
  
122
subordination of reality to textuality implies that no real-world act can affect this 
textual play.  
According to Adriana Cavarero: 
Le biografie e le autobiografie, prima di essere luoghi testuali di un’ermeneutica 
raffinata e professionale, sono infatti delle storie di vita narrate per iscritto. Per quanto 
necessariamente costruite secondo i canoni più svariati, a seconda dell’epoca e dei 
gusti, esse raccontano di un sé narrabile la cui identità, unica e irripetibile, è quella che 
andiamo a cercare nelle pagine del testo. (2001: 95) 
When memory is accordingly studied from the view of the textual practice of 
deconstruction, it is examined in the light of the merely textual, without taking into 
consideration that memory belongs, to put it in Cavarero’s words, to a “sé narrabile la cui 
identità, [è] unica e irripetibile”. That is, memory goes beyond the textual, engages with 
not necessarily linguistic processes such as “il fluire della azione da cui la storia di vita è 
risultata” (2001: 95). Ricoeur devotes a great part of his works to explaining how action 
helps to shape narrative identity. Thus literary practices such as intertextuality and 
deconstruction make it more difficult to confer some agency to the self. Yet the idea of 
the self in literature should not and cannot be abandoned, even if it is no longer possible 
to go back to the logocentric model, that is, the idea of “author” as the entity from which 
the text originates and takes all its significance. Bennett agrees that we cannot neglect the 
question of authorship: “[…] literary criticism is inextricably engaged in studying 
questions of authorship” (2005: 112). 
  
123
One way out of the blind spot created by making subjectivity textual is thinking of 
the author as giving form to an absence. Such an absence is opposed to the temporal or 
culturally informed dimension of the self and points to another level: the eternal 
dimension of nothingness. In this zone of indetermination the self is in the constant 
process of becoming.66 The re-discovery of nothingness in relation to being can be 
attributed in our contemporary times to Sartre: “[...] a new component of the real has just 
appeared to us—non-being” (2003: 5). In reality, the concept of the self must necessarily 
originate from absence that symbolic activity —above all language—attempts to 
overcome. According to Heidegger, the first function of language is to name and to give 
birth to what would otherwise remain an eternity of death and silence and it is precisely 
this characteristic of language, its ability to name, that allows us to envisage the empty 
too: 
[To bring] what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time. Where there is 
no language, as in the being of stone, plant and animal, there is also no openness of 
what is, and consequently no openness either of that which is not and of the empty. 
(2002: 73)  
The modern recognition that language points to the absence it attempts to overcome 
does not entail that it is useless in transcending this lack. On the contrary, language has to 
a large degree effectively managed to transcend silence, emptiness. According to George 
Steiner: “It is language that severs man from […] the silences that inhabit the greater part 
                                                 
66 I borrow the concept of becoming from Deleuze (1998) who, in his turn, has borrowed it from 
Bergson. See Bergson (1988). 
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of being” (1982: x). What I would like to discuss here is that the postmodern view of 
language as always pointing to silence has confused and mistaken, to a great extent, the 
reason why language sprang up in the first place, namely, the existence of nothingness, by 
almost turning nothingness into language’s “end”, as if language were there to serve the 
end of disclosing nothingness and silence. Brook explains this well in her analysis of the 
modern crisis of the word (some times called “the critique of language”). She refers to the 
changing of the rhetorical device of inexpressibility, which originated in the Greek 
tradition and which led from a certain mistrust in language to express realities such as the 
divine in the thirteenth century or to communicate emotions in the nineteenth century, 
toward the transformation of such a rhetorical device into the principal leitmotiv of 
postmodern poetry: the radical negation of language. Thus whilst for the modernist poets 
there was still some confidence in poetry, the postmodern attitude consists in utterly 
denying the ability of language to express. According to Brook: 
For them [the Modernists], although transcendent notions might be considered beyond 
the reach of the word, the concrete thing, the gentian, was not. And for them, there was 
the optimistic belief that through various forms of experimentation something real 
could be brought into language, that language was more than the play of words. 
(2002:14) 
Brook states that after Modernism “the relationship between signifier and signified, 
and between language and reality” was rendered “increasingly problematic”, to the point 
that “all reality becomes inexpressible in language” (2002: 14). Yet this assertion is a 
contradiction in terms, for even if the only thing language could express is that it cannot 
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express, we would nevertheless be expressing a concept. In other words, if we are able to 
conceive of the concept of nothingness, then this entails that nothingness is not all there 
is, for we can state something about nothingness and such a possibility is a fact. 
Nevertheless, inexpressibility became the topos of postmodern literature. However, the 
employment of this commonplace by poets and writers who used it as a theme or made of 
it an rhetorical technique, has nothing to do with the kind of inexpressibility proper to 
trauma as will be seen further on. Nothingness seems to be more genuinely reflected upon 
and conveyed when it is not a “subject” or “theme” consciously thought out or used 
deliberately as an expressive tool. On the contrary, nothingness, if it is to be authentically 
so, must necessarily inhabit the poem in ways that the poet is not able to identify or 
decide upon beforehand.  
The other germane question that remains to be discussed in relation to this is the 
question of whether or not any individual linguistic exercise of self-construction is bound 
to be merely fictional. Such seems to be the conclusion reached by a conception of the 
self as a “linguistic effect” which discards agency, as shown by M. H. Abrams below: 
[…] Derrida solicits us to follow him in his move […] This move is from what he calls 
the closed “logocentric” model of all traditional or “classical” views of language […] to 
what I shall call his own graphocentric model, in which the sole presences are marks-
on-blanks […] Since the only given are already-existing marks, “déjà écrit”,  are denied 
recourse to a speaking or writing subject, or ego, or cogito, or consciousness and so to 
any possible agency for the intention of meaning something (“vouloir dire”); all such 
agencies are relegated to the status of fictions generated by language, readily dissolved 
by deconstructive analysis. (1977: 429) 
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Paul de Man (1979) argues that, as language is the only means for achieving self-
knowledge, any attempt to establish the “truth” about oneself is condemned to founder on 
the realization that language always mediates between our desires and the Real. In this 
critic’s objection to the achievement of “truth” through language, there is an implicit 
recognition of a consciousness: for do desires not have a source? Can this source be other 
than the self? In any case, what is taken for granted in both Derrida and De Man’s views 
is a vision of language as a useless instrument to access any reality at all, which 
consequently blurs the distinction between autobiography and fiction, making all 
autobiographical writing fictional.67 Such a distinction, however, needs to exist from the 
perspective of memory, because memory also connects non-linguistic realities with 
words, and is linked to the questions of commitment or intentionality. Intentionality and 
commitment are not textual entities. And they form part of the creative process. Recently, 
there has been a proliferation of works that recuperate the concept of intentionality. 
According to Bo Pettersson, the premises behind textuality are clearly ideological and, as 
a consequence, textuality has lost force and intentionality has, again, been brought into 
forth: 
We should be aware that its [the term “text”] spread was based on specific, tendentious, 
even ideological, view of the humanities as well as the social sciences, which quite 
                                                 
67 I would like to mention in passing that postmodern ideas of language deserve credit only if they 
leave space for other conceptions of language. As Erickson (2001) observes, the problem with 
postmodernism is that it encourages freedom of reading at the same time as guarding itself against 
criticism, without realizing that the same spirit of freedom that postmodernism stirs may be 
behind the anti-postmodernism’s critique. This undermines the credibility of postmodernism. 
Erickson writes: “Certain problems with postmodernism have been becoming increasingly 
evident. One of these is the problem of autoreferentiality: postmodernism’s failure to apply its 
tenets to its own view” (2001: 233). He also asks why deconstruction cannot be deconstructed.  
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blatantly advocated a textualist view of not only literature but culture in general [...] By 
a decisive severing of the connection between author and text in “The Death of the 
author” the authority of the author and his or her intentions were so forcefully ousted 
that it took literary studies (despite philosophical aestheticians and a few other 
exceptions) a generation before intentional issues were again brought under scrutiny. 
(2005: 134 and 138)  
Thus the inclusion of categories such as intentionality and commitment leads to the 
realization, as observed by Deleuze, that “a text is merely a small cog in an extra-textual 
practice […] that prolongues the text” (1998: xvi). Hence, of importance is the distinction 
of the intentionality or the degree of commitment to truth in literature produced to bear 
witness to historical events, namely the testimonial literature produced by political 
prisoners in Francoist prisons, or Primo Levi’s account of his Holocaust experience, and 
any other kind of literature whose production obeys a different intentionality or 
commitment to truth. When it comes to bearing witness to testimony, the commitment, as 
Derrida puts it, consists in this: “I promise you to tell the truth and to be faithful to my 
promise and to engage myself to be faithful” (2005: 76). The only flaw in Derrida’s 
argument is his assertion that such a commitment does not have a “probative 
demonstration” and therefore cannot bear on theoretic-epistemic knowledge (2005: 76). 
However, the problem with such a notion of truth as needing probative demonstration is 
contradicted by our everyday experience: we live in a world where many of our shared 
truths are not demonstratable. And although the questions of commitment and 
intentionality are difficult to discern, that should not prevent us from approaching them, 
for they are, as observed by Bennett and Pettersson, central to literary criticism.  
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Similarly, to think of autobiography as a “truthful” account and fiction as “fictional” 
seems as categorical and reductive as blurring the line between autobiography and fiction. 
According to Kavolis: 
The autobiographical text in the strict sense differs from the other literary texts, which 
always retain an autobiographical aspect, not in that the former necessarily provides 
more informative content or more truthful documentation than the latter, but that it 
constitutes a firmer, more unconditional (private or public) commitment to a particular 
way of comprehending oneself. “Fictionalized autobiography” or “autobiographical 
fiction”, in contrast, leave open the possibility of an escape from a binding commitment 
into a conditional perhaps so-perhaps not so statement, one of several possible 
statements, by which the author’s identity is not responsibly bound. But precisely 
because autobiography—particularly autobiography intended for publication—is so 
firmly committed to a particular mode of self-comprehension, it may be less revealing 
of those aspects of one’s own experience of oneself to which one is either less 
committed or which cannot be firmly grasped, than does fiction, poetry, the visual arts, 
and music. (1984: 21) 
Hence, the latter demonstrates that literary texts disclose aspects of the real not 
graspable by other forms of self-writing. In fact, imagination, frequently seen as a source 
of fiction, is instead regarded as a real component of the self (Ricoeur 2000: 146) and, 
what seems most interesting, imagination does not exclusively belong to the realm of 
literature, since imagination is constantly put into play in any cognitive activity, including 
scientific thinking. Therefore, the question is not whether imagination is present or absent 
in cognitive processes other than the processes of literary creation, but, rather, it is a 
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matter of commitment to self-comprehension, as observed above. According to Mark 
Freeman too, imagination is a component of the Real: “Yes, self and world are 
fundamentally products of the imagination. But no, they are not to be thought of as 
merely imaginary, in the sense of being essentially fictional creations” (2003: 70). 
Similarly, Ruth Ronen declares that: “[…] fictional worlds are worlds possessing some 
kind of concrete reality” (2005: 354).  
 It is clear that in order to be able to talk about imagination as an element of the 
Real there needs to be a transition from a naïve idea of realism toward a theory of 
constructive realism. And that implies a form of understanding not as verifiable facts or 
as “raw” material but as a construction. If we see the world as an array of scattered 
elements, whose gaps and inconsistencies memory and imagination attempt to supplant, 
then we need to concede that art creates its own truth. Caballero Bonald states: 
“Únicamente soy/ mi libertad y mis palabras” (2004: 163). 
To fashion oneself through free uses of language does not entail discarding memory. 
Memory constitutes the foundation of the freedom to linguistic creation by establishing 
the limits within which creation occurs. Real creative freedom takes place in the 
framework of boundaries. According to Bakhtin, “without constraints of the right sort 
[wrong constraints would be state censorship] neither freedom nor creativity […] can be 
real” (cited in Morson and Emerson 1990: 43). We tend to privilege freedom over 
memory, in reality, as Caballero Bonald reminds us too, memory does not restrain but 
makes creative freedom possible: “Mengua su libertad aquel que olvida/ que es su propio 
recuerdo quien lo salva” (2004:175). Memory, language and imagination are the 
“ingredients” of the identity of the self. Such recognition implies that it is arbitrary to talk 
  
130
about a “real” and a “fictionalized” self. According to Ricoeur and his followers, such as 
Freeman, we need to think anew the idea of the author and its relation to his or her 
fictionalized self: “The creativity of the author and the individuality of the self, are 
intimately related; they are, we might say, two sides of the same coin” (2003: 68). In 
other words, what an author writes in creative exercises of imagination forms part of the 
identity of its self.  
This idea has found ample support and is increasingly gaining credence in 
contemporary literary theory and criticism.68 A significant case is the aforementioned one 
of Philippe Lejeune. Francisco Brines agrees with Lejeune: 
Al escribir solemos añadir al texto nuevas realidades que, aunque sólo fuesen 
imaginativas, alcanzan la misma necesidad y verdad que el núcleo originador, y que 
gravitan con no menor fuerza. […] Mas no olvidemos que el poema está siempre 
escrito desde el hombre […] todo en el poema está haciendo referencia única al que lo 
ha escrito, nada hay que no dependa de él. La autonomía de la experiencia poemática 
respecto de la experiencia vital que mayoritariamente lo origina admite grados, pero 
siempre tienen ambas en común su absoluta dependencia respecto de una misma 
persona. Alguna vez, y es caso extremo, la concreta experiencia vital que me impulsa a 
la realización no aparece para nada en el poema; éste la rechaza y, allí está, lleva una 
                                                 
68 See for instance, to cite just a few examples, the works of Ricoeur (1984 and 1992), Eakin 
(1999) and Freeman (2000). Even those who have been traditionally skeptical about the relation 
of author and work in our day have ended up conceding that the author is, at least, a ghostly 
presence in the work. One of the most important books published recently on this subject is 
Bennett (2005). In it, Bennett declares that the author’s presence in his or her work cannot be 
completely denied. He writes: “(even Barthes, especially Barthes, reserves a certain desire for the 
author, needs him or her when he talks about “the pleasure of the text, about the pleasure that he 
gets from literary texts”. And he quotes Barthes: “in a way, I desire the author: I need his figure… 
as he needs mine” (2005: 117). 
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máscara que la invisibiliza o es puro vacío: el único lector que sabe de su fantasmal 
presencia es el propio autor. (1999: 21-22) 
The writer Carlos Fuentes shares the view that imagination, that is to say, the 
imaginative component of memory, for without memory there is no creation, creates 
reality, of the self and the world: 
La imaginación y el lenguaje, la memoria y el deseo, son no sólo la materia viva de la 
novela, sino el sitio de encuentro de nuestra humanidad inacabada […] la novela no 
sólo refleja realidad, sino que crea una realidad nueva, una realidad que antes no estaba 
allí (Don Quijote, Madam Bovary, Stephen Dedalus) pero sin la cual ya no podríamos 
concebir la realidad misma. (2002: 205 and 198) 
Summing up, I have tried to show three things here. The self is not a mere 
“linguistic effect” whose reality is a “discursive effect”. The self is also a kind of 
emptiness which re-shapes, that is to say, fashions itself through its linguistic uses of 
imagination. The self is, as Lejeune puts it, its récits, be they literary works or not. 
Among the récits of the self are found rational discourses, as in narratives of the self 
guided by logic and historical precision, but, also, the self is constituted by imaginative 
discourses fraught with desire and emotion. And the latter is as real, that is, tells us as 
much about the self, as the former. The poet and novelist Manuel Rivas notes that 
literature is, in “'su forma de pensar', próxima al 'pensamiento salvaje': el espacio donde la 
razón es sensorial”.69 Antonio Gamoneda agrees:  
                                                 
69 Manuel Rivas, in an on-line interview with the readers of El País (15-11-2006).  
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La finalidad de la poesía es la creación de placer y la creación de un conocimiento 
distinto del que proporciona el pensamiento reflexivo, por ejemplo, es de otra 
naturaleza. La poesía nace de la vida. Se trata de un saber no sabiendo y de un entender 
no entendiendo. (2006: 55) 
Similarly, Valente has written that poetry is a “pensar no interrogativo” akin to a 
“presentimiento”. There is, he declares, “un saber del corazón, which does not need to be 
sought, it is a “pasivo entender” (2004: 8-9). 
To be sure, in addressing the questions of self-writing and fictionality, what I propose 
here is to reconsider the notion of accuracy, and to begin to talk, rather, of fidelity to the 
past. In its search for a certain truth memory is, according to Ricoeur, faithful to the past. 
This is precisely where any credibility or veracity of memory should reside. The focus of 
memory recuperates the idea that in any act of creation there is a consciousness that 
creates. If we refuse to see memory as an intertextual exercise and, more accurately, 
drawing on Memory Studies, start to see memory as a cognitive process, in the first place, 
then we can conclude that it implies more than the anxiety of influence, to use Harold 
Bloom’s well-known expression.  
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3. Language, memory and forgetting in Grande’s work 
3.1 Surviving separation through language 
 
Si uno no tuviera confianza en las palabras ¿en qué?  
Juan Gelman (El País, 29-11-07) 
La palabra 
que entrega lo perdido 
(Juan Gelman, Incompletamente) 
 
Apparently, Grande’s poetic voice’s relationship with the signifier is one of overt 
trustfulness and submissive dependence. In reality, it is more ambivalent. The poetic 
voice celebrates the signifier as that which holds the power to overcome separation. And 
yet its traumatic attachment to words shows the problematic nature of this relationship. In 
Chapter IV, this neurotic approach to words will be analyzed in further detail. Here more 
positive aspects in the poetic voice’s approach to language will be explored.  
Two remarkable characteristics in the poetic voice’s relationship with language are 
the contentment and consolation begot in the act of writing. There is a sense of perplexity 
and joyful bewilderment (“deslumbramiento”) embedded in the playing with words, like a 
child who begins to learn how to use words plays with their internal rhythms. Grande’s 
initiation to writing occurred when he discovered poetry by way of the reading of poems 
with a friend, Carlos Sahagún: 
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Yo escribía como a quien le llevan de la mano: feliz: descubriendo el lenguaje. Taranto 
es para mí esa porción de deslumbramiento y de felicidad que toca un niño con las 
sílabas cuando empieza a reunirlas. (2001: 14-15) 
Taranto (1961) is Grande’s first publication. The book was written in homage to the 
Peruvian César Vallejo, an influence on the poetry of many other Grande’s 
contemporaries.  
In order to understand the poetic voice’s admiration for words one must consider 
two recurrently present ideas in his work—love and and demise of love, that is, 
separation, which is felt by the poetic voice as a kind of death. Love and separation 
(death) can be taken to refer to an array of diverse and interconnected questions. They are 
present in the metaphor of “eternal stones”, in the opening poem of Las piedras: 
… y llevamos la cabeza 
esclava 
entre dos piedras eternas 
 
Piedra del amor a un lado, 
el amor que se hizo piedra, 
no estatua, significado, 
símbolo; no: piedra, piedra. 
Piedra del horror al otro, 
el horror que nos golpea 
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desde el centro de la muerte 
que habita en nuestra conciencia.70 (55) 
Stone is the word with which the poetic voice signals both the beginning and the end 
of life. In “Generación”, from Taranto, the first stone is a date, 1937, the year in which 
the author was born. The two eternal stones (love and death) can be understood as 
alluding to general notions of both physical and spiritual unity and separation. Grande’s 
poems constantly call attention to these two conditions governing human existence, a 
reminder of our dual reality. On the one hand, they are evoked as two physical sensations 
(“Amar y morir son dos/ sensaciones corpulentas”), their physicality being ceaselessly 
present, embodied for the poet in the woman and materialized in objects growing old and 
ragged. Such an association of thanatos with the impulse of erotic love refers us to the 
Freudian notion of “death drive”. On the other hand, the semantic field of love and death 
extends further to encompass a worldview that engages with certain ideas about language 
and memory. The poetic voice relates love and language, in that it confides in the 
reassuring capacity of language (and memory) to unify, to hold together and give 
coherence to what is dismembered and disaggregated.71 
This view of language as a unifying force that connects and gathers stems almost 
from an imperious need. Even when the poetic voice adopts the viewpoint of death, 
language is useful in that it holds together the self through a discourse that confers 
                                                 
70 In Rafael Alberti’s La arboleda perdida we find an echo of Grande’s view of the entanglement 
of love and death: “El placer y la muerte son paralelos. Se dice que en el momento de morir un 
último estremecimiento seminal corre entre las temblorosas piernas” (1996: 38). 
71 Eros referred to erotic and maternal love has the mark of death but understood as the opposite of 
death drive it is related to knowledge and jouissance.  
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coherence. The ability of language to speak of and from death does not represent for the 
poetic voice separation as silence does. Absence of language (silence) symbolizes for the 
poetic voice an irreparable fracture with that which lives.  
On occasions the poetic voice seeks the articulation of its own linguistic identity 
through identification with either death or that which is unnameable. The poetic self’s 
positioning in the place of death seems to seek to transcend a precariousness and 
vulnerability that would lead to its own dissolution. In Memoria del flamenco it is stated: 
“Mediante el horror de pensar lo que era poco menos que impensable el yo y el otro 
comenzaban a confundirse y a ser una empresa común” (1999: 444). “El otro” (the Other 
in me, death) elicits the confrontation with the unknown, the unnameable, resulting in a 
fusion and con-fusion with it. This leads to the paradox that language becomes both a 
conduit to transcend silence as much as it reproduces the frontier and limits to cognition 
which death represents.  Given death’s opacity the poetic voice’s words result in the 
illusion of appropriating death through its introjection. Identification with death in and 
through language creates the imaginary effect of unity, by causing the restoration of a 
missing link. An invisible tie that has to do with a lack of suture among the past and the 
present: “el vago temblor de su pasado y su presente, aún ambos sin soldar” (153). 
By grounding its identity on loss and death the poetic voice ultimately seeks to 
prevent disintegration and dissolution into nothingness. However, its recourse to the 
language of death to substitute for separation and traumatic loss perpetuates the same gap 
that such an employment of language attempts to avoid. The poetic voice contradictorily 
confronts the separation inherent in death with images of death themselves. And yet the 
creation of these representations contributes paradoxically to the formation of a less 
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destructive identity as well as opening up the possibility of a mirage of unity. If death is 
that which is repressed, even in love, then its continous exposition establishes the 
condition of its hopeful disclosing (even a glimpse). Any other form of employment of 
language is condemned as spiteful jargon (“jerga vil”, 309) that produces repression (it 
suffocates), as “Elogio a mi nación de carne y de fonemas” illustrates: 
Los que sin fervor comen del gran pan del idioma 
y lo usan con adorno o coraza o chantaje 
sienten por mí un rechazo donde la rabia asoma: 
yo no he llamado patria más que a ti y al lenguaje. (309) 
Grande is opposed to a use of language that silences and causes repression. For the 
poet the purposes of language engage with a lack of plenitude, a certain irrepressible void 
he attempts to fill. Precisely, by way of speaking from death in order to avoid separation, 
the poet experiences vicinity with the divine, the enigmatic and the sacred. It is only by 
taking the latter into account that the poetic voice’s recourse to self-aggression implicit in 
the adoption of death’s viewpoint and constant masochism might be explained. We can 
then understand how apparently separation produces joy, precisely because it is not such, 
the poetic voice prevents it by speaking with the voice of the eternal: 
Tendremos, como todos los humanos, una separación 
Pero a partir de ese momento nuestras horas serán ya irreparables 
como las de los dioses. Alégrate, mujer, alégrate 
porque no quedará un solo lugar sobre la tierra 
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donde podemos encontrar el olvido, la paz, el apetito, el sueño. (357) 
 It comes as no surprise, then, – given the repairing mechanisms found in language – 
that the poet sees language and love as his only habitable nation, which he worships like a 
god: 
La carne me ha enseñado el más hondo saber 
y el lenguaje me enseña su lección venerable: 
que el Tiempo es un abrazo del hombre y la mujer, 
que el universo es una palabra formidable. (309) 
Love entails preserving at any cost the unity of memory and language, even if it 
involves unbearable pain: “ni pidas socorro al olvido […] sin este tormento que llega en 
la memoria/ tu soledad sería mortal” (308). The action of keeping memory reunited, and 
avoiding its tearing apart, even if fallible or beset with suffering, is also an act of love, as 
Cernuda declares in “El ruiseñor sobre la piedra” from Las nubes: “Pero en la vida 
todo/Huye cuando el amor quiere fijarlo” (1993: 315). Like Cernuda, the poetic voice in 
Grande’s work does not delude itself in this respect. It knows too well the devastating 
effects of time : 
Las cosas nacen, fulgen,  
se arruinan, son recuerdos 
recuerdos capitales 
que se avienen a menos, 
recuerdos veniales 
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que van y van cediendo 
mientras la nada cunde 
por afuera y por dentro, 
hasta que un día el hombre 
se pregunta ¿estoy muerto? 
 
Y quizá hace ya siglos 
que yacía bajo el tiempo. (89) 
When memory retreats, nothingness (death) takes over. And yet memory stands as 
the only useful antidote. It is an aggregating force which eventually fixes the 
fragmentation that time brings about. It establishes some unity, even if this is precarious 
or transient. Without unity there is no life that can be called as such, nor is the idea of self 
possible. Behind this idea there is no particular school of thought, apart from the 
quotation by Luis Rosales, “lo vivo era lo junto” (1996: 187), which might have had a 
bearing on the poetic voice’s own ideas.72 Language, which is to a great extent the 
embodiment of memory, serves this very same purpose of containing and holding things 
together. Thus it comes as no surprise that the critique of language and its result, its 
emphatic enhancement of the inextricable haunting of nothingness in language, has not 
received Grande’s endorsement. He argues that we need language to deal with 
nothingness. If we assume that language is no more than nothingness, what other kind of 
                                                 
72 Ricoeur (1992) defends the idea that identity must be based on at least certain fixity within 
constant change. 
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“language” can be used to deal with nothingness? According to Grande, there are no other 
means for dealing with nothingness. Therefore, without language (and this includes 
music) we would be condemned to the “discourse” of silence. Language means for 
Grande the rebuttal of nothingness. Thus by nurturing our love for language, our own 
identity is enhanced. If love fails, language diminishes too and so does identity:  
El desamor nos vacía de lenguaje […] La vida era lo junto y, de pronto, la unidad se 
disgrega, y el yo se queda absorto y fragmentado, sin el alivio de poderse reconocer. Es 
algo que habla en otro idioma. Un idioma ininteligible, que duele porque es 
desconocido, porque nos condena a una rencorosa, desvalida mudez. (1996: 188) 
Behind the association of muteness and suffering there is the fear of asymbolia. 
Separation from language, silence, means the impossibility of symbolic apprehension as a 
defense mechanism from depression. Kristeva in Black Sun puts it this way: “the 
melancholy person appears to stop cognizing as well as uttering, sinking into the 
blankness of asymbolia” (1989: 33). The poetic voice’s rejection of the idea that silence 
illuminates existence must be understood in the context of the relationship between 
silence and suicide. There is the poet’s realization that while nothingness (death) can be 
conceived of, resignation to it cannot. He resists the notion that silence and nothingness 
are epiphanies on the grounds that they constitute a premature death. Therefore, Grande 
condemns the certitude with which it is often expressed in the language of those poets 
who exercise a critique of language. In the following paragraph it is difficult not to see 
the poet’s critique of the modern crisis of the word, incarnated in the so-called “poética 
del silencio”: 
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La separación nos roba el ser –o nos lo escamotea— y nos deja únicamente el alvéolo 
de ser: algo parecido a la nada. ¿Y ahora? ¿Y ahora? Ah, ahora, los más apresurados 
identifican esa experiencia de supremo analfabetismo, de clamorosa e impúdica 
ignorancia, con la conciencia de la muerte y con un nuevo orden donde reina la nada. 
Pero los más humildes, muy trabajosamente, muy lentamente, corazón, muy despacio, 
inician, con cuidado conmovedor, la reconquista del lenguaje. (1996: 188) 
 The above passage can be taken as exerting a veiled critique of a form of criticism 
that regarded silence as a brilliant achievement of thought. Implicit in the revering of 
silence is the mistrust in the idea that the poet is able to create a dwelling in and through 
language. Grande considers this discourse of silence as utter illiteracy, clamorous and 
shameless ignorance. According to him, the prestige of silence and nothingness was 
engendered by an insufficiently thought-out view of the implications of the issue. Grande 
believes that it is precisely language that which “saves” us, gives us a habitable space to 
protect us from chaos. It is a home and a shelter, which makes it admirable: “[palabra] 
que intentas construirme un mundo en este mundo” (98). Furthermore, the poet cannot 
imagine life without language: “sin ti, mi vida ya no sé lo que sería / algo como un sonido 
que no se puede oír” (98).  
Lack of language, compared to a silent music, is diminishing of individual and 
social life. One of the poetic images that he uses to refer to language is “fire”, around 
which humanity gathers together to warm itself. This image of language recalls Valente’s 
“palabras de la tribu”. Grande does not ignore the fact that language is necessarily a 
collective creation and that poetry itself emanates from collective feelings and emotions. 
More precisely, universal human feelings (“las emociones oceánicas” [1999: 129]) have a 
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history behind them and that history is not individual, but rather a painstakingly collective 
creation of humankind. Without that backdrop one could not even think of writing a 
poem. In this respect he recognizes his indebtedness to collections of collective literary 
creations, such as popular poetry, Romanceros and the poetry of flamenco.73 
 The imagery used to refer to language reveals that the poet considers language as 
that which illuminates: “[palabra] Eres una cerilla para mí”, what is otherwise obscurity 
and void: 
como ésa 
que enciendo por la noche y con la luz que vierte 
alcanzo a ir a la cama viendo un poco, como ésa; 
sin ti, sería tan duro llegar hasta la muerte. (98) 
In the following stanza, the poetic voice’s bedroom and bed are used as metaphors 
of both the journey and the final point in the journey of life: “[palabra] cruzo contigo el 
dormitorio/ desde la puerta niña hasta la cama anciana” (1989: 98). Bedroom and bed are 
used with the same meaning as the image of the river leading to the sea, alluded to in the 
following verse, was for Jorge Manrique the metaphor for dying:  
Gracias sean para ti, gracias sean, mi hormiga 
ahora que a la mitad de la alcoba va el río. 
Después, el mar; tú y yo ahogando la fatiga,  
                                                 
73 On 1 March 2007, Grande gave a conference in the Instituto Cervantes (London) on the 
“cancionero flamenco” in which he defended its often unacknowledged literary value.  
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alcanzando abrazados la fama del vacío. (1989: 98)                                                                           
 In Félix Grande’s poetry reflections upon the subject of language tend to be 
positive and metaphoric. His poems, instead of exerting a demystifying critique of 
language, do celebrate language. It is obvious that for Grande the gift of language 
outweighs its imperfections. It is not that the poet cannot see the traumatic event at the 
origin of which the creation of language is situated—the progressive and painful 
separation of human beings from nature, that is, the abandonment of a paradisiacal pre-
Oedipal state—but, rather, that he refuses to reject or criticize exactly what can be 
employed to ease and relieve trauma. In fact, the wound of the trauma to which he refers 
with various names, such as the scar (cicatriz), decay (caries) or simply the wound (la 
herida), and for which language serves the end of a healer, is a constant presence in his 
poetry. This wound is readable through and through Grande’s work. And even if one 
cannot fully explain the wound verbally, still traumatic reality slips through language, 
facilitating the (partial and incomplete) access to the unknown. The following passage 
metaphorically describes the sickly pervasiveness of trauma: 
Advirtió que tenía un hueco, una especie de alvéolo apócrifo y grandioso […] conforme 
iba notando que el hueco se agrandaba […] ese hueco vertiginoso que al parecer 
necesitaba ser una cueva bajo su piel o un centro palpitante en el fondo de sus ideas 
[…] pensaba ligeramente en ir a la casa de un psiquiatra, pero como esa cosa, esa 
caverna, le hacía pensar que era el universo lo que resultaba confuso, comprendía que la 
humildad a que lo reducía esa caries le vedaba la recuperación: […] y el hueco seguía 
creciendo con una silenciosa y enigmática presencia […] allí donde estaba, fuera donde 
  
144
fuera, ya no cabía cómodamente […] En ocaciones, por entre las palabras le emergían 
pedazos de ese hueco. (1975a: 11-12)  
In a short story from Parábolas (1975) still another word is added to the lexicon of 
trauma: “momia”. The poet begs for “piedad para quien tiene una momia, porque la 
tengo, porque no logré ajusticiarla” (1975a: 71) and compassion for “los seres que tienen 
momia. Charlar con ellos, agradecerles su desgracia” (1975a: 72). It is an interesting story 
because it shows two things. On the one hand, the narrative voice’s libidinal attachment 
to the lost Object. In the following passage we find the narrative voice wishing to practice 
a coitus with the “thing” (an indefinite presence) that accompanies him everywhere and 
that is the cause of his “existencia insoportablemente confusa”. The narrative voice gives 
an overwhelming power to this entity, for he thinks that if he could symbolically 
understand what this shadow is by metaphorically loving this “thing”, as in the end 
happens, everything would become clear and coherent at once, the significance of the 
“thing” in his life, why it accompanied him everywhere, this impenetrable mystery, “la 
respuesta a toda mi existencia”, would be finally exposed, his “unity” finally restored. 
Perhaps the reference here to a female body, pleasure and the desire for unity and 
completeness makes it almost inevitable to think of the profound psychic longing to re-
establish the sense of unity characterizing the pre-Symbolic order.74  
Tenía yo la sensación, la sospecha de que, de haber sido posible vivir un coito con 
semejante cuerpo, con semejante infinitud profunda, antiquísima e inalterable, ello 
                                                 
74 See my analysis of “Como una inundación”, pp. 256-261. 
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hubiera significado quizá algo así como la organización de todas mis horas, como la 
unidad, el orden de todo mi destino, y, además, por medio de un acto gozoso. Hubiera 
significado algo así como la respuesta a toda mi existencia insoportablemente confusa. 
Porque, como ya he dicho, yo soy un hombre sencillo y aspiro a la coherencia de las 
cosas. (1975a: 61). 
On the other hand, the passage gives us a useful insight of what is at stake in 
Grande’s relationship with language. It is not only that language gives, in fact allows, 
contact with the traumatic wound—often it is a passive, melancholic and masochistic 
self-indulgence in the wound, although the passage above shows a jouissant symbolic 
transfiguration of injury—, language provides that sought-after coherence, by annulling 
separation and pursuing unity. Grande seeks a shelter in language, “una caverna de 
descanso” (111), a temporary halt, a truce from the devastating effects of continuing 
suffering. In fact, the verse calls for a comparison with animals in their shelters. A human 
being likes to “withdraw into his corner” and “it gives him pleasure to do so”, writes 
Bachelard (1994: 91). But in the following lines we learn that the “caverna de descanso” 
is a womb which demonstrates to what degree the erotic is interwoven with the 
“maternal” security language confers. Maternal, not only because it nurtures and protects, 
but, foremost, because it gives birth to the self: 
y entonces 
se enrosca a un cuerpo de mujer 
y convierte en un gesto turbulento 
lo que mantiene al mundo 
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y busca en la matriz no un siempre venturoso 
sino un jamás enérgico, 
no un hijo sino una caverna de descanso,  
no un porvenir ilusionado  
sino el umbrío rincón para la fiera herida; (111) 
  
3.2 Grande’s “theory” of memory and forgetting 
 
Ese don que nos consiente tener reunida nuestra vida: la memoria 
(Grande, Biografía) 
Siento gratitud hacia los seres que me ayudaron a descubrir la grandeza de la memoria. 
(Grande, Once artistas y un dios) 
No creo honesto negar el pasado […] usando para ello el desvergonzado procedimiento 
del olvido  
(Grande, Once artistas y un dios) 
 
Reyes Mate argues that Spanish is not a language for logos; Spanish is, he asserts, a 
language for memory (“the memory that confronts the forgetfulness of logos” [2001: 
260]). By this he means that there has generally been a lack of philosophical thinking in 
Spanish. María Zambrano (1939) also made the same remark—that Spain has not 
generally been a country of philosophers. Reflecting on the relationship between poetry 
and philosophy, she states that it is within the realm of poetry that any genuine Spanish 
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thinking takes place. So, according to both philosophers, Spanish thinking has taken place 
less within the framework of logical categories, that is, in the mould of philosophy, than 
within the context of literary forms of “thought”. 
By the same token the historian Sánchez González observes that: 
[…] Aunque pueda parecer paradójico, los historiadores en general, y los españoles en 
particular, hemos reflexionado muy poco sobre la naturaleza y posibilidades de un 
concepto como el de la Memoria. (2004: 153) 
According to Ignacio Sotelo, Spanish literature has recently been greatly concerned 
with memory, but the same cannot be said of literary criticism: 
La “memoria” histórica ha ocupado una posición destacada en la novelística española 
[…] los ejemplos son tan abundantes que echamos de menos un libro que muestre las 
raíces profundas de la “memoria histórica” en la literatura de los últimos decenios. 
(2007: 16)  
The quotations above are particularly revealing when it comes to the study of 
memory in Grande’s work. For, if we bear them in mind, we can happily assert that the 
work of Grande surely offers an insightful reflection on the mechanisms and dynamics of 
memory. Yet the visions on memory that spring from his work vary if we isolate his 
poetry from his prose. Whereas in prose Grande demonstrates an awareness of the subject 
of memory and develops his own coherent thoughts on the topic—his own “theory”, one 
might be tempted to venture—it is rather in his poetry where forms of traumatic memory 
manifest themselves more clearly. Put differently, Grande’s poetry shows a sick 
functioning of memory, insofar as it displays the workings of mechanisms closely linked 
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to trauma, such as obsessions, blocked memory, hallucinations, narcissistic identifications 
and melancholia. These differences may rely on the specificity of the “genre” (if it is one) 
of poetry in contraposition to the genre of the essay. Carmen Martín Gaite, for example, 
observes in her introduction to his work in verse that prose is the conduit to tell stories in 
a detached manner, “un vehículo de historias menos apegadas a la mía” (2001: 16). More 
significantly, it is also the particular nature of trauma that makes poetry especially prone 
to becoming more revelatory of a damaged memory, for it is in poetry that the breaches in 
cognitive thought characterizing trauma can be better staged.  This is not to say that in 
Grande’s poetry the treatment of memory is exclusively traumatic, since we also find 
fitting sentences about the normal functioning of memory, and interesting observations 
about memory and ethics, as well as memory’s connections with language and identity. It 
needs saying that even if Grande’s poetical memory remains to a great extent unhealthy 
(although, paradoxically, traumatic recalling seeks a cure precisely in the act of 
remembering), the poetic voice never ceases to rate it highly. 
I will mainly draw on the essayistic work Memoria del flamenco to show that 
Grande’s thinking of memory is original, in that he shied away from what were at the 
time common views. Grande’s way of understanding memory is largely opposed to the 
disillusioned vision shared by most of his contemporaries. His vision includes reflections 
on memory’s mechanisms and practices that have come to coincide with an important 
part of current research carried out by experts from different fields. His poetical intuitions 
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are relevant for their philosophical, cultural and ethical import, and clarify from the 
perspective of literature what is a highly theoretical topic.75  
If Memoria del flamenco shows Grande’s “theoretical” grasp on the practices (uses 
and abuses) of memory, this relentless belief in “good” memory and in the ways it can 
triumph over memory’s more destructive aspects has culminated in the writing of his 
(2003) fictionalized autobiography, La balada del abuelo Palancas. Even if trauma 
admits a difficult (full) resolution, we have nevertheless to concede that Grande’s novel is 
a remarkable attempt to narrate his life in ways that are not venomous or overtly self-
destructive. Foremost, biographical and historical events are put into narrative form, 
which is already a step forward in working through trauma. In addition to this, all the 
mechanisms of a “good” memory are set in motion, to the point that perceptions of the 
past are radically different from the traumatic ways in which experience is treated and 
worked through (and even left unspoken) in his poetry. La balada del abuelo Palancas is 
seemingly a practical exercise, even an embodiment, of Grande’s prescriptions for a good 
use of memory explicitly alluded to in Memoria del flamenco.  
We need to take into account that Grande’s latest work in verse is a collection of 
poems completed in 1984. This means that Grande has not published poetry for more than 
two decades. Twenty years are a considerable amount of time to work through trauma, 
and given the self-analytic skills the poet shows he is endowed with in his poetry, where 
                                                 
75 I am thinking, for instance, of Ricoeur’s study of memory. What Grande has in common with 
Ricoeur’s thought is, fundamentally, his believing in what Ricoeur calls “good” memory. Ricoeur 
states: “It is important, in my opinion, to approach the description of mnemonic phenomena from 
the standpoint of the capacities, of which they are the 'happy' realization […] What in the final 
analysis, will justify taking this position in favor of 'good' memory is my conviction, which the 
remainder of this study will seek to establish, that we have no other resource, concerning our 
reference to the past, except memory itself” (2006: 21). 
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he sets out on a quest through an abyss of inwardness, as will be seen, it comes as no 
surprise that in La balada del abuelo Palancas Grande attempts a reconciliation with his 
own memory (a difficult enterprise which his poetry challenges in any case) and with the 
memory of his historical circumstances.  
When Grande stopped writing, the dictatorship had been over for some years and the 
Spanish transition into democracy was confidently established. However, this conscious 
exercise of memory in La balada del abuelo Palancas does not cancel the work of 
mourning carried out in his poetry. Neither does it mean that Grande’s work of mourning 
has been completed. For, as we have seen in relation to the fashioning of the self, an 
author is able to create new sides to the self that nevertheless do not invalidate other 
dimensions which are far more problematic and less likely to be articulated through 
narrative means. This amounts to saying that La balada del abuelo Palancas is an 
extended part of his previous work. 
As already pointed out, differences in the treatment of the problem of the past may 
be accounted for by the specific nature of the “genre” of the novel, as opposed to the 
particularities of poetry to which I referred in chapter II. Since in this thesis I set out to 
demonstrate the two distinguishable aspects of Grande’s memory, its traumatic 
manifestations in poetry, on the one hand, and the poet’s effort to make sense of the 
phenomenon in prose (especially in the paradigm of the essay), I claim that these two 
distinct modalities of memory are sufficiently demonstrated, first, in my exploration of 
his poetry, and, second, in Memoria del flamenco. La balada del abuelo Palancas would 
not add anything significantly different or new from what I show in my discussion of 
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Memoria del flamenco. Therefore, I will not dwell on it to discuss the good uses of 
memory which will be addressed in the following pages.  
In Memoria del flamenco explicit and straightforward reflections on memory are 
conflated with patterns of recalling that unveil an underlying structure of memory. 
Grande states: “Si es cierto que este libro es un homenaje al flamenco no es menos cierto 
que es también, en un segundo plano, un homenaje a la memoria” (1999: 486). These 
reflections are particularly applied to the gypsies and to the Jews. In the preface to it, 
Caballero Bonald states that: 
Se trata, en cierto modo, de un texto cuyo despliegue parece obedecer a una conducta 
fluvial: a medida que avanza en su curso se va engrosando –diversificando– con un 
singular acopio de afluencias. No pocas de ellas vienen de los yacimientos de la 
erudición, otras –abundantes también– provienen de un opulento manantial de 
intuiciones y contribuyen a enriquecer lo que pudo haber discurrido por un deficitario 
cauce emocional. (1999: 9) 
Grande’s vision emerges from a variety of sources, which include poetic intuition. 
Memoria del flamenco is a book written by a poet with, to a great extent, poetical instinct 
or, to use Kristeva’s words, with chora.76 There is also intellectual erudition in Grande’s 
analysis of memory, especially when he examines the cultural and historical remembering 
of minority ethnic groups. More interestingly, Grande’s observations stem, perhaps, from 
his own experience of the catastrophe of inner exile.   
                                                 
76 Kristeva defines “semiotic chora” as the “flow of jouissance into language” (1984: 79), which, 
according to Calvin Bedient means that “art utters what cannot be uttered: instinct” (1990: 807). 
  
152
As his writing is essentially poetic, even when he writes in prose, the form that his 
thinking takes is, to a great degree, intuitive. Intuition is precisely what makes Memoria 
del flamenco a book between history and memory. The orthodox practice of history is 
counterbalanced here by the tacit knowledge of a form of representation that does not 
have to rely necessarily on a scientific methodology and, yet, is endowed with 
epistemological value. In the book we are presented with a form of knowledge that ranges 
from anthropology to art. And art bears its own kind of anthropological knowledge. 
Caballero Bonald draws a parallel between the flamenco song (a form of knowledge) and 
an ontological mode of becoming: “No hace falta decirlo: un modo de cantar define 
antropológicamente un modo de ser” (1999: 16). According to Derrida, too, the bearing 
witness of memory has to do not only with language, as it is also inextricably connected 
with music:  
Bearing witness is not through and through and necessarily discursive. It is sometimes 
silent. It has to engage something of the body, which has no right to speak. We should 
not say, or believe, that bearing witness is entirely discursive, through and through a 
matter of language. (2005: 77) 
Memory, then, is not only connected with words; it is also connected with the body 
as it is interwoven with music. Derrida uses the word “silent” in contraposition to 
“discursive”, so there is no need to understand silent as “no meaning”. Grande himself 
refers to the eloquence of silence. This is especially true of flamenco singing, a very 
physical singing where the so-called “ayeo”, that is, the inarticulate lamentation—almost 
a pitiful cry—along with its silent pauses as well as body gesticulation, are as meaningful 
  
153
as the words themselves. Grande observes that the memory that inheres in the flamenco 
song is the “missing” link unifying history with the self: 
Lo que en el cante anuda al ser y al tiempo histórico es esa forma de moral sin la cual el 
hombre no sería emocionante, el arte carecería de duración, los pueblos no tendrían 
proyecto: la memoria. […] Las vivencias […] ¿se han convertido ya en memoria en el 
interior de los cantes? (1999: 486) 
The artistic lament springs from a primitive scream—a form of moral complaint—
bonded to memory from the remotest origins of the self. Memory, inseparable from the 
ways of practicing it, defines an anthropological way of existence, that is, of making 
sense of the world.  
Grande’s memory, as his own sense-making mechanism, is grounded not only on his 
own experiences but also supported by the memory of others, especially the collective 
memory of the gypsies as an ethnic group. Grande is a conoisseur of Andalusian gypsies’ 
customs and traditions and an expert on their practices of memory. In his poetry, 
Grande’s life experience comes to merge with their experience in dramatic questions, 
such as traumatic loss. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Grande’s first serious 
approximation to the subject of memory (Memoria del flamenco) took the form of a book 
that had the history of the Andalusian gypsies as protagonist, given the interest and 
intense communion he held with this minority. So, interestingly enough, he articulates his 
private memories through the cultural memory of this ethnic group. Perhaps, Grande 
found in the memory of flamenco an effective way to objectify and give a narrative 
context to his own painful remembrances, making the book a good example of how the 
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private and the collective are embedded in one another. Memoria del flamenco also refers 
to the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Grande justifies his including reflections on the 
Shoa in the book in terms of his own life: 
Los individuos de mi generación hemos leído una gran cantidad de documentación 
sobre aquella barbarie antisemita. […] El horror hizo que al pensar en judíos gaseados 
pensáramos en nosotros mismos; y a nosotros, no hay duda, nos pensamos como 
personas. Si el judío pudo haber sido el otro, ahora ya no lo era: ardía como hubiera 
ardido nuestro padre, se vaciaba de su singularidad y dejaba al desnudo a una persona 
como tú, incluso como yo. (1999: 444) 
Even if Grande gives historical facts and dates, he does not refer to memory from 
the perspective of a professional historian, which he is not, or as an expert on memory--
although he laments that history hardly pays attention to that other form of historical 
knowledge that memory is—but, rather, through the analytical methodology he derives 
from his own living and understanding of memory. The first identifiable aspect of 
memory he highlights, which can also be found in the gypsies’ use of memory, is 
precisely its being ingrained in the body. Memory, he observes, is a living organism for 
whose description we need images of the body. He employs corporeal metaphors, some 
of them borrowed from flamenco gypsies. Grande assures us that the last element to 
disappear among all the sensitive components attached to memory, the sense that remains 
when the others have almost disappeared, is the sense of touch. In order to support this, 
he cites Manolo Alcántara: “De los recuerdos, como de los náufragos, lo último que se ve 
son las manos” (cited in Grande 1999: 23).  
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Other images of the body that he identifies with memory are “veins” and “blood”:  
[…] el latido de los años circulando en esta inmensa red de venas calendarias, en ese 
otro sistema circulatorio al que llamamos memoria. La memoria es también la verdad y 
la vida, otra manera de la sangre.  (1999: 24) 
For Grande memory engages with life. It is so powerful as to win over and outlive 
death itself: “la muerte tiene incluso más fuerza que los niños, pero menos que los 
recuerdos” (2003: 215).77 As a consequence, illness comes along when memory fails us: 
A veces la memoria empeora, y la emoción se vuelve anémica. En otras ocasiones nos 
falla la memoria, y uno se apoya contra la pared, sin fuerzas y perplejo como un 
enfermo. (1999: 24) 
Upon this trait of memory, its being a living organism that can contract diseases, 
rests precisely one of Grande’s intuitive and yet accurate comprehensions of what 
memory is: a living entity which is therefore subject to constant change. Grande’s words 
are intended as a metaphor, yet his intuition is remarkably accurate. This analogy of 
memory being blood and veins reminds us of the bio-physiological constitution of 
memory. Some experts believe that memory, rather than a product of thinking, is literally 
a material place that can be located in the brain. For these “materialist” scientists, there is 
no such a thing as the mind. Brain is all there is (Ruiz-Vargas 2002).  
                                                 
77 A mighty memory is also the idea behind some of Alberti’s lines in “Retornos del amor en los 
balcones”, in which “retornos” manifest the evocative power of memory and the force with which 
it resuscitates the past: “Ha llegado ese tiempo en que los años/ las horas, los minutos, los 
segundos vividos/ se perfilan en ti, se llenan de nosotros,/ y se hace urgente, se hace necesario,/ 
para no verlos irse con la muerte,/ fijar en ellos nuestras más dichosas,/ sucesivas imágenes” 
(2006: 330).  
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Being a living organism, should memory be lacking, there are consequences for the 
body. We may become sick or, what is worse, become living corpses. This happens, 
according to the poet, when we attempt to escape, negate or avoid memory: 
Hay quien, un día, escapando de su memoria, huyéndola, negándola, se da cuenta de 
pronto de que ha muerto, de que se ha convertido en un ser macilento, superfluo, 
vegetal: lo que llamamos, con precisión cruel, un cadáver viviente. (1999: 24) 
Since Grande establishes an unavoidable link between memory and identity—a 
connection that contemporary research has widely acknowledged (see Middleton and 
Woods 2000)—no memory means the self’s annihilation, an “être-pour-la-mort” (Ricoeur 
2007), death-in-life. 
The capacity of memory to create identity resides in its ability to unify, to put 
together different elements and in so doing produce sense and meaning from scattered 
elements. In other words, it confers sense to the relationality that combines dispersed 
objects, therefore, turning them into proper “experience”. This is the characteristic of 
memory that justifies for Grande its fundamental role in his life. He finds in memory the 
same reassuring sense of uninterrruption only comparable to the perception of 
connectedness in nature. It comes as no surprise, then, that he uses metaphors taken from 
nature to express this illusion of seamless continuity provided by memory. He selects 
words such as “mies” and “sarmiento”, perhaps because for Grande nature is the first and 
ultimate memory, the book from which human beings have learnt to read. Here, again, we 
  
157
confirm Grande’s material attitude toward making sense of the world, also the world of 
the immaterial:78 
Es importante nuestro trato con la memoria: ella es la tomiza que maniata los haces de 
mies, es también la cadena que sujeta los perros de la vida, y el sarmiento que anuda a 
la gavilla que nos calentará las manos; ella es lo que reúne. (1999: 24) 
Indeed. One of the central operations of memory is to unify. Memory selects and 
combines those elements so that meaning can be produced. This is not to say that memory 
does not include contradiction or is not fraught with inconsistencies. “Sense” and 
“identity” are terms that entail at least some unity and coherence but which, nevertheless, 
do not necessarily foreclose meaning or rule out change. Sense indicates that there has 
been a process of recognizing, selecting and associating, so that we can make sense of 
ourselves and the world, preventing our identity from going adrift. In this regard Grande 
reminds us that relinquishing memory means our own mutilation or dissolution into 
nothingness. 
Grande’s faithful attachment to memory—for him a moral issue—functions at his 
own emotional cost. Too much remembering—or rather the obsessive repetition of certain 
patterns of remembering—leads the poet to display a great deal of complacency with 
neurosis. But this will be analyzed at length in the final chapter.  For the most part, in 
regard to Grande’s “theory” of memory, oblivion means forgetting those elements that 
                                                 
78 I use the expression “material attitude” rather than “materialism” as the latter sometimes has a 
negative meaning. 
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have configured our public and inner lives and which we cannot do without paying a 
price: 
Es cierto que en ocasiones no podemos del todo con nuestra vida entera; desearíamos 
abandonar en una plaza silenciosa una época particularmente perversa, perder por las 
calles años completos de demasiado barro, borrar sucesos testarudos con testarudo 
olvido. Pero quizá la vida es como un cuerpo: y separar alguna parte es simplemente 
una mutilación. (1999: 24) 
In this quotation the adjective “silenciosa” accompanying “plaza” is not arbitrary or 
casual. Silence threatens when memory ceases to exist. In fact, Grande’s theory of 
memory is connected with his questioning of a deliberate and seemingly suicidal quest for 
silence. If, for many poets, poetry consisted in a purposeful pursuit of silence, this 
approach has gone mainly unused in Grande’s work. Not least in the manner of a literary 
technique or a thought-out plan. Grande’s poetry does not encourage silence but it 
contains silence. Silence as the theoretical premise behind poetic creation is in contrast 
with the kind of silence engendered by the poet’s inability to grasp something which is 
beyond expressibility. It is in Grande’s work a void or zone of indeterminacy. And it also 
points indirectly to the presence of a totalizing discourse that under the Franco regime 
stifled artistic creation. Seen in the light of the historical context of authoritarianism and 
terrorist nationalism, it is easier to understand the artist’s quest for his own voice and 
identity. The artist then becomes the voice of the Other, the non-place left for alterity.    
 Another discernible characteristic of Grande’s theory of memory implicit in his 
Memoria del flamenco, has to do with particular uses and practices of memory. In the first 
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pages of the book, Grande tells us about a man in conflict with his own memory, and 
embarks on a reflection to suggest that the way we remember is a question of will. In 
clear disagreement with the statement that our memories are imposed on us, as 
indomitable and untamed forces, Grande believes that one can choose to misuse and 
abuse memories or, conversely, learn how to make good use of them. Of the man in 
conflict with his memory, Grande writes that he possessed: “una memoria contrariada, a 
la defensiva, una memoria a la cual estaba agrediendo con sus provocaciones” (1999: 25). 
The ability to use memory for our own good is a gift, which is also linked to the concept 
of responsibility. Herein rest the ethical aspects of Grande’s theory of memory: 
La memoria no es un regalo, no es una caricia del tiempo, no es invariablemente un 
bien: es un don y también un desafío al coraje, es un espejo de agua, es la palabra de 
honor que nuestra fidelidad le da a la vida. No siempre podemos cumplirla, y entonces 
nos sentimos iracundos, e incluso miserables. Y se nos desdibuja el rostro. (1999: 24) 
Grande shows that memory cannot be thought beyond its uses, for it does not exist 
in abstract terms, except in a world of abstractions. Memory is ineluctably connected with 
practices of memory. It is not unconditionally good, he states, as the kindness or the harm 
of memory depends on its uses. To remind us of the different elements the practices of 
memory put into play, Grande brings forth the question of perception. By relating the act 
of remembering with that of perceiving, he suggests that the way we see things is, 
ultimately, our choice. He illustrates this view by showing how a pernicious use of 
memory, for which the man in conflict with his memory serves as an example, engenders 
violence and suffering: 
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Sus ojos no estaban furiosos, sino desesperados; imposible quizá saber de dónde le 
llegaba esa violencia estúpida y suicida; probablemente algún estorbo había en su vida, 
una desilusión, no sé, una desgracia: y una memoria contrariada, a la defensiva, una 
memoria a la cual estaba agrediendo con sus provocaciones y con su vino 
descompuesto; […] qué habrá sido de aquel hombre patético; quizá le haya pegado un 
tiro alguien más desesperado que él, o acaso esté en la cárcel, o haya muerto en 
Vietnam, o exhiba o esconda una medalla militar, o ande pegando puñetazos sobre una 
mesa para humillar a sus subordinados. (1999: 24-25)  
Grande is remembering here how anger interferes with memory—how emotions 
weigh on the selection and combination of individual memories—and in so doing he 
leads us to the ethics of the self: a violent and disturbed identity springs from a memory 
in conflict with itself. This, which serves for the individual, can be applied to any society 
or community where conflicting memories generate violence.  
According to Kahneman (2006), the secret of happiness resides in memory, for 
which discovery he has recently gained a Nobel Prize.79 He argues that memory is not a 
passive mechanism of retrieval—we actively reconstruct our memories: 
Attualmente sono in favore di un modello ibrido, di una visione più complessa e 
integrata, che tenga conto sia dell’esperienza vissuta che del modo di archiviarla, 
classificarla, riviverla e raccontar(ce)la. Ricordare, rivivere e narrare le nostre 
esperienze è per noi importante, anche se il loro vissuto originario era per noi diverso. 
(2006: 24) 
                                                 
79 In an interview conducted by an Italian newspaper, Il Corriere della Sera, Kahneman declared 
that: “È nel ricordo la vera natura della felicità” (2006: 31). 
  
161
Such a reconstruction of memory (the archiving, classifying and way of narrating 
experience, according to Kahneman) needs to take place with the intervention of 
imagination. Richard Schoch, who has extensively researched the subject of happiness 
(2006), has come to the similar conclusion that the use of imagination brings happiness 
and that the former is a component of the Real: “imagination is the path to happiness. But 
imagination is less about making things up (which is fantasy) than about grasping truths 
that lie beyond rational comprehension”.  
Grande reveals in his texts that, somehow, he was aware of the above, namely, that 
memory is not exactly imposed on us but, rather, that narrative memory has very much to 
do with ethical choices. According to him, a self-denying memory may well be equal to 
oblivion (“desmemoria”): 
Resentidos o zalameros, hostiles o ceremoniosos, conmovedores o irritantes, unos 
simulando un heroísmo que con toda seguridad no tienen y que sin duda creen necesitar 
y otros apostrofando con un valor colérico y necio a cuanto se mueve junto a ellos, unos 
insultando a sus ausentes familiares, otros insultándose aplicadamente a sí mismos, 
unos agrediendo a quien se demora por mirarlos, otros asustándose de cualquier mirada 
inocente e incluso compasiva, cayendo al suelo con desinterés o incorporándose con 
exhausto orgullo, mostrando un iracundo puño u ocultando el rostro en las manos, 
vomitando pudorosamente detrás de las puertas de un coche u orinando con ostentación 
o con indiferencia  en medio de una plaza; vociferantes, silenciosos y hasta, en 
ocasiones, gimiendo o cubiertos de lágrimas…, pero siempre llenos de un raro y turbio 
frío, acompañados o perseguidos por su exilio: solos. Muestran una derrota y a la vez 
una desmemoria. (1999: 25-26) 
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In the passage above Grande shows again that memory is linked to the ways we 
see; “see” in the sense of perceiving.80 Memory constitutes in itself a kind of perceiving, 
for which description Grande also uses the metaphor of drinking wine. Wine, he observes, 
can intensify our emotions, annihilate them or it can numb our senses. These three distinct 
ways of drinking wine may be taken as symbolizing three different practices of memory 
which can be arguably and metaphorically applied to three distinguishable periods in the 
recent Spanish history. Two of them are periods of our recent past, a third one can be said 
to be at the dawn of a recently inaugurated period for Spanish society. The first practice 
of memory or, to use Grande’s metaphor, the first mode of drinking wine, consists in 
annulling memory. Of those who use memory (or drink wine) in order to forget, Grande 
observes: 
Muestran una derrota y a la vez una desmemoria. Beben, ciertamente, para olvidar. Ya 
no pueden con todo, están profundamente fatigados o desilusionados o hartos y 
estrangulan a sus recuerdos con la mano del vino. En realidad quieren morir, o matar, y 
no pueden: matan y mueren con sordina; cubren su cabeza de olvido, cubren de olvido 
su eszaleado corazón. Beben un vino trágico. Un vino aislante, fronterizo, caído. Un 
vino en el fondo del cual hay ojos vacíos y bocas silenciosas y manos apagadas y 
palabras petrificadas y calendarios quietos: y unos cuantos siglos dormidos. Y, todavía, 
una lágrima. Una lágrima que ya empieza a secarse. (1999: 26) 
                                                 
80 Rafael Alberti, whose poetry presents similarities with that of Grande when it comes to the 
latter’s “theory” of memory, also relates a relinquishing of memory to losing the sense of sight. 
Alberti knows well that memory is a way of “seeing”. 
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Grande’s metaphoric words need to be read for what they imply as well as for what 
they say metaphorically. The realm of signification gathered in by Grande’s words 
expands here from his personal experience of those historical years to collective 
experience. Collectively, the necessity to forget was an urge to get rid of a painful past 
under the dictatorship, a willing strategy for survival. That survival is the driving force 
behind forgetting is well illustrated in the works not only of Grande but, also, of other 
poets such as Antonio Gamoneda and José Hierro. In Grande the need to forget assumes a 
reproachful tone, even if he recognizes that a state of utter desperation, mental exhaustion 
and disillusion may lead to willed forgetfulness (“desmemoria”). However, he argues, this 
is an unfortunate end for which memory should not be employed.  
In “Por los barrios del mundo viene sonando un lento saxofón”, and establishing a 
parallel between slavery and exploitation in America, the “old world” exploited white 
laborers and victims of war and deprivation, the poetic voice refers to the act of drinking 
wine in order to forget as a strategy for hiding desperation: “Blancos bebiendo el vino/ de 
la derrota disfrazada […] blancos desconcertados […] borrachos/ de vino y blancura 
injuriada” (1989: 178-179).   
The second practice of memory indicated by Grande has also much to do with 
forgetfulness. Yet, it is a kind of forgetfulness that is no longer a strategy of surviving 
but, rather, a sense of numbness originating in what Vilarós (1998), in her study of post-
Franco literature and culture, describes as a fracture produced in the text of the grand 
narrative of the Franco regime, which was brought to a halt in the years of the transition. 
Let us see how Grande metaphorically represents this use of memory by referring to a 
way of drinking wine which does not remember: 
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Hay un vino intermedio. No tiene relación con la memoria: no quiere asesinarla, no 
quiere acentuarla. Es un vino ruidoso, que ayuda a hablar, a reír, finalmente a dormir. 
Se toma en grupo, con abundancia y sin hacerle caso: no se cohabita con él, se le 
utiliza. Es el vino de las fiestas de fecha fija, es un vino excitante, veloz, sin 
imaginación. Junto a él hay sonidos de tenedores, músicas voluminosas de aparatos de 
radio, gritos de camareros o de anfitriones o invitados. (1999: 26) 
Grande invokes above the atmosphere of a never-ending “fiesta” in which the years 
of the Spanish transition to democracy were imbued, as the phenomenon of the “movida” 
illustrates. He goes on to observe: 
Es un vino que comparece […] en los sábados que lograron eludir la desgracia de las 
horas vacías. No tiene relación con la memoria. A este vino no se lo bebe con 
desesperación, ni con rencor, ni con autopiedad; tampoco se lo bebe con parsimonia y 
corazón, con lenta plenitud, con inteligencia del mundo. Se lo bebe, quizá, entre baile y 
baile, con avidez casual, o con una alegría que no tiene conciencia de su propio 
milagro, una alegría municipal, útil, muy sana, no muy conmovedora. (1999: 26) 
This use of memory that Grande describes in the passage above is illuminating of 
the “politics of memory” during the transition. Grande’s words “alegría que no tiene 
conciencia” indicate well the state of affairs at the time. Those were, undoubtedly, happy 
years in an anaesthetic fashion. What they lacked was, precisely, “inteligencia”, an 
intelligent way of employing memory. Instead, “desmemoria” was all there was. 
According to Vilarós: 
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La movida es, a pesar del ruido que produce, un silencio especial: el silencio de un 
pasmo. De ahí la siguiente afirmación de Herminio Molero: «En la movida hay siempre 
un problema de vacío. Es inverosímil. Por donde tires te encuentras con la nada, con 
eslabones que ya no existen. Es la historia de un vacío. Todo estaba a punto de ser y no 
ha sido». (1998: 37) 
Thus from the point of view of memory during the transition the big expected 
change did not occur. As Álvarez Fernández, citing Vázquez Montalbán, observes, the act 
of  “desmemoria” could be taken for granted “para los hijos o nietos de los ganadores de 
la Guerra civil y evidentemente ganadores de la transición”, for whom “la condena del 
levantamiento militar es inadmisible ya que sería como sacrificar la gallina de los huevos 
de oro que «les devolvió el poder para siempre»” (2007: 23). Yet, what it is more difficult 
to understand is that: 
Si los franquistas niegan con su actitud cualquier responsabilidad en los crímenes 
cometidos, también la sociedad española en su conjunto se empeña en ignorarlos al 
enterrar en el olvido y la indiferencia a las víctimas de la España vencida. (Álvarez 
Fernández 2007: 30) 
Thus for Grande neither the first nor the second use of memory described above 
should be the best employment of memory—perhaps the second is even less appropriate 
than the first—precisely because the two entail forgetfulness. Grande’s ethics of memory 
advocate a use of memory that is also a reflection on silence, as it discards oblivion 
preventing the memory of violence from falling into the nothingness of silence. Silence in 
this case is understood by the poet as a betrayal, a lack of loyalty to life. In relation to the 
  
166
kind of wine to which Grande referred above and which can be identified with the 
transition years, he states:  
Es un vino que no busca al olvido, pero que finalmente lo encuentra: en el sueño, en la 
fatiga, en el embotamiento, en la indiferencia de la repetición. Y ese olvido, aunque sin 
crispación, de algún modo también sustituye a la vida. De algún modo, la usurpa. De 
los días, de los hechos monótonos y repetidos, se desprende fantasmal, la ceniza del 
Universo. Este vino intermedio no reaviva el incendio de vivir. Sin vehemencia, sin 
hondura, modesto, el vino del presente carece incluso de lo que tiene aún el vino 
trágico: la lenta y solitaria lágrima que se enfría. (1999: 27) 
Thus, the employment of memory proposed by Grande is one which has to do with 
preventing the “lenta y solitaria lágrima” from becoming petrified, in other words, it has 
to do with the opposite of forgetting, that is, with the healing power of memory: this 
employment is precisely mourning. Grande’s entire work, in fact, can be considered a 
continuous labour of mourning. He mourns in solitude and vehemently by willingly 
entering in his burning memory. This is suggested by the title of the closing poem 
belonging to Las rubáiyátas, “El vino a solas, la memoria ardiendo” (1989: 372). He 
keeps warm the cry of memory and history which in others becomes cold or dry through 
no invocation. What Grande learns from the way the gypsies live their collective memory 
or what he shares with them, is to immerse himself in the oceanic cry of memory, he lets 
himself be drenched in its ardent waters. And he learns to do this with delicacy, 
peacefully and “a palo seco”, that is, without the accompaniment of anaesthetic or pain-
killers—and oblivion, he assures us, is the main pain-killer. Grande enters into the vast 
sea of suffering to become engulfed in pain, moreover, to be mastered by pain. In other 
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words, he invites us to confront the pain of loss. Yet this pain constitutes, paradoxically, a 
“dolor feliz” (1999: 27), since it is the only means for healing. Let us see how Grande 
describes this third and desirable way of drinking wine—that is, of remembering, of using 
memory—leading to mourning: 
Entonces recordé otra lágrima. Muy caliente. Digna de ser vista, descrita, memorada, 
envidiada. Bebo un sorbo de vino y entro con cierta vehemencia despaciosa en la 
memoria de una madrugada de cante. Fue la noche del 29 de agosto de 1969 […] Cierro 
los ojos y veo de manera muy nítida el gesto parsimonioso y absoluto con que Manolo 
Caracol toma sorbos de vino. Se le juntan las letras de fandango en la boca, las historias 
nefastas o brutalmente solidarias que cuentan esas letras con una escandalosa sencillez, 
esas letras misteriosas y reventonas como la barriga de las embarazadas. Caracol nos 
mira sin vernos, cabecea para recordar, toma su necesario sorbo y alarga el vaso 
silenciosamente para que alguien le ponga otra cinta de vino, manotea con tensa 
suavidad, desvariado, escuchando con bravura los fandangos de Juan de la Vara que 
Camarón edifica ladrillo a ladrillo, o levantando él mismo en una mezcla de Gaudí y 
Dostoievski edificios inverosímiles en donde la desgracia y la caridad se juntan con una 
voz destrozada y eterna para protestar por ese dolor como jamás tal vez ningún ser 
quizá de la Tierra lo hizo con tanto corazón sin embargo.  (1999: 27-28) 
Wine, language and voice are united here to recall an ancient pain and by so doing 
the poet carries out an act of condemnation or protest. The act of mourning entails a 
process of rendering suffering and the lost object into metaphorical meaning, it 
sublimates it into symbolic activity, and the joy and relief liberated in this process 
become the recompense of mourning, the “dolor feliz”. For Grande this process is a 
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process of consolation and solace that lies at the heart of words and in their rhythmic 
sound: “que vive palpitante en el fondo de las palabras y en los sonidos de la rima” (2003: 
183). Mourning in itself does not guarantee the disappearance of trauma, but it provides 
the path to work through it. Hence trauma is not simply re-lived in the act of mourning 
because the reliving of trauma would mean its endless and unendurable repetition. 
Instead, mourning implies that the survivor is aware that something overwhelming has 
impacted on him or her and owing to this recognition the survivor can begin to transform 
traumatic memory into a narrative pattern. Trauma tells its own story, which signifies that 
it cannot be easily identified or its origin found in a specific event or sets of events. When 
the gypsies sing and remember their millenarian suffering, they are certainly 
remembering certain conditions that they were forced to suffer. Yet, most of all, what 
they remember is the act of suffering itself, a suffering that has become the ultimate 
condition determining their ethnicity. It is, as María Teresa León puts it in Memoria de la 
melancolía when she writes about flamenco singing, suffering without a specific time or 
location: “fuera del tiempo, en la época del dolor del alma” (1989: 194).   Hence when 
they sing they refer to this suffering very often without attributing it to anything in 
particular. They remember just the state of being in pain, precisely because it has become 
part of them, flesh and spirit. The suffering of the flamenco gypsies does not always name 
its cause; it is the story of a void, it exists in its own right. It has been objectified, like 
trauma is objectified in a gap, the unnameable thing. Paradoxically, this unnameable thing 
needs no justification nor corroboration nor explanation. Bearing witness to one’s own 
traumatic experience that trauma involves, is not longing for historical verification, but 
human empathy and compassion—“caridad”, “misericordia”—(Grande 1999: 28). It does 
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not vindicate or reclaim. It does not expect to produce epistemological knowledge, 
although the truth it brings out is real and consists in our recognition, that is, our bearing 
witness to the survivor’s bearing witness that the suffering constitutes its own truth and 
carries its own legitimization.  
When Grande tells us that Manolo Caracol is singing and remembering he refers to 
his singing as “documento”, that is, a documental proof: 
Nada de lo que ocurra o se diga en este instante en esa habitación será mentira […] 
Aquí no se miente. En uno de esos gritos, en uno de esos documentos con que Caracol 
hoza en el origen del dolor o del amor como hoza un animal sediento por entre las 
ausencias del barro, oigo una voz llena de tiemblo que susurra Es un Dios. Miro a 
Quiñones: con la camisa abierta para escuchar con todo el pecho, tiene lágrimas en la 
cara y se tapa la boca con la mano. Con la otra mano buscaba, tanteando en la mesa, un 
vaso misericordioso. (1999: 28) 
Grande is well aware of the temporal dimension of the pain to which Caracol is 
bearing witness and he, moreover, by listening, becomes involved in the process of 
testifying, a process in which he is an empathetic testifier—every time Grande remembers 
the scene, he becomes a witness. Yet the objectification of pain makes it eternal. Grande’s 
further remarks on Caracol show this point: 
Han pasado unos años y veo esas lágrimas y esa noche sonando por entre mis 
recuerdos. Caracol no era un dios. Era uno de los más trágicos artistas que jamás haya 
dado el cante flamenco, y era una tensión ya casi de metal por el afán de unir la vida 
entera con el tiempo entero, y era nosotros participando de esa tensión que tiene cara de 
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reloj parado e infinito, y era mucha memoria ocupada en el laborioso destino de reunir a 
la vida, y era un vino profundo ocupado en el laborioso destino de reunir los caballos de 
la memoria. Vino tentacular, lleno de clemencia, tremante como la de un monstruo 
dormido, vino sabio que conoce la inmensa solidaridad que une a las horas más 
apartadas y las congrega. Vino profundo como el amor, la música, el lenguaje. (1999: 
28) 
Here, once more, the literal reference of the text is transmuted into a figurative and 
metaphorical rendering of the scene. Wine, memory, language and singing become 
interwoven and reclaim one another. Wine assumes the valence of memory, its emotional 
force and significance. Thus wine acquires the attributes Grande associates with the use 
of memory he defends: memory as an overreaching force (“tentacular”), merciful and 
wise (“lleno de clemencia”, “vino sabio”) that puts the pieces of life together (“era mucha 
memoria ocupada en el laborioso destino de reunir a la vida”), by making the remotest 
times come back and gather together (“vino sabio que conoce la inmensa solidaridad que 
une a las horas más apartadas y las congrega”). Wine and memory are interconnected, 
wine as an intensifier of emotions—where memories are encoded; also, as the social rite 
of solidarity, understood as the gathering together to show empathy for one another, wine 
is made a symbol to remind us of the common memory of Humanity. In the poetic world 
of Grande these are the ways of building memorials of trauma.  
Wine is the unifier of memory, with regard to which let me pause on the image of 
the horses of memory (“los caballos de la memoria”). Elias Canetti observes of the horse: 
“Siempre vivió en manadas y estas manadas estaban acostumbradas a huir en conjunto 
[…] El hombre, que se apoderó del caballo, constituye una nueva unidad con él […] El 
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caballo comprende los impulsos de voluntad del jinete y los obedece” (1999: 312-313). 
Grande seems to use the symbol of the horse in the same way as described by Canetti, 
namely, as if the pieces of a life were in stampede, in danger of dispersion, and memory 
served to reunite and gather them. This is similar to Grande’s use, further on, of the 
expression “[memory is] la cadena que sujeta los perros de la vida” and, also, parallel to 
the use of the words “tomiza” (rope) and “sarmiento” (“vine shoot”) to symbolize what 
memory effects, namely, memory ties up, holds, knots, that is, memory reunites. And 
what does memory reunite and join together? Here, again, we find Grande’s use of a 
meta-language to refer to memory. He refers ultimately to life but uses metaphors taken 
from the organic world of nature: “gavilla” (sheaf), “mies” (ripe grain), that is, “piles” or 
grains, things that are separated. This desire to reunite in piles is, according to Canetti, a 
symbol that has stayed with human beings as a reminder of its surviving nature, and a 
trace of the times when human beings were harvesters: 
El hombre ha reunido en un mismo grupo todos los montones que tienen precio para él. 
La unidad del montón que está constituido de frutas o granos es el resultado de una 
actividad. Muchas manos estuvieron ocupadas en su cosecha o recolección […] los 
hombres celebran su alegría sobre los montones que han logrado […] representan el 
esfuerzo rítmico de muchos. (1999: 83-85) 
This anthropological observation about a more primitive interaction between man 
and nature shows how the task of piling up grains, ingrained in our adapting brains for 
survival, is also reproduced or has direct implications for the way human beings learnt to 
accumulate symbolical objects and created language and culture. It is precisely this 
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accumulative and unifying trait of the nature of human beings that for Grande constitutes 
the foundational grounds of memory. It can be clearly seen, then, that the etymological 
meaning of “to recollect” comes from “to collect”, that is, to gather together, to assemble. 
Thus memory is opposed to the dispersing force of temporality.  
Ricoeur has observed that temporality is linked to three principles: “dissolution”, 
“agony” and “banishment”, whereas memory is endowed with the symbolism of eternity, 
“in the figures of recollection, living fullness, being at home, enlight” (1984: 28). 
According to Ricoeur: 
To temporality as “dissolution” are linked the images of devastation, of swooning, of 
gradually sinking, of unfulfilled aim, of dispersal, of alteration, and of extreme 
indigence; to temporality as “agony” are related images of deathwatch, of sickness and 
frailty, of civil warfare, of tearful captivity, of aging and of sterility; temporality as 
“banishment” includes the images of tribulation, exile, vulnerability, wandering, 
nostalgia and vain desire […] There is not one of these four principal images or of their 
variants that does not receive the strength of its meaning a contrario in relation to the 
opposing symbolism of eternity. (1984: 28) 
Thus the finite comes with sorrow, in opposition to the celebration of eternity (1984: 
28). Grande seems to know that things are eternal in memory and hence his celebration of 
it. Yet, when memory is not able to recollect, banishment and its variants is all there 
seems to be. Hence a great part of Grande’s poetry can be seen as a reflection upon the 
radically threatening possibility of the inability to remember, which will be addressed in 
the second part of this thesis.  
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All the metaphorical references to different elements—wine, music, nature, 
language—point to a semi-implicit and intuitive knowledge of memory: they themselves 
embody memory and constitute the medium through which it is invoked, drawn and 
depicted. They form, ultimately, the condition of the possibility for mourning. Grande, 
like few other poets of his time, understood the remote origins of memory and, perhaps 
more fundamentally, the central role of memory in the healing of trauma. 
Along with admitting the re-elaborations of the self carried out by memory, Grande 
remains faithful to the act of remembering. Grande chooses memory where forgetting 
could replace it, sometimes at his own emotional cost. He knows this well, for in a 
comment on César Vallejo’s poetry he claims Vallejo died from pain because he was 
unable to forget: “Vallejo, el memoriado de dolores” (1986: 15). This fidelity to memory 
is not only faithfulness to one’s own identity or to certain ideas or lived experiences, as 
the poet suggests in the closing line of “No eches angustia a la desgracia”: “Defiende tus 
antiguas verdades para no ser un muerto” (132-133); it is fundamentally an ethical 
approach to human life. For without memory, he wonders, what can be left of humanity, 
as poems such as “No eches angustia a la desgracia” illustrate. 
In Grande’s obstinacy with memory can be seen a stubborn act for survival, 
justifiable on the grounds that memory guarantees an identity to the self, despite its being 
subjected to devious practices, and regardless of its emotional cost. It avoids the 
dissolution of the self into nothingness and guarantees its stability, even if it is a 
precarious one.  Memory keeps depression at bay, no matter the attachment to sufferance. 
Keeping memory alive is an ethical imperative, especially when the memories that need 
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to be protected form part of the integrity of our own self. It is a form of obsession that 
attempts to give trauma a place, as will be seen in the following chapter. 
There is still a fourth justification Grande uses to defend remembering at the 
expense of the benefits of forgetting, which is pleasure. There is no pleasure without 
memory. The destruction or underestimation of memory would signify the pernicious 
disappearance of gratification and delight. Memory has the ability to turn pain into 
pleasure. As Dostoyevsky, an admittedly great influence on Grande’s work, has one of his 
characters say about another suffering character, Katerina Ivanovna: “[memories] are all 
that remain to her now […] I’m glad, for even though it’s only in her imaginings, she’s 
able to perceive herself as having once been happy” (2003: 21). The imaginative 
component of memory, as Kahneman and Schoch remind us, allows for a reconstruction 
of past events in ways which are beneficial to one’s own current interests. Memory can 
then have the effect of a therapeutic catharsis.  
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4. Trauma in the poetry of Félix Grande 
4.1 The poetic voice’s impossible witnessing 
 
They cite poets as witnesses  
(Plato, Republic) 
¿Quién podrá desdecir lo inexpresado? 
(Carlos Marzal, Ánima mía) 
Intentas ajustar cuentas con tu pasado para dejar en paz a un presente que no acaba de 
cuajar, del que está brotando a borbotones sangre, herida 
operación imposible dado el estado general del mundo 
(Grande, Biografía)  
 
This chapter will analyse some distinguishable aspects in which trauma manifests 
itself in the poetry of Grande.  It will deal with the ways in which a series of conditions 
akin to this psychic pathology are constantly and obliquely conjured up. In making sense 
of the world the poetic voice uses recurrent patterns of traumatic recalling which will be 
explored in the following sections. I will look at how the poetic self addresses the 
problem of conferring meaning to unresolved experiences through its employment of a 
specific terminology and certain symbolic representations. If trauma could be regarded as 
a theme, which it is not, being rather a structure of writing and a sense-making memory 
mechanism, one could say that trauma is the main theme of Grande’s work.  
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The poems this thesis studies attempt to articulate unfinished experiences through 
their varied depictions of psychic “objects” which hold a remarkable resemblance to the 
phenomenon of trauma. These unarticulated experiences, whose latency is rather clear, 
are significantly grounded on silence. In “Lentos como inmortales” from Cuaderno de 
Lovaina (Inéditos de Horacio Martín), a collection which has not been dated, the poetic 
self writes: 
Hay trozos de ti mismo 
ocultos en ti mismo     Carcomas 
hechas de tu propia materia 
Callan mientras trabajas 
callan mientras te engranas 
sin pasión en la historia              
Pero luego se agitan 
reaparecen durante  
tu pesadumbre o tu fatiga o tu asco. (378) 
The first striking feature of this opening stanza is the poetic self’s use of a set of 
terms which can be applied to trauma, since they resemble common mechanisms of 
traumatic recalling. What these words describe is the conditions of powerlessness over 
overwhelming psychic objects and the impossibility of their location within certain 
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experiences. Or they refer to an utter inability to name them as experience.81 The inability 
to escape them is as overbearing as their being hidden and belated. Words such as “trozos 
de ti mismo […] Carcomas”, “ocultos”, “callan”, “luego se agitan reaparecen” indicate a 
state of the self linked to traumatic unnameability as well as denoting the latency and 
(semi or un) consciousness of trauma. There is even a line in “Como el nombre de un 
dios” (270-271) from Puedo escribir los versos más tristes esta noche that “beautifully” 
describes trauma: “agresión antigua, invisible, monocorde”: 
que me convierte en mi enemigo, que me cubre el camino de nieve alta. Que 
desencadena una tormenta de paredes alrededor de mí. […] 
Veo un túnel oscuro detrás, delante, arriba, a mis costados, a mis pies. (270) 
These forms, which receive the general designation of “trozos”, are inconcrete and 
undetermined objects, as are the psychic forces metaphorically rendered into an indefinite 
aggression and a tunnel in the lines above. They are defined as an unidentifiable and 
shapeless encircling line (“recinto sin forma”) which is sinister and unintelligible—all of 
which denotes an inexpressible experience. Furthermore, haunting this encircling line 
(“deambulan en redondo”) there are silent and phantasmagorical figures. All this psychic 
material is perceived of by the poetic voice as an inheritance (“tu propia y sola herencia”) 
which nevertheless is a threatening punishment and an unnameable legacy: “Oh materia 
materia qué ominoso castigo/ tu propia ceremonia innombrable” (377).   
                                                 
81 When referring to similar psychic forces, the Grandian lexicon is very telling: “me sobrepasa”, 
“es más fuerte que yo”, “es gigantesco y despiadado”, “y mudo” (1975a: 15). They all account for 
an experience which turns the self upside down and is undescribably upsetting.  
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Their poison consists in their inhabiting the poetic self as though they were 
woodworms (“carcomas”) devouring the self and causing its premature aging and its 
becoming an increasing void (“oquedad”).In fact, they are said in the poem to accelerate 
death. These indeterminate psychic objects are pieces of the self which have been torn 
apart from the past, remnants that behave as if they had acquired a life of their own. They 
are therefore unmodifiable (“Pero cómo modificar/ cuanto ya no te pertenece/ Ahora y 
ayer ya no caminan juntos”, 379), and re-appear belatedly as suggested in “Pregón”, a 
poem whose main theme is loss: “para historias/ atrasadas, la tuya” (43). 
In their inscrutability and impenetrability these conditions surrounding the poetic 
voice represent death. The aporia of mourning loss and death consists in the impossibility 
of a complete interiorization of the lost Object. This leads to the paradox of having to 
incorporate alterity within us, knowing that alterity is other than us. Thus, any attempt at 
interiorization is doomed to be reduced to spectral images, that is, ghosts: “Ghosts: the 
concept of the other in the same […] the completely other, dead, living in me” (Derrida 
2001b: 41-42). They are nondiscursive formations that can be taken as unfathomable 
regions into which the poetic voice nevertheless inquires. In this respect the problem of 
recognition can be understood as unmasterable interiorization. Yet the poetic self does not 
seem to gather any doubts as to the constitutive character of these emotional impressions. 
They have been interiorized, introjected as belonging to its own: “Son tú     De ti”. And 
here an historical, external, cause is even suggested: “Vienen de un viejo ayer / aterrador 
de cicatrices” (378); “te digo que con […] este temor tendré que deambular/ hasta que 
muera” (455). The poetic voice affirms: “pero tengo que volver a volver” (456), as if it 
were aware of its inability to change that which is an integral part of itself, the alterity that 
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death has introjected and which never dies, as the title “Lentos como inmortales” 
suggests.  
Perhaps there is no better metaphor to convey the poetic voice’s struggle than the 
concept of “cancer”. If we were to understand the past as presence in the body, these 
menacing fragments of the self—bits of the past that have become part of the self—would 
constitute a sort of autonomous alien intruders. In fact, in the poem the past is somehow 
somaticized, as both the use of the word “entrañas” and the “hearing” of voices suggest: 
Vienen de un viejo ayer  
aterrador de cicatrices 
[…] 
Y a veces cuando cierras 
ese cuaderno infame en donde  
como a una mariposa podrida 
has pinchado una noche 
o un amor o un fracaso, ellos avanzan 
ellos los vengadores sobrevienen 
pululan y dan golpes 
en las entrañas —tú— que los apresan   
y con voces casi inaudibles  
pavorosas y resurrectas 
te llaman, te llaman, te llaman. (379) 
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The poetic voice does not know the origin or the meaning of these enigmatic 
presences partaking of life, just as in a similar vein cancerous cells begin to reproduce 
without a purpose. They belong to the “misterioso tejido de la vida, en el fondo del fondo, 
en la/ trama/ del laberinto” (455), as it is put in “Luz lejana de la cabaña” from the 
collection La noria. “Laberinto” is another specific term used by the voice in the poem to 
convey a reality that he cannot escape.  
 The somatization of psychic trauma is also named through the use of vocabulary 
which points to the aftermath of a catastrophic accident: “herida”, “cicatriz”, “maraña”, 
“caries”, “frío”, even “monstruo”, “costra” as in the line “velarse a gritos la costra de la 
infancia adolescente” of El ojo enorme de tu sepultura (1989: 32); in“Luz lejana de la 
cabaña”: “Por el espanto y la caries y el frío vine subiendo tramo a tramo,/ ya no 
encontraba un solo mueble de paz en la casa de mi/ memoria” (455); in “Pomada de 
llanto”: “en la oscura maraña/ que forman mis raíces y mi historia y mi entraña,” (457); in 
“Nocturno”: “los siglos acuden al agujero del invierno/ como hojas descosidas” (453). On 
occasions the poetic self names the catastrophe itself, as in “Ni cicatriz siquiera”: “Y nada 
tengo yo más que mis sienes/ abarrotadas de devastaciones” (440). Other times these 
enigmatic creatures manifest themselves as voices that tell “shadowy” things of the poetic 
voice: 
y caminan por la espalda del tiempo 
resonando a pasado y a renuncia 
y de un modo remoto dicen 
cosas de mí de sombra embadurnadas.  (307) 
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Even if at the level of the formal the extensive use of blank verse throughout 
Grande’s poetry may indicate an attempt to elaborate trauma through a narrative style, 
this writing trauma is beset with processes of condensation and displacement. The earlier 
process points to what remains concealed within a certain image or a given structure of 
thought. The latter denotes that an emotion, originally connected with an object or person, 
has been transferred to another object. Both processes are characterized by an excess or 
surplus of meaning and both have much to do with the formal side of writing. In the 
several close reading of selected poems, attention will be paid to condensation, 
displacement, violations of grammatical rules, variations of the same obsessions, surplus 
of sense, inflexibility masked as excess—what Bataille (1985) has called “the economy of 
excess”—and hyperbole, as ways of approaching an unlocatable excess that is the 
ultimate object of address in Grande’s poetry.82 Such an excess, as will be seen, is 
embedded in Grande’s concerns with and poetic exploration of psychic illness.  
Finally, although I shall focus on Grande’s poetry in this chapter, trauma is not absent 
in other genres. Grande’s prose is full of mentions of medicine (often psychiatry) and 
disorderly figures such as the different narrative voices in the short stories of Lugar 
siniestro este mundo, caballeros, whose neurotic characters struggle with muteness or are 
dragged down by obscure psychic powers. 
 
                                                 
82 Hyperbole is the main figure characterizing all Grande’s expressive strategies. According to 
LaCapra, “trauma registers in hyperbole in a manner that is avoided or repressed in a complacent 
reasonableness or bland objectivism” (2001: xi). 
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4.2 The losses behind silence, guilt and hyperbolic pain 
 
Tú volverás a la miseria. Tú y la miseria 
tenéis un pacto de aniquilación. 
(Grande, Biografía) 
He querido expresarme. 
Toda mi vida he querido expresarme. 
No tengo otro destino, otro afán, otra ley.  
(Grande, Biografía) 
Quería decirlo todo. Es imposible. La mayor parte de las cosas se escurren 
calladamente hacia la muerte.  
(Grande cites Amos Oz, Sobre el amor y la separación) 
 
The place of a survivor is unlocatable. […] If such a place were ever located,  
[… ] the speech to be held or the word to be kept there would remain impossible. 
(Derrida, The Work of Mourning) 
 
 
We know that loss lies where there is a remnant: “loss is inseparable from what 
remains” (Eng and Kazanjian 2003: 2). Loss, then, can be understood as death that is 
nevertheless not final, in that something always survives (a remnant, a trace, a memory of 
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what it was, even if it is only a silence).  As Butler (2003: 468) has pointed out, this 
survival of the past in its remnants animates the thought about the past but does not 
recuperate it. In Grande’s work pain, silence and an overwhelming sense of guilt 
constitute the traces of past losses which, nevertheless, they cannot replace. The 
threatening anxiety attached to feelings of guilt or responsibility for this loss becomes an 
emotional burden haunting the poems. Guilt has been studied in relation to the survivors 
of the Holocaust. Primo Levi’s entire oeuvre is, for instance, a good example of sense of 
guilt attached to surviving catastrophe. 
Life is experienced as the penance imposed by an offence, as though loss had been 
the result of a personal sin. The poem “Visita” (34) from the collection Taranto works as 
a metaphor for a sense of guilt engulfing the poetic voice. Here, the symbolically-charged 
objects are photographs representing a neglected past to which little attention has been 
paid. The word “Visita” already indicates a memorialisation of the past or a ritual, as 
when one establishes for oneself the need to visit regularly the tomb of a loved one. The 
exercise of memory contained in this poem is a painful one, for memory emerges as an 
obligation, almost as a whip that arouses conscience. The sense of guilt is contained in 
expressions that suggest that the poetic voice is accused and charged with metaphoric 
imprisonment. The crime committed consists in recognizing the danger of the disavowal 
of memory, a moral indictment to be commuted for the same pain: the poetic voice’s 
abandonment to oblivion.  
In fact, Taranto is a book structured around the axis of haunting familiar links and it 
is traversed by a clear sense of guilt. It does not matter that this work was engendered by 
Grande’s admiration for and a wish to imitate Vallejo’s style, for in this collection Vallejo 
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is treated as part of the family and called a “brother”. Curiously enough, the poetic 
voice—a mature, grown up voice one surmises—addresses an Other, identifiable as the 
child that this adult once was, naming it with the affectionate diminutive “Felixín”. The 
way this child Other is treated in the poem “Hermano germinal” accounts for the 
psychological renderings of the poetic self throughout Grande’s work, for the key to the 
problematic of trauma seems to rest upon this life phase, where the seed of future 
neuroses is planted. The premature death of a baby sister described in “Gemela temprana” 
shows well how the poetic voice struggles to accept survival.  
All Grande’s collections touch upon the subject of loss, although the latter is posed 
in different recognizable fashions in each of them. Las piedras can be seen as a work in 
which absence is metamorphosed into a philosophy of time. In Música amenazada there 
is a search for metaphorical ways of fleeing the passage of time, and the devastation it 
creates in the psychological sphere of individuals and also in whole communities. 
Taranto constitutes an elegy to the symbolical loss of Vallejo and at the same time is a 
funeral song to structural losses (the ones caused by the course of time) and historical 
deaths suffered in childhood as well as biographical losses transformed into collective 
suffering.83 Grande’s work is also replete with references to lack, material poverty, and 
spiritual misery.  
                                                 
83 According to LaCapra, this confusion is proper to traumatic and post-traumatic states: “To blur 
the distinction between, or to conflate, absence and loss may itself bear striking witness to the 
impact of trauma and the post-traumatic, which create a state of disorientation, agitation, or even 
confusion and may induce a gripping response whose power and force of attraction can be 
compelling. The very conflation attests to the way one remains possessed or haunted by the past, 
whose ghosts and shrouds resist distinctions (such as that between absence and loss). Indeed, in 
post-traumatic situations in which one relives (or acts out) the past, distinctions tend to collapse, 
including the crucial distinction between then and now wherein one is able to remember what 
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Loss holds a difficult relationship between that which is already gone, dead, or 
perhaps never was (an abstract idea, a cherished ideal) and that which remains. So the 
presence of loss can only be visible or intuited from its remnants to which there is a 
recurrent reference through a very specific Grandian lexicon: ruins (“ruinas”), piedras 
(“las piedras de mi arqueología” and “cascotes ahogados en musgo” in “No eches 
angustia a la desgracia”), embers (“brasas”), etc.:  
Si ahora, con el concurso de las brasas 
que no pude eludir y vinieron conmigo 
en forma de nostalgia y de vergüenza, 
escribiese un poema de pérdida y de amor 
que viviera más allá de mi muerte. (355)  
The experience of loss, whose nature remains unknown to the poetic voice and 
therefore inexpressible, leaves the poetic self torn apart into pieces while at the same time 
it painstakingly attempts to bring these ruins or remnants together, in order to produce 
through words something coherent and eternal.  
In “Compañía” from Las piedras, Grande writes: “el yugo de mi vida perdida, en 
donde empieza/ un abismo nocturno de pasos y de voces” (61). In these lines it is 
affirmed that the whole life is lost and that where loss exists an abyss begins. This is in 
accordance with Kristeva’s observation that “any loss entails the loss of my being—and 
of being itself” (1989: 93).  
                                                                                                                                                  
happened to one in the past but realize one is living in the here and now with future possibilities” 
(2001: 46). 
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To build upon ruins—to attempt to construct coherence from traces—consists in the 
symbolic task of making loss never complete and insurmountable, that is, in somehow not 
succumbing to the death drive. Yet in reality the poetic self’s stance toward the remnants 
of loss is ambivalent. Remnants of loss are either cherished and turn into the haunting 
presence of ceaseless pain, a sensory memory that puts into play the acting out of trauma; 
or, other times, these ruins of loss constitute the remnants through which the poetic voice 
works through loss, that is, its quest to overcome silence.  
However, just as happens in a visit to an archeological museum, where we see 
remains testifying to past existence, Grande’s remnants of loss stand in place of a gap left 
by “something” that needs to be reconstructed in narrative terms. And in this failure of 
producing meaning the poetic self’s difficulties in working through trauma can be seen. 
Loss is informed by symbolic figurations that in their attempt to overcome it end up 
instead replacing or re-enacting the unrepresentability of loss, and so become figures of 
silence. And they constitute figures of silence because these remnants are to a great extent 
kept intact by compulsive repetition, causing silence to take the disguises that the lost 
Object adopts. Just as emotional pain and an overwhelming sense of guilt may be masks 
of loss, we find recurrent images that convey both the ideas of inextricability and 
inaccessibility associated with traumatic loss. Terms such as “noria” or “círculo” or 
“cerco” symbolize through their remitting to the notion of circularity, trauma’s cyclic 
condition, as well as incapability, inability or even unwillingness to reach an “outside” of 
them, in order to achieve some knowledge. All of which underpins an ambivalent relation 
to mourning as the poetic voice longs to feel “extraviado en las galerías de mi alma” (13). 
In “Guarida” it even gives up on mourning: “hace tiempo que cede al cerco/ llamándose 
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cobarde” (153). At the same time, they point to a lack, to an inevitable absence: “toda 
ausencia es inexorable” (354).  
There is no overcoming, that is, the impossibility to find an exit to it, a path of 
explanation or a way of substitution. Thus in some sense there is resistance or refusal to 
symbolic figuration to survive loss. By the term “survive” I mean, with Poucel, 
“successfully overcoming, through poetic creation, the silence that follows death” (2006: 
183).  
The poetic voice situates the beginning of its creativity in an early loss. In “Pregón” 
(Taranto), it states:  
He aquí un pregonero 
que se hizo tal por pura pérdida 
y, particularmente, vocea lo suyo 
sin cansarse, al parecer, y que nadie ha visto. (43) 
In Taranto the origin of loss is placed in childhood and, more specifically, in the 
death of a loved one, as the poem “Gemela temprana” illustrates: 
Con esta voz de luto 
adónde iré que no me miren negro. 
Infancia sola y triste, tú has culpado  
mi vida […] 
Hermana de tres años, si no hubieras  
tan pronto y absolutamente muerto 
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acaso no me hubiera puesto solo 
Te fuiste tanto, mi estupor fue tanto, 
mi desengaño tanto, que ahora tengo 
mi tanta vida silenciosa en luto, 
que ya es vida enlutada mi silencio.  
[…] no es tu destino 
parte del mío? no eres mi comienzo? (40) 
 Silence takes shape in the early stages of life. It was then that something 
irretrievably lost grew into a woodworm which was progressively to devour the life drive 
and vital energy of the poetic self. In “En este poema” of Cuaderno de Lovaina it is 
asserted: “yo escucho la carcoma en mi juventud” (380). This premature loss (the death of 
a loved one and possibly an ideal) has silenced the poetic voice’s life, turning it into an 
almost dead (“casi como un muerto”, 40). 
 There is also an overt political dimension to the representation of silence in 
Grande’s poetry that should not be overlooked. It is linked to state violence and the 
impossibility of speech: 
Mientras asimilaba aquellos versos súbitos y calientes, ateridos y fraternales, supe que 
Carlitos y yo, aquella tarde, hace un cuarto de siglo, habíamos comenzado a derrotar a 
la dictadura franquista. (2001: 91) 
Silence also comes to be represented overwhelmingly as a kind of prison or cage or 
as that which leads to a prison-like state (“Jaulas está pariendo este silencio”, 352). 
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Silence as a prison-like state does not necessarily have to be metaphorical. It may well be 
literal. Grande has described on several occasions the agony suffered during endless 
nights that prevented him from falling asleep, as he feared that the regime’s police could 
turn up and seize him or any member of his family. Inquisitorial and arbritary accusations 
formed part of individuals’ everyday lives. This prison-like state that made speech 
impossible shares the same connotations of isolation, fear and isolation to which, 
according to José Ignacio Álvarez-Fernández (2007), prisoners were subjected to under 
Franco’s regime.  
Again, here we find an experience of silence that distances itself from an idea of 
silence as illuminating epiphany or the means for producing light. Grande associates it 
with a shadow: “Como una sombra he de callar” (352). Note the nuance of imposition or 
lack of choice in the use of the verb “to have”. It is then inevitable to place the latter 
words within the context of the “prohibición de saber” (Suso de Toro 2006) or the equally 
telling “No se puede decir” in regard to the imposed silence under Franco’s regime 
(Manuel Rivas 2008). Note how symbolically close to the writers’ statements above are 
Grande’s following lines: 
Lo que siento, Lejana, 
nadie y nada en el mundo 
logrará persuadirme 
de que es bastardo, 
de que no ilumina. 
Y sin embargo no puedo decirlo. (352) 
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 It is significantly ambiguous that the verb used in the last cited line is “no puedo”. 
Is this “being unable to speak” an imposition coming from state violence or is it, rather, 
the inability to speak attached to trauma? Be that as it may, what seems likely is the 
presence of two kinds of different but interwoven silences: the loss of speech due to 
political circumstances, traumatizing in itself, and the one associated with traumatic loss. 
Even if diverse in nature they only problematize each other further.  
 The impossibility of speech due to censorship may have led to the conflation of 
personal loss with collective trauma. In the opening poem of Música amenazada the 
poetic voice jumps backwards and forwards from its own trauma to collective trauma. 
Some of the closing lines are ambiguous if we take into account previous stanzas. The 
second line of the poem: “descendiendo por las cloacas de mi tristeza” (103) apparently 
sets an intimate tone that will nevertheless disappear in subsequent stanzas, for the 
personal is merged with the collective in the final lines of the poem. The use of the verb 
of movement “descender” (to go down, to descend) already indicates the semi-reflexive 
stance adopted in many other poems analysed. For the descent runs through the poetic 
voice’s metaphorical “sewers” to somewhere deep down, at the bottom, at the origin of 
misery.84 Perhaps, down there, an explanation awaits—whence all this sadness comes? 
What foul waste is blocking meaning? It is left unsaid. 
What we know is that he cannot bear any more reality: “El siglo veinte me golpeaba 
como a un gong/ Mi cráneo acabará resonando a chatarra” (103). The poetic voice cannot 
                                                 
84 To this descending movement that memory effectuates Grande also refers with the term 
“tobogán”: “en el tobogán donde la memoria se divierte y se marea y grita de terror y se ríe” 
(2003: 219). 
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bear any more sewerage draining its head. The twentieth century ages: “Se envejece muy 
rápido en Europa” (103). So, when in the fifth stanza we read what follows we never 
know whether it is the poetic voice, its country, Europe or the whole century that which is 
subjected to segregation, menace and contempt: 
Entre segregación, amenaza y desprecio, 
dentro del mastodonte informe de mi siglo, 
oigo balar antiguas ovejas. (103) 
To be sure, one never knows if the above is exactly what the poetic self wants to 
write, one never knows whether Grande is saying less, saying differently, being aware of 
censorship. There is a region of silence in this not knowing. And one never knows if 
fleeing from memory or fleeing to good memories has to do with not being able to bear 
very much reality or whether it is rather an act of self-censorship.  
Other poems, as the following stanza shows, track down the original loss further 
back to the outset of life, in the poetic voice’s birth:  
Memoria: humeas. –Con aquel bagaje 
fleté en el tiempo, con aquellas muletas 
di en correr adolescencia adentro; 
me fui poblando poco a casi nada 
y toda cosa nunca pude olvidar si era sombría; 
hasta que un día supe que mi aquella  
enfermedad novena del nacer (he aquí la cuestión) 
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abdicó sobre esta larga convalecencia con recaídas en que ahora consisto 
y a la que llamo mi existencia, proféticamente. (50) 
It is loss that leads to perceptions of existence as a fatal illness conducing to death. 
Space and the passage of time are constantly seen from the viewpoint of death. A 
cemetery becomes the poetic self’s humble dwelling (“una pensión sencilla”, 40) and 
time has ceased to exist (“Me puse/viudito y a las márgenes del tiempo”, 40).  
These losses are also transfigured into certain configurations of time and space. 
Time is interiorized as a loss and so is the emotional structure of space. From the very 
occurrence of this early traumatic loss onward, the continuation of time is systematically 
negated and decomposed in fragments of time and remnants of the past. The poetic voice 
looks at the past from the perspective of the devastation it created and the ruins it left 
behind: “El tiempo de sudor de aquel verano/se denigró hasta mera arqueología que tirita 
de historia” (41). The past has become arrested, leaving no room for the change that 
memory operates. Loss is interpreted as a kind of impenetrable void. What is worse, it 
leads to the perception that the future does not follow the past. In such a state of 
suspension from any meaningful attachments to a past that “is not the past” (Butler 2003: 
467), there can be no memory: “Las aves que ahora anidan este alero son nietas, no 
recuerdan” (41). It only brings out pessimistic bouts of no memory: “el recuerdo,/algo 
que se desconcha hasta quedar de una fealdad solemne” (42). “The past that is not the 
past” is the idea behind the following lines: “Pero cómo modificar/ cuanto ya no te 
pertenece/ Ahora y ayer ya no caminan juntos” (379).  
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According to LaCapra, historical loss is to be distinguished from transhistorical 
absence.85 In Grande’s work we can talk about loss, absence and lack. On occasions they 
are clearly identifiable, although they present themselves interwoven more often than not. 
Conflation of the biographical with the historical and structural pervades Grande’s poetry, 
although it is not always manifestly apparent. Preeminently, losses are presented as 
structural absence in that they are approached as painfully insurmountable, frequently 
eliciting an ineffective search for biographical/historical causes. This occurs, for instance, 
in “Nevermore, dijo el cuervo” (a title and theme borrowed from Poe’s “Nevermore”), 
wherein the elusiveness or difficulty in producing an account of a past time is conflated 
with the urge to find a historical/biographical reason for the emergence of suffering: 
¿Y nunca más nos saldará mamá un pecado 
de un pescozón, para que la tristeza no nacía con causa, 
sino este ahora de tristeza unificada, 
pescozón permanente ¡y cómo, si mamá ya no pega! 
qué saldamos, por qué no se nos da 
un sentido para sufrir, ahora que mamá envejece? (48) 
A unified sadness without a cause, and for which a sense is not found is what 
prevents the poetic voice, notwithstanding its efforts, from freeing itself from traumatic 
loss. The poetic voice shows its perplexity about the fact that the wounds inflicted long 
ago (symbolically “mamá ya no pega”) retained their powerful and ineluctable influence 
                                                 
85 The difference between absence and loss, argued by LaCapra (2001), has been already noted. 
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over the present. The adjective “unified” accompanying sadness is wittingly inserted here, 
for there is no better way to describe a pervasive melancholia without fissures. The 
introjection of loss leading to melancholy lacks for the surviving self a rational 
explanation. We may infer from the adjective “unified” that suffering and sadness cannot 
be subjected to a work of deconstruction that would eventually liberate some meaning, 
through its dissection into manageable concepts.86 Thus the historical/biographical wound 
is made structural (“pescozón permanente”, 48) and the structural loss is permanently 
bemoaned, for pain does not justify itself every time the self is engulfed by it.  
 The poem “Generación” (Taranto) attempts to look for historical answers to the 
metaphysical question of having been born and being painfully alive. The poetic voice 
feels guilty for being in pain, so it embarks on the task of finding a justification: 
Adolescencia, cállate, vayamos  
por orden, narremos la caída: no parezca 
lujo el susodicho ay. Nacer (he aquí la cuestión)  
como has nacido, donde has nacido, para qué has nacido. (49) 
This unusually autobiographical account stands out as one of the poems where the 
temptation of enmeshing the biographical and the collective in structural loss is almost 
avoided. The reader is incited to look into the historical “archives” of the poetic voice’s 
pain and the horror of its time: “vean crónicas” (49). In this poem the year the author was 
born is fatally enmeshed in the Spanish Civil War. In it, there is a clear enumeration of 
                                                 
86 About the power of deconstruction to deal with loss, see LaCapra (1999) and about the 
deconstruction of melancholia, see Kristeva (1989). 
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biographical causes of pain (war, extreme poverty, derangement and illness caused by 
war and lack of means), which the poetic voice normally skews by converting those 
historical losses into a transhistorical and sempiternal state. An uncanny will to give an 
account and deconstruct trauma, for this happens rarely, is stated by the opening gambit 
in which a few lines make an encouragement statement to confront the personal crisis: 
“Anda, no más; resuelve,/ considera tu crisis, suma, sigue,/ tájala, bájala, ájala” (49). In 
fact, more often than not in the poetry of Grande each experienced death or suffered loss 
is made equal to other losses, that is, they are unified into a single vast and unspeakable 
loss. Thus the treatment of loss allows for the blurring of different losses. Distinguishable 
and unique losses become undistinguished within the whirlwind of grieving. Vague pain 
acts as the centripetal force gathering all losses and turning them into identical psychic 
objects which do not belong to the poetic self: “Qué traes, ¿dolor? […] ¿o sea, que eres/ 
la vieja avispa en la testuz del mundo?” (43). Individually rooted pain is then converted 
into a metaphysical universal condition inflicted without beginning in the subject. 
Blanco spirituals is the only work in which war and collective fear and pain are 
clearly confused and fused with personal suffering through a process of identification. In 
“Diana” from Taranto, the poetic voice abandons the search for a personal cause of its 
pain by diluting it in the ocean of everyday tragedies of anonymous people:  
los que en el tren no van ni vienen ni se trasladan, 
los que llevan a sus casas el suicidio de un amigo 
los que se arrugan ante un nombre amado 
[…] 
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vengan, que para ellos tengo una ventana y un trozo de preguntas filiales 
pues la fraternidad cuaja de noche, especialmente. (45-46) 
Using collective catastrophe as a reminder of its own suffered injustices, the poetic 
voice reproaches itself: “no te da verguenza?/¡mira no hay desamparos que te ven!” (46). 
It does indeed not wish to usurp the place of genuine victimhood. In “Pregón” the poetic 
voice insults itself and reproaches itself for being a town crier of its own unbearable pain: 
No usurpes, seamos civilizados. Y bellos, 
no como tú, gibado de yoísmo, dromedario de tiempo, 
fea cosa, que ni conviene, ¡según dicen! (44) 
We can see the originality of Grande’s approach here too. For he puts forward in his 
poetry, even if briefly mentioned, the debate around the ethics of identification. Does it 
constitute a genuinely ethical stance to claim to feel the pain of others or to take their 
place as victims? Can one compare or draw parallels among different kinds of suffering? 
Do these enumerations of other people’s tribulations not hide a wish to avoid 
confrontation with something else, perhaps the poetic self’s personal losses? And why 
does guilt loom over these descriptions of painful existences? 
A sense of guilt does not automatically lead to revenge or to pointing accusatory 
fingers. Very rarely does the poetic voice embark on the task of looking for culprits, as is 
the case with the poem “Como el nombre de un dios”. The poetic voice rejects 
biographical remembering in favor of a vicarious remembering of collective injustices. 
For instance, in “Diana” recalling is preceded by the statement that there is no intention to 
  
197
find causes, culprits or responsibilities. Culpability is diffused and fails to find its object, 
the cause of suffering being more often than not unknown: 
Qué me habrán hecho. Cuándo me habrán pegado con una  
cadena. En qué lugar del acerico de mi edad quedó clavado 
todo aquello, que no conozco bien.  
Cuantos me hicieron daño son unos asesinos. No puedo odiar- 
los, no sé ya exactamente quiénes son. (270)  
 The stance is rather one of melting its own pain with an undetermined and 
generalized suffering rooted in common fears of a historical time: “Sufro porque van a 
caer bombas” (270). Throughout Grande’s work we find poems where there is the 
blending of the poetic voice’s sadness with the sadness of whole communities (the 
gypsies and the Jews) or the suffering brought about by catastrophic times (the twentieth 
century with its destruction in the opening poem of Música amenazada or throughout 
Blanco spirituals). As Kristeva remarks, the pain inherent in melancholia confers unity 
and coherence, precisely the plenitude the melancholic self lacks. In this sense, the 
persistence of pain also points to the poetic voice’s attempt to avoid disintegration by 
conjuring up in the imagination some sort of communion with an imagined community—
the community of those drowned and condemned of whom the poetic voice expresses 
that: “tal vez huyendo de mi propio terror […] llegué a desear el beso ecuménico” (103).  
 “Oh materia materia” illustrates the fact that losses are alluded to but never 
mastered or conquered. In it, the poetic voice refers to psychic material which is 
described in terms of horror, impossible defeat and psychic attachment to negativity: 
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“Nuestra palabra favorita es no” (375). This negativity has to do with resistance to 
denying the losses inherent in a world divided by violence and submission which is 
described as “obediencia penuria y cadenas” (376). And even though the poem apparently 
speaks of an “I” and the group of people this pronoun represents, the unkown characters 
of the poem, hidden in the first-person plural of “somos” (“we are”), can be regarded as 
symbolizing a moral attitude, one that has to do with looking horror directly in the eye: 
“Y arañando a la oscuridad/ reconocemos al terror/ en nuestro propio corazón” (377).87 
Such an ethical stance bears on the courage to confront the opacity of loss, its impossible 
mourning. It all suggests a situation in which the poetic voice is prompted to resist the 
silence posed by that which is occult, for such a “secret” is a “stain” that jolts the 
continuation of life: “Cuanto oculta a lo oculto nos mancilla” (375). Through dismantling 
the hidden, the “secret” at the core of sense of guilt, the possibility of survival is 
established. Yet, at the same time, bearing witness to loss pays the high toll of torture in a 
culture dominated by unmourned death drives:88 
Desde el origen de las comunidades 
nos vienen arrojando al fuego  
Nuestra palabra favorita es no 
por ella nos aíslan nos torturan 
                                                 
87 This is also an ethical or unethical attitude adopted by certain kinds of autobiographical writing. 
Bolaño, for instance, refers to the kind of writing that never ends because it ends with blood: 
“termina con sangre, es decir, no termina nunca” (2004: 207). Similarly, in the poetry of Grande, 
there seems to be no redemption from a past which is not followed by a happy resolution (end) in 
the future.  
88 See Sánchez-Pardo’s definition of “cultures of death drive”, pp. 27-28. 
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nos asesinan como a perros. (375) 
The recourse to self-aggression is a complex response to external persecution, 
whereby responsibility is diluted in the indefinite pronoun “they”: “Ellos tienen razón yo 
estorbo/ Yo no deseo destruir ellos están dispuestos” (380). Violence generates a response 
of submissive fear, or an active but impotent commitment to bearing witness to violence: 
“Yo ausculto la guerra y veo/ barro fémures violaciones” (380). Violence produces and is 
produced by fear: “Yo creo que el miedo y la agresión/ tienen una frontera que a menudo 
los une” (380).  The poetic self internalizes the “secret” (sense of guilt) as punishment: 
“Oh material materia qué ominoso castigo/ tu propia ceremonia innombrable” (377). 
The only thing that cannot be “muted” in the silence inhabiting the poetic voice’s 
work of mourning is pain. Pain emerges as a kind of resistance against the idea that 
something is irretrievably lost. Its cry is ever present, sometimes assuming the tones of a 
protest.  For silence, be it in the form of traumatic loss or the violent prohibition of 
speech, constitutes an emotional burden whose discharge becomes increasingly imperious 
for the poetic voice by making its survival dependant on it. Discharge here means the 
necessity to find a place for that which is unlocatable or displaced. At the expense of this 
very same unlocatability, the loss is preserved. In other words, suffering contributes to the 
maintaining of the thing lost, preventing its dying.  
There is a libidinal attachment to sadness made manifest in expressions which 
show the poetic voice’s sensual attraction to it. The poem “La pantera” allegorizes such 
an attachment. It is also a metaphor of impossible mourning. “Pantera” is regarded as a 
sensual animal to the point that at an erotic level, when the word is used to refer to a 
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woman, it normally means sexual voraciousness and voluptuousness. This is how the 
poetic voice sees sadness too. The poetic voice claims:  
Ella, desde su agilísima forma cubierta por el ébano centelleante, se acerca para 
seducirme con sus movimientos de acero: miro su brillo hipnótico lamentando la 
pobreza de mi poder y recuerdo las veces en que nos hemos arrojado al pasillo, 
hermanados por el común deseo de aniquilación. Nuestro incesto se va fortaleciendo 
gracias a un estilete de rencor en cuyo filo sonríe una ternura desconcertante: 
aprendemos que el odio es más sensual que la piedad. (264) 
The feminizing of sadness and its being addressed in terms of desire, as well as 
the highlighting of its potential destructiveness, is made through an odd parallel with the 
ways in which beauty has been traditionally depicted as irresistibly alluring. Feminine 
beauty has also been claimed as a source of men’s powerlessness and perdition. So is 
sadness posed in the poem. It is objectified (I am tempted to use here T.S. Eliot’s term 
“objective correlative”) and personified as having a beautiful head and being splendorous. 
In setting out to come up with a means for removing sadness, the poetic voice indulges in 
lust. This leads to the paradox that sadness is called a monster and a sister. So incest 
marks the erotic relationship held in the poem between the poetic voice and personified 
sadness. It is nevertheless an erotic—incestual—love that hurts: 
Usé todas las armas contra tu cabeza bellísima y oscura, todas las armas contra tu 
esplendor, todas las armas contra el desatino de tu inmortalidad. Esta pantera es mi 
hermana mayor. Me vigila como un océano a la costa y me nombra por sus 
diminutivos. Yo la vigilo como un reo de muerte a los minutos, y le llamo Tristeza a 
falta de un nombre más vasto y depravado. (264) 
By virtue of such an ambiguous erotic rapport the poetic voice polarizes sadness as 
both affective affiliation and harm or even utter destruction. In fact, from the first 
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published work by Grande, Taranto, the poetic voice seeks affiliations in order to re-
establish some sort of connections or relationship that would put loss into perspective. 
Looking for affinities and objectification leads to an empowering position that attempts to 
tame sadness. Those strategies act as tools which help the poetic voice to defend itself 
against sadness by both taking distance from and identifying with it. The need to ward off 
sadness is conflated with a longing for its protection. If it were not for what the poetic 
voice gains from its attachment to sadness, the hope to overcome sorrow would not be 
seen as unbearable:89  
Diles que me defiendo de tus arañazos. Diles que mi mayor lujuria consiste en meditar 
tu destrucción. Diles que contraataco a todas horas con la insoportable esperanza de 
desmenuzar poco a poco tu compacta agresión, tu existencia, tu proximidad, tu 
memoria. (264)  
Does the poetic self wish or not to overcome sadness? The use of adjectives such as 
the above makes it ambiguous. The relationship of the poetic voice with sadness is 
ambivalent. In “Generación” there is a line in which the poetic voice claims to refuel its 
own sadness with others’ disgrace: “y salgo por las calles, chirriando,/ a repostar desdicha 
en todas las ojeras fiscales” (51). 
                                                 
89 The poetic voice’s attitude toward sadness is ambivalent, for at times it relinquishes the struggle 
to claim power over sadness, precisely because it finds a reassuring coherence, paradoxically,  in 
a “sound” sadness (without fissures). In prose, Grande writes: “¿El combate desde el 
renunciamiento como medicina contra la desesperanza? […] una bestia que avanza para 
aplastarnos la armonía del total desconsuelo” (1975c:32). Both the aggression carried out by 
sadness and its eventual overcoming represent for the poet similar “beasts”, posing two different 
kinds of risk (without sadness the poetic self remains unbearably “empty”, therefore, self-less). 
This is congruent with the way Grande’s poetic voice sees, contradictorily, health in illness (see 
the discussion about insomnia, below).  
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 There is something revealing about the ways the poetic self engages with pain. 
The persistence of suffering is silencing in that it contributes to the maintenance of 
silence. The pain that a loss produces constitutes in itself a kind of fidelity which confers, 
paradoxically, a sense of coherence and unity within disruption. It is then understandable 
that throughout Grande’s poetry one can clearly see a determined will to conserve and 
cherish pain. Yet this refusal to relinquish pain equally springs from the poetic voice’s 
belief that only pain preserves memory; moreover, that pain is the oxygen that feeds 
memory. The attempt to give birth to memory is in itself a sign that there has been a loss, 
and pain constitutes for the poetic voice the means to keep loss from becoming conclusive 
and final: “sufrir es la ganancia en lo perdido” (1996: 136): 
Para las hemorragias del olvido 
tengo estas vendas de dolor amargo: 
con mi dolor a mi memoria alargo  
y así preservo cuanto ya he perdido. (1996: 137) 
So, pain preserves that which is lost and, for the poetic voice, even if it leads to 
lethargy, it also maintains some sort of vitality due to its fury: 
Para mi corazón descolorido, 
amenazado ya por el letargo 
del largo adiós, aún guardo sin embargo 
la furia de esta pena en que he caído. (1996: 137) 
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Pain is, furthermore, the antidote against forgetting, characterized in the sonnet as 
evil. Other lines of the sonnet refer to oblivion with less frantic but equally unequivocal 
terms. Oblivion is a shameful, dishonest and unfixable error, “afrenta irreparable”, 
leading to a faded memory: 
De pausas y de arritmias y de arena 
vierte Olvido su afrenta irreparable 
sobre el errar de la memoria mustia. (1996: 137) 
Only an invigorated memory might resist its own dissolution by way of turning into 
an erratic memory, bound to have an inconsistent and slippery nature. Such is the 
impression that words like “arena”, “pausas” and “arritmias” convey. Here, again, pain 
appears as that which cures—in its being identified with the terms “hospital”, “yodo”, 
“gasa” and “reparación” —, paradoxically too, as opposed to that which needs cure: 
contra ese mal es hospital mi pena 
y es el aullido un yodo confortable, 
gasa el dolor, reparación la angustia. (1996: 137) 
What sonnets like the above evoke is a sense of radical prevalence of memory over 
forgetting at the cost of endless pain: 
una concepción romántica que, entre el alivio engañoso del olvido  —engañoso y 
estafador— y la plenitud del dolor, elige siempre esa plenitud del dolor y se resiste, con 
violencia, al olvido […] (1996: 153) 
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Furthermore, Grande writes about a kind of pain that is ancient like the earth or, as 
Luis Rosales puts it, “esa tristeza que es más antigua que la carne” (1981: 227). That pain 
coming from the furthest distances in time and leaving a mark on the poetic self like an 
animal is marked when hunted with an harpoon: “Marcado está en mi cráneo aquel 
escarnio, / como un arpón remoto” (329). This state is often associated with loneliness as 
in “Dolmen de soledad, lecho de frío”, although it is more frequently linked to a remote 
and unknown cause. 
The poetic voice frames its own experience of loss within the context of the pain of 
others, or it attempts to objectify pain through its conversion into transhistorical absence: 
“Llora cuanto lo necesites por esa cordillera de ausencia que has heredado desde lo más 
remoto de tu raza” (398). This might be seen as a strategy to confront trauma. And yet, 
inherent to this operation of transforming loss into insoluble absence is the risk of 
foreclosing the possibility of finalizing the process of mourning. For sadness is converted 
into an unavoidable and even desirable emotional attachment.  Silence in that case would 
mean, as Derrida observes in the opening quotation, the experience in which working 
through losses cannot be brought to completion, so sadness never ends. For the poetic 
voice, this void emerging from the impossibility of coming up with an historical narrative 
becomes the source of unlimited melancholia, and it prompts feelings of constant 
loneliness and isolation. The poetic voice’s identification with silence is such that it 
implies a relinquishing of mourning. In “Madrigal” it states:  
Soledad, tú no eres un sereno vacío; 
tú eres esta distancia, tú eres esta impotencia, 
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tú eres mi sentimiento inútil, sin destino,  
tú eres mi pequeñez desnuda, sin soberbia.  
[…] 
Tu vida está a jirones como la vida mía  
[…] 
tú eres algo que un día se quedará conmigo 
para siempre, y entonces no nos daremos cuenta. (71) 
 
4.3 Awakening to trauma and the role of art 
 
Tengo la prisa del insomne que una noche descubre  
(Grande, Biografía) 
Despertar de este modo es excesivo  
(Grande, Biografía) 
Es clara la hermosura 
 de mi memoria aterrada 
en cada despertar 
(Juan Gelman, Incompletamente) 
Art is a quest for order and sanity 
 
(Al Alvarez, The Writer’s Voice) 
 
  
206
Beauty (art) has a role in the context of trauma. It may lead to certain cognition, 
even if partial or incomplete. It can also help to heal. Awakening to trauma through 
poetry is this section’s concern. To be more precise, how the re-enactment of this 
awakening metaphorically takes place. In the poetry of Grande, awakening from either 
literal sleep or a symbolic state of drowsiness indicates the coming out of a state in which 
one was severed from the consciousness of an excess. It is as if an insomniac one night 
discovered something brutal, a meaning or link that it had long been missing. Awakening 
refers to momentarily seeing through the dense layers of forgotten memory realities that 
had been censored or displaced. In the work of Grande, awakening has to do with 
becoming conscious and aware (either in daylight or during nights of insomnia) of 
trauma. It is often a semi-conscious state that causes a crisis of identity—often partly 
resolved through artistic invocation.  
Disturbing images and tormenting nightmares appear themselves as fixed mental 
objects, as if they were photographs or flashes of unelaborated historical material.90  
…quise apartar de mí aquella imagen 
que mi destino habíame puesto en la memoria 
como un clavo torcido por golpes poco humanos 
                                                 
90 Levy, from her experience as a psychotherapist, recounts how patients lacking a coherent 
memory and suffering from torturing fragments of memory have lived experiences they can not 
yet put into words (1999: 243-252). In Schooler and Eich we find the following statement: 
“Trauma victims [...] reported that they initially remembered the traumatic event in the form of 
somatosensory or emotional flashback experiences, and narrative memory began to emerge only 
later. In contrast, nontraumatic events were recalled as narratives without sensory components” 
(2000: 387). Hence the appropriateness of literature, which is the realm of emotions, to deal with 
trauma. 
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y manchado de huellas digitales antiguas 
y acumulada, numerosa herrumbre. (122) 
However, these images are rarely fully named and symbolically elaborated. They 
contain the repetition of an old violence and reproduce its pernicious energy by the use of 
expressions of inhumane violence: “un clavo torcido por golpes poco humanos”. They 
evoke unrecognizable spectres:  
Acaso un vómito de miedo 
impulsó oscuramente a la compleja fantasía 
… y creíste imaginar, por sobre el descampado, 
el paso lento de un anciano 
tal vez borracho; al parecer, enfermo. (121) 
These images caused by fantasy come to appear during insomniac nights. The state 
of aroused awareness prompted by insomnia makes it impossible to leave painful 
recalling behind (in “Premonición” it is prospective recalling). This traumatic form of 
lucidity represented by insomnia is described as “an excessive coherence” (“desmesurada 
coherencia”, 285), a depiction that echoes the following line by Gamoneda: “la lucidez 
trabaja en mí como un alcohol enloquecido” (2007: 14). “No se puede soñar en ausencia 
de sueño”, Grande writes (1975b: 12), which amounts to say that no escape from reality is 
ever possible for the insomniac, his memory cannot be “repaired” by sleep. “No se puede 
soñar” means there is no hope. Insomnia is indeed seen as void, even a malaise which 
contains in itself the “medicine” for its cure. In his prose, Grande describes insomnia as 
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“esa ausencia que duele y da placer a un mismo tiempo, como si la enfermedad fuera la 
única posibilidad de curación” (1975b: 11).  
Thus literal or symbolical insomnia describes or hints at a condition of paralysis 
and stagnation as well as illness. Insomnia then would be an inescapable clearness of 
thought leading to quasi-madness, as in a similar vein in Goya the dream of reason 
created monsters. In “Gravedad de la noche”, another poem built upon a night of 
insomnia, a couple of lines mention madness and the damage it provokes in the brain: 
“Por medio de esta demencia […] /pobre cerebro disgregado” (73). The poem “Magia” 
equally displays the destabilizing effects of a night of insomnia for the tortured brain: 
En esta noche tibia 
me asomo a la ventana, 
por el cerebro absorbo 
una fusión en llamas 
formada de pasado 
porvenir amor nada 
como un bulto está el alma. (81) 
Going through the night as an insomniac erodes the self: “Voy pensando en la 
noche / que me gasta y se gasta” (84). Let us remember that sleep, especially in its REM 
phase, is necessary for a normal working of memory.91 In “Otra figura del insomnio” 
                                                 
91 Ruiz-Vargas states: “Es precisamente durante las fases de sueño REM cuando entran en acción 
diversos mecanismos de consolidación de la memoria […] la función del sueño REM no sería la 
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(Puedo escribir los versos más tristes esta noche) we find a description of insomnia as the 
trigger of memory that is also revealing of the mechanisms governing the poetic process: 
Mi vida más frenética, más enigmática y reunida, sucede hoy en 
estas horas lentas y altivas como el mar, tan silenciosas como 
un hilo negro, a las que llamo con el nombre pobre de insom- 
nio. Maníaco, ayudado de pastillas y médicos, de torpes conse- 
jos y de un turbio rencor estéril, he combatido durante años al  
frenesí parsimonioso de este velar, sin querer ver que en él mi  
soledad se iba transfigurando en una especie de macabra fortu- 
na. Pues estas madrugadas, casi estalladas de silencio y verdad, 
a cambio de unas migajas de salud me dan mucho: traen nom- 
bres y fantasmas de nombres. (284) 
Thus it is insomnia which sets in motion the process of recalling. Yet this is a 
traumatic recalling, made equally of silence and truth (“silencio y verdad”), of names and 
ghosts of names. These are haunting names of a broken picture whose image can only be 
partially recomposed through its fragments and remnants. Names lacking a history (“sin 
un solo apellido”) or whose history is only partly revealed through the veils of things torn 
apart and deranged objects: “trigo sin pan, peines rotos, botones caídos”.  
                                                                                                                                                  
de olvidar, sino la de eliminar patrones anómalos de conducta tales como las fantasías, las 
obsesiones o las alucinaciones” (2002: 97 and 99). 
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In the poem “Oscuro” of Música amenazada (1989: 113), one of the patterns 
showing trauma is awakening. Awakening is the central theme in some poems in which 
the poetic voice’s stability is jeopardised, only to force madness to recoil when memory is 
invoked and regained. Traumatic memories return as nightmares, which, Freud says, 
“wake the dreamer up in another fright” (cited in Caruth 1996: 92).  
“Oscuro” brings to the surface, as though it were the tip of an iceberg, the latency 
of a hidden trauma. Apparently, it deals with insomnia, to which Grande, the historical 
man, has referred in his prose and critical essays as one of the causes that led him to 
writing poetry. Yet insomnia is only the symptom of what lies underneath, unnoticed. 
This technique of showing trauma by letting us know about the symptoms is a recurrent 
feature in the poetry of Grande. The opening line, “en la alta madrugada” echoes 
Cernuda’s celebrated line “en alto olvido”. Here “alta madrugada” assumes the dark tones 
the word “olvido” would suggest if we were to perceive it visually, as in a kind of 
synesthesia. In our western tradition light is synonymous with knowledge and knowledge 
is supposed to illuminate the darkness of ignorance. Thus “olvido” necessarily refers to a 
state of absence in the mind, one in which there is no consciousness. Interestingly 
enough, in this poem the darkness of the profound night or early morning (“madrugada”) 
has as much to do with forgetting as it has with memory, for the night ends in an abrupt 
awakening from sleep and, during insomnia, the poetic self sets out to decipher the 
meaning behind the nightmares that have altered its sleep.  
The poetic voice, unfolded in the pronominal “you”, addressing itself—a 
distancing, cerebral technique—awakes from darkness—as represented by sleep, where 
the world is shut down as eyelids close—only to return to a similar darkness, the 
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“madrugada”: “Despiertas […] /Hundes tus ojos en la oscuridad” (113). The darkness is, 
arguably, literal and symbolic, affecting both sleep and vigilant states:  
Sales del sueño como si salieras 
de una placenta pobre, enferma. Emerges 
de entre miserias y sangre;  
de entre heridas emerges. (113) 
Yet sleep, leaving aside nightmares, can also be a blank parenthesis of apparent 
nothingness where impressions and memories are permanently or temporarily eliminated. 
In this case insomnia signifies not simply lack of sleep, but also the impossibility of an 
escape from distressing memories. Thus, both in sleep and in an awake-state of the brain 
there can be no escape to a torturing consciousness, as the poem also illustrates. With lack 
of sleep the possibility of giving vent to perturbed memories is played off. The strain of 
insomnia is made even more acute by the poet’s sense of solitariness: 
En la alta madrugada 
despiertas de un disparo y te parece 
que te han abandonado hace ya años 
todos los que te quieren: 
toda la soledad de un golpe sorbes  
y te quedas anciano de repente. (113) 
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In the following poem of Música amenazada, the title “Nocturno” tentatively 
suggests that it was written during another night of insomnia. Although there are elements 
in it related to trauma parallel to the previous one, I would like to stress its more hopeful 
tones, as, in it, the poetic voice struggles to annihilate and control the demonic force 
pushing him toward an identity crisis. The relationship of the poem with trauma is here 
explicitly brought forward and discussed by the poetic voice that this time speaks from 
the more direct perspective of the “I”.  
The beginning of the poem is already emblematic of a post-traumatic state: “No fue 
sino alucinación”. The poetic voice affirms that having been continuously struck by 
insomnia, it attempts to escape from it, from the immobilizing state to which insomnia 
condemns him. But, in the following lines, we realize that he is really escaping from 
confrontation with its past and its memory by way of this disease:  
De madrugada, entumecido  
por el insomnio, huí del lecho con un abrigo 
sobre el pijama, con mis treinta años 
tras de mí pidiendo socorro. (114) 
The poet needs to find out who he is, to find himself in what he loves, by way of his 
“habits” and “objects”: 
puse Beethoven, encendí un cigarrillo, 
[…]  
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acaricié los libros;  
contemplé las fotografías 
de los muertos que no olvido nunca. (114) 
The photographs, the poetic voice tells us, belong to literary figures: Antonio 
Machado, César Vallejo, Cesare Pavese, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, as well as a musician 
painted by Delacroix, from all of whom he remembers something lovable and familiar to 
him. It is worth noting that “los muertos que no olvido nunca” in the poem are literature 
itself, embodied by the artists mentioned.92 In fact, this poem is also a reflection on art, on 
what art does for the poet and of what he looks for in art, which is none other than 
becoming “serene” and being spiritually “warmed”. It is curious that his desperate desire 
to find comfort in art is not reducible to his own act of writing; it is in other writers’ art 
that he looks for comfort. The poetic voice desperately needs to hold on to the memory of 
his beloved “objects”: books, photographs of people he loved and music. Far from 
entertaining the hours when sleep is absent, the poetic voice assures us, it is a question of 
survival: “Iba y venía, tocaba, miraba, para sobrevivir”. 
On the other hand, the poetic voice insists that art and life—the latter represented 
by his wife and daughter—reunited, “reunidos”, have formed his self:  
Empecé a intentar rescatarme 
en mis objetos y en mis hábitos  
                                                 
92 Art and life are interrelated here as much as the poet, as the historical man, and the poetic voice 
as a fictional creation are.  
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[…] 
Todo esto es mío  
Yo soy de todo esto 
Que no se rompa. (114-115) 
For it is precisely the unity of the self, his identity, which is being questioned by 
“something”, a force that could be described as the demonic power dragging the poetic 
voice toward madness, where all allusion to a coherent identity is lost: 
Mas por debajo de mi conciencia 
algo buscaba una rendija 
algo pugnaba contra las paredes 
de mi equilibrio y de mi libertad. (115) 
This force capable of driving the poetic voice into madness is one of the obsessions 
that will be found throughout Grande’s work. Precisely the last cited line alludes to the 
precariousness of poetic identity. And throughout the poem the poetic voice fears that a 
fragile identity could dramatically result in the possibility of losing one’s own 
consciousness and becoming an unrecognizable other. Madness represents here negation, 
in the sense of inability to make the self’s experience communicable to itself, that is, the 
resistance to any form of self-understanding and the sense of displacement or the fear of 
being left alone with fixed images and nightmares without elaboration. Put differently, it 
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means the loss of meaningful consciousness. The poetic voice asks what its place is, and 
realizes that it has lost contact with reality: 
Qué hago yo aquí 
(¿Qué era “aquí”? ¿mi despacho? 
¿mi profesión? ¿la tierra? ¿mi existencia? 
[…]   Otro.    
Era horrible: fui otro). (115) 
Yet memory progressively re-appears to the tormented poetic voice to restore to it its 
consciousness: 
Las fotos, los objetos, la música 
la respiración confiada  
de los que amo […] 
Todo inició un lento regreso […] 
   De nuevo 
mi conciencia conmigo. (115-116) 
“Nocturno” is the re-enactment of an identity crisis, which contains a reflection on 
poetry, art and memory. The latter elements are not that which disrupts the equilibrium of 
the self; on the contrary, they constitute the quest that makes it possible for the poetic 
  
216
voice to recover sanity by reminding him of who he is and what he loves. What is 
interesting to note is the intersection of both the poetic voice’s act of producing a 
contribution to its own salvation, which that particular poem represents, and the desperate 
recourse within the poem to the art of others to fulfill such salvation. That is, an 
intersection is produced between the levels of writing and reading.93 The memory of 
reading here is confounded with the writing of memory. It is in this sense that one can 
reasonably state that trauma is being re-enacted at the same time as it is being worked 
through.  
 In Memoria del flamenco Grande observes that any attempts to go back to the 
roots of music, that is, laying bare its origin, would lead to madness: 
Afanarse en hallar las raíces de la música es una actividad entre emocionada y demente. 
[…] Si ese vertiginoso viaje de regreso pudiera remontar la abundancia del tiempo, en 
la llegada nos estaría esperando la locura. […] Y todo empeño por llegar al centro de 
ese ejército de interrogaciones nos dejaría flotando en el asombro y acaso en el temor, 
con la razón desvariada. (1999: 128-129) 
Ultimately, the passage above constitutes an analogy of the process of working 
through described in poems such as “Nocturno”. The purpose of returning to the origin in 
order to know, to gain comprehension, passes through having to confront so many 
disturbing interrogations that the whole process of attaining knowledge turns into a 
reliving of madness, the same madness which may be underlying the artistic drive. And 
                                                 
93 Peter Middleton and Tim Woods have declared that “reading itself is a practice of memory” 
(2005: 5). 
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yet, paradoxically, this has also a calming effect. Perhaps the best description of what art 
does for the poet is found in Grande’s words about music, which can be perfectly applied 
to poetry as well. Music, like poetry, is the indestructible object that gives way to the 
psychic organization of loss and traumatic wounds: 
Quizá la música, memoria de ese desvarío, sea también una compasiva forma de la 
fascinación, una manera cordial de ansiolítico: algo que, al mismo tiempo que nos 
prueba que hemos sido infinitos […] nos da un beso en la fiebre, nos lame la herida 
incurable, le pone una especie de nombre al ansia que no tiene fin, que sólo puede 
aspirar a ocasional reposo. Prueba de una abundancia frenética y al mismo tiempo 
ordenación de esa abundancia. (1999: 129) 
 Yet achieving understanding of the past is a double-edged weapon, for it might 
deceive with its pretence of certainty but also menace us with its obscurity and the abyss 
that undermines it. So, the poet recommends prudence if we wish to arrive “donde quizá 
la certidumbre y la sombra nos fulminarían con su elocuencia vasta –y, tal vez, también 
ilegible” (1999: 129). Grande knows the risks of knowing and his poetry conflates a fear 
to know with a determined will not to accept a threatening forgetting. And this is where 
insomnia acquires its methaphoric meaning. Insomnia represents involuntary 
remembering of threatening psychic material. And it also mostly represents a kind of 
lucidity that is deeply traumatic. Insomnia, the impossibility of being other than awake in 
the sense of consciously aware, binds the poetic voice to a state of perennial and painful 
recalling. Hence nights of insomnia are synonymous with memory: “y en la noche, 
adversaria del olvido” (1996: 134). And they are identified with a kind of remembering 
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that plays havoc and elicits madness: “de noche, la resurrección de la memoria y esta 
locura mansa como un gong extenuándose” (1925c: 27). 
Thus night is associated with a pellucid memory, a use of memory without 
complacencies, one which, turned into art, creates consciousness of suffering. But again, 
it is a circle (“noria” in the line), a wheel whose point of departure coincides with the 
arrival. According to Blanchot, “art is primarily the consciousness of unhappiness” (1982: 
75), and this is what memory associated with insomnia and the state of ever awakening 
appears to represent. The night symbolizes for the poet the anguished experiencing of a 
void. In “Sueño” from Años: 
La noche es un gran cero, 
nada y nadie hay en ella, está desierta. 
Iluminado y silencioso 
salgo a la sombra y busco y nada encuentro 
y vuelvo tembloroso, 
miro hacia atrás y entro 
en mi cuarto… (1975b: 224) 
 “Boceto para una placenta” illustrates how the use of the condition of insomnia is 
also symbolical and not only literal. In this poem insomnia means the realization or 
awakening toward the fact that time has destroyed the natural homeostasis of the poetic 
self and, therefore, identity has been torn into pieces. Whenever time (memory) fractures 
so does identity. This is the reason behind the description of identity as a “resumen 
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amenazado” (153). As in the lines of “Nocturno” reproduced above there is an adverbial 
reference to an unidentifiable site or state pointing to this break:  
La vida aquí es muy frágil 
 la vida aquí es esquirlas 
 me falta tiempo o bien el tiempo aquí está roto 
 y agrupándolo me desgasto. (191)  
One can pose some of the same questions the poetic voice addressed to itself in 
“Nocturno”: What is “here”? (“¿Qué era 'aquí'? […] ¿la tierra? ¿mi existencia?”). As will 
be seen, “aquí” in the work of Grande denotes a non-place where time is divided and 
there is an identity crisis. Hence its inherent contradiction: here is a nowhere. And, once 
again, as in “Nocturno” the recourse to emotionally charged objects of memory and the 
memory of his readings and his music restore some unity and sense where there was 
none: 
cuando reúno gente en casa y bajo la escalera corriendo 
y regreso con vino y pongo un disco y otro 
y leo Machado a quienes ni siquiera lo desconocen 
no es amistad tan sólo, es impaciencia, es 
como apartar piedras de alguna galería derrumbada. (191) 
It is not difficult to see how implicitly the ruins of this gallery constitute the “aquí”, 
the image of the poetic voice’s existence. In relation to the role of art, the poetic voice 
needs the wound of the Other, represented by the literary and artistic works of those the 
  
220
poet admires. This identification with the wounds of others, wounds writers or artists of 
all sorts have turned into words in their works, helps elaborate and heal one’s own 
wound. In principle, what the reading of other survivors’ works provide is an 
interpretative frame and a terminology. Vallejo is a clear example of this process of 
identification and projection. In an early book dedicated to the “master”, Grande clarifies 
what both writers have in common, which is: the infant roots of trauma: “velarse a gritos 
la costra de la infancia adolescente” (32). In “Gemela temprana” he writes: 
Con esta voz de luto 
adónde iré que no me miren negro 
Infancia sola y triste, tú has culpado 
mi vida. (39) 
 Insomnia and awakening: “cuánto te despertabas al despertar y cuánto/ insomnio 
añejo te colgaba del párpado hasta el suelo” (32). 
An important feature of Grande’s poetry is the fact that the recalling of the poetic 
voice’s memories is indirectly produced through the recalling of other people’s wounds, 
as in the case of Vallejo. This is why the notion of postmemory is central to his work. 
Postmemory, referred to in Spanish as “memoria diferida” (Rico 1998), defines second-
hand or vicarious memories in that the situations they recall have not been directly lived 
by the survivor but by the survivor’s family or close relatives.94 The interesting thing is 
                                                 
94 Beatriz Sarlo clarifies the notion: “La palabra “posmemoria”, empleada por Hirsch y Young, en 
el caso de las víctimas del Holocausto (o de la dictadura argentina, ya que se ha extendido a estos 
hechos), describe el caso de los hijos que reconstruyen las experiencias de sus padres, sostenidos 
por la memoria de éstos pero no sólo por ella. La posmemoria, que tiene a la memoria en su 
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that in the work of Grande the notion of postmemory could be extended and defined in 
the following way. He uses the memories upon which other writers have written in order 
to understand and work through his own memories.  
Consider the following passage of the opening poem of Taranto, the work that 
Grande dedicates to Vallejo: 
y entre lo que yo pensaba  
recordaba tus recuerdos 
llenos de hambre y de cárcel 
y de pesadumbre llenos, 
y entre lo que yo iba hablando  
eran tus trágicos versos  
que se incorporaban como  
irresistibles enfermos. (27) 
Strictly speaking, we cannot remember what happened to others. Yet, due to the fact 
that one of the components of memory is imagination—imagination is necessary 
whenever the processes of identification and projection are set in motion—, the poetic 
voice’s memories are interwoven with the emotional burden of Vallejo’s memories or, to 
be more precise, with the reading of Vallejo’s writing of his own memory. For how is it 
possible—as the line “recordaba tus recuerdos” tells— to remember other people’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
centro, sería la reconstrucción memorialística de la memoria de hechos recientes que no fueron 
vividos por el sujeto que los reconstruye” (2005: 129).  
  
222
memories? Experiences are not transferable. Understanding and empathy are only 
produced from the stance of shared ways of making sense of the world, and such is the 
case with the tragic experiences of loss and mourning common to Grande and Vallejo. 
Thus the notion of postmemory can fittingly be applied to the weaving and unweaving of 
first-person memories with memories that one could not possibly live but which 
nevertheless contribute to the construction of our own memory.   
 
4.4 Spatializing trauma or the content of the form 
 
Memory is always framed in space. In trauma space is alluded to in the form rather 
than in a specific content for which the form would serve as a conduit. In trauma there is 
not a structuring of space in recognizable forms of narration, for traumatic recalling gives 
way to a more problematized organization of space. Places in Grande’s poetry are places 
of no memory. Anne Whitehead uses the term “non-places”. Butler calls them places of 
“no belonging” (2003: 468).  Rather than places, therefore, we ought to regard them as 
psychic spaces of melancholia which are characterized by a fusion and con-fusion of 
forms that testify to a problem with boundaries.95 Such a problematic is substantiated in 
the difficulty of finding a balanced demarcation between inside and outside, that is, 
between individuation and the social. The impossibility of containing experience within 
recognizable spatial limits, due to its nonreferential status, is instantiated by the 
                                                 
95 Sánchez-Pardo points out that “the space of melancholia is an uncertain space, whose form is 
drawn and redrawn until it becomes reified and solidified and whose content is disseminated and 
redistributed in virtually endless ways in its interior landscapes” (2003: 214). 
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employment of adverbs of imprecise location, such as “aquí” and “allí” in “Superficies”. 
“Aquí” and “allí” only communicate a sense of not knowing, even of disavowing 
meaningful context. “Aquí” alludes to a zone of no sense-making: “Aquí, en la superficie/ 
o simulacro del sentido,/ […] incapaces de comprender”, as does “allí”, “donde la palabra 
sentido/ no ha nacido ni va a nacer” (381).  
The sense of no belonging is also conveyed through the employment of 
adverbialized nouns which act as places of nowhere. It is as though the poetic voice 
wondered in perplexity “Where is my place?, Where is my location?”. And so the answer 
to those questions is “catastrophe” and “loss”, “fear” and “pain”, which are nouns that act 
as adverbs of places of no belonging. Places are always more than mere spatial location. 
They are composed of physical space but, more importantly, of emotionally lived time, 
that is, of memory. If we leave aside the factual components of a place where catastrophe 
occurred, that is, if we forget the contextual minutiae that can be put into narrative, we are 
faced with the experience of utter void. However, even when the foreground elements of 
memory are gone or have never existed, the emotions attached to such a memory cannot 
be easily deleted. This is so because they have not yet been rendered into factual narrative 
experience. Thus the impossibility of articulating experience, of putting it into narrative 
means, precludes the possibility of working through emotions of pain and fear. These 
emotions, lacking a narrative frame, can only be conveyed as an excess that lacks 
meaning which only context can confer. And this excess is what ultimately constitutes the 
spatial dimension of Grande’s poetry.  
There are hardly physical places to be remembered in Grande’s poetry. The poetic 
voice inhabits psychic places of death or places which are not places at all, just the 
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reminiscence of an excess. Ultimately, the only “space” the poetic self inhabits can be 
said to be set within the borders of the poem. The poem thus serves the crucial end of 
accommodating an excess that cannot be put elsewhere. Making poetry is likened to the 
act of containing such a surplus which, if it were not to be contained in any other way, 
could lead to death itself. This is how, according to Middleton and Wood, Ann 
Lauterbach understands the relation of memory, poetry and trauma: “the task of 
reconstructing memory after catastrophe might be managed by creating a poem which 
simulates the energy and structure of the remembered trauma but without its poison” 
(2000: 191).  
Música amenazada begins with a poem called “Inocencia” (108-109) in which an 
indeterminate place is continually called upon by the adverb “aquí”. We never know what 
“aquí” is or where it is located. We do know that whatever “aquí” means, it exceeds a 
referent or, more accurately, it represents an excess. If we keep reading the poem we 
realize that “aquí” embodies or is associated more with a state of mind which is described 
with the terms “nightmare”, “terror” and “insanity”. In this sense, the poem is incomplete: 
it tells of something we cannot grasp. We can only perceive the suffering, even become 
engulfed in it, although without fully understanding whence all this pain comes. The 
poem relives an experience it never names. Nevertheless, what the poem does manage to 
communicate is an excess, the same excess that in other poems the poetic voice will 
attempt to integrate into a narrative, failing to do so in this particular one.  
The sense of being overwhelmingly constrained by a powerful and unknown 
entity is wonderfully rendered by the images of “blind birds between walls” (“ciegas aves 
entre muros”), where the adjective “blind” and the expression “birds between walls” 
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doubly emphasize a two-fold idea. On the one hand, there is the poetic voice’s effort to 
find a way out (to fly out of the nightmare). On the other hand, the difficulty or near 
impossibility of such a task. In other poems, for instance, “En este poema” (Cuaderno de 
Lovaina) we find the same feelings of imprisonment: “yo aprieto los dientes y paso como 
puedo” (380). The poetic voice’s difficulty in liberating itself from being enchained to the 
oppression of continuous suffering is clear in “La pantera”: “yo vivía como la palabra 
socorro. Yo vivía en legítima defensa. Usé todas las armas contra tu cabeza bellísima y 
oscura, todas las armas contra tu esplendor, todas las armas contra el desatino de tu 
inmortalidad” (264). In admitting that there is insanity in the perpetuity of pain, the poetic 
voice implicitly claims its pathological inability to mourn. 
Further on, we find the following lines: 
Aquí, 
poca belleza; 
no es hermoso esto: 
demasiado profundo. (108) 
What is “here” (“aquí”), what does the poetic voice mean by “this” (“esto”)? 
Whatever it is, there is an attempt to seek an origin for “esto” by returning to the origin 
itself, the beginning of humanity. The poetic voice not only gives birth to the poem but, 
more interestingly, the poem registers in itself the birth of the world, a birth that re-
produces the origin. The poem is, thus, a return to the origin. In “Inocencia” the origin is 
invoked not only as the unnameable place which is the provenance of all suffering, but, 
also, it alludes to the return to the origins of humanity as the constitutive trait of the 
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human. “Inocencia” is not only a response to the veiled and implicit questioning of the 
poetic voice’s suffering: it is a reliving of the pain which inheres in the origin and, by 
extension, in every human being.  
 The latter shows why it is so difficult to disentangle historical from structural 
trauma in Grande’s work. Let us see the lines that call upon the Origin: 
Aquí, 
poca belleza;  
no es hermoso esto: 
demasiado profundo, 
sucio de origen, 
pegajoso aún 
de la placenta de la creación, 
lastimado aún 
por el dolor del parto del mundo, 
debitativo aún de caos primario. (108) 
With “demasiado profundo”, too profound, the poetic voice seems to imply precisely 
the difficulty of giving form or shape to that which it seeks so desperately, in its attempt 
to render visible the invisible. For “demasiado profundo” stands as the very impossibility 
of getting to know what is beyond, what otherness or alterity is present in the poem. 
Further on the poetic voice affirms: “Siniestra es nuestra comprensión/ somos feroces de 
la nada”. Any effort to understand or to gain knowledge must, in fact, be “sinister” and 
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eerie insofar as beyond such vain effort awaits nothingness (“la nada”). Two more lines 
reinforce this sense of hopelessness. This time, nevertheless, what is unnameable is the 
past, put in a general and undefined way, which is also identified with shadow, an image 
insisting on the enigmatic nature of what is being talked about and which can also be 
profusely found in the work of Paul Celan:  
Aquí 
el pasado es absurdo, 
residual 
e inexistente a fuerza de ser sombra. (109) 
Let me say in passing that although Paul Celan might not be counted as one of the 
poets who influenced Grande, nonetheless the two poets have much in common. The 
adjective “residual” recalls Celan’s remnants. It is the traumatic dimension of their 
respective works that supports the association.96 Curiously enough, this poem has been 
called “Inocencia” (being innocent) and has death as its main reference, just as the 
experience of Celan is marked by death imposed on innocents.   
 Between brackets, as if in a dream or nightmare, the poetic voice screams (the 
repetition can be taken as revealing the anguish in a scream): 
(Aquí, 
no se quiere matar, no se quiere matar, 
                                                 
96 Ulrich Baer (2000) has associated through his application of trauma theory Celan and 
Baudelaire, two apparently very different poets.   
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se está cansado, se es inocente sin destino). (108) 
These words come after the invocation to the origin, and “no se quiere matar” may be 
reliving the violence and death of it. With “inocente” the poetic voice seems to undertake 
the discharge of a sense of guilt. And with “sin destino” it points to the pointlessness of 
existence, the latter being reinforced by the following lines: 
Ya no quedan resoluciones  
que miren al otro borde del morir; 
nada que viajar, ninguna espera. (108) 
The recourse to expressions such as “Ya no (quedan)”, “nada” and “ninguna” 
emphasize the poem’s invocation of nothingness. This negativity or labour of the 
negative, which we also find in Celan, is, nevertheless, constitutive and not constrained or 
sought. Nothingness predates the poem not as a theme, but as a haunting presence, as that 
which resists explanation and cannot be named, the undecidable. Nothingness is the 
otherness that resists assimilation in language, even though language indicates its 
presence. The poetic voice is served by language: language is the ally. It is not the limits 
of language that constitute the problem. It is rather the nature of the experience that 
cannot be accommodated into a narrative. Ulrich Baer (2000) lucidly points out that what 
was traumatic and inassimilable for people in the past has been integrated into language 
because language has been expanded and patterns of understanding or frames have been 
created. The refinement of thought has only been possible thanks to the evolution and 
more complex elaboration of language.   
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 Further on, some lines indicate a kind of foundering, which presumably refers to 
the sinking of the concept of humanity: “Esto es un lento cataclismo/ […] Y que abdicó 
una noche en la prehistoria” (108). Throughout this book and the rest of the poet’s work 
in verse, there is a constant reference to the destruction of the concept of humanity. It is 
as though the poetic voice were saying that we, as human beings, are, still, at the point of 
departure, at the origin, that is, the beginning of our humanity.  
 In addition, this particular poem shows two more relevant aspects that turn out to 
be recurrent traits in Grande’s poetry. In the first place, structural trauma is attached to 
the consciousness of death. Secondly, structural trauma is enshrined in historical trauma. 
To make things more complicated, the latter is in its turn enshrined in the collective: 
Una de nuestras manos da al vacío 
y regresa a la frente, 
la otra permanece en el horno del siglo 
y se quema y no disimula 
su dolor y su aullido natural. (109) 
The imprecise reference to a place that is only referred to with a vague word, “aquí” 
reveals a sense of displacement and a crisis of identity, as the following lines illustrate:   
Despertar de este modo es excesivo y al izarme del lecho 
mi cráneo golpea el día y lo quiebra en cristales 
la vida aquí es muy frágil la vida aquí es esquirlas 
me falta tiempo o bien el tiempo aquí está roto 
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y agrupándolo me desgasto qué atroz subtarea. (191) 
To be placed inside the vortex of trauma is to be located among the fragility of the 
ruins that catastrophe leaves behind. There cannot be a sense of being, sense of unity, and 
sense of belonging precisely where time has collapsed. Time is here interiorized as 
broken time; the normal flow of consciousness, interrupted. It occurs as though the self 
were thrown outside the course of the collective and were constrained to develop an inner 
time of its own, failing to do so. Here the poetic self has not managed to identify with the 
proper movement of the narrativity of history, where there are causes and effects, 
triggering events and consequences. There are no patterns of narration in this poem or in 
the previous poem. Ultimately, what the poetic voice finds it difficult to reach is the 
substance of its own self, that is, a foundational breath or rhythm that would encompass 
its existence. There is the urge to follow the frantic rhythm of life and not remain still, 
which would mean death. In other words, the poetic voice struggles to interiorize what it 
perceives as the demented and accelerated speed of the course of history. The poetic 
voice fails to situate itself within the turbulence of its time. Its own self risks ceasing or 
being reduced to pieces of no sense.  There are two lines of the poem “Concepción 
Oconto” of Blanco Spirituals that symbolically point, notwithstanding that the context of 
the poem is a very different one, to the process of having necessarily to adapt to a rhythm 
of change. Lack of adaptation would lead to the prison of no communication: “Te 
encierran en una prisión sin que comprendas nada./ Y sigue la civilización su curso.” 
(211) 
 In “Superficies” of Cuaderno de Lovaina the referential use of the adverb “aquí” 
is more explicit:  
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Aquí, en la superficie 
o simulacro del sentido, 
[…] 
aquí en lo racional, 
en lo cotidiano, en lo amable. (381) 
However, the following stanza reveals that “aquí” in “Superficies” is no other than 
the “allí” of poems such as “Inocencia” and “Boceto para una placenta”, that is, the core 
of trauma: 
Allí, en el fondo, donde  
 […] 
donde la palabra sentido 
no ha nacido ni va a nacer 
[…] donde todo  
es verdaderamente horrible 
pero mucho menos impuro 
que la simulación. (381) 
Grande uses these two adverbs of place dialectically to point to layers of perception 
or modalities of understanding. One of them remains on the surface of knowledge and is 
identified with the rational, and the conventional, what he calls false reason, “simulacro 
del sentido”. The other is compared with true knowledge and cognition but not in the 
sense of cognitive reason.  Whereas the former precludes the possibility of genuine 
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knowledge, the latter allows entrance into the unknown, but also opens up the path to 
realities that might result disturbing: “allí, en el fondo, ¿aguarda,/ por ventura, el 
descanso?” (381). 
 The poetic self somehow asserts that our capacity to confront horror constitutes the 
condition of the possibility for a deeper knowledge. This is in accordance with what 
Caruth observed about trauma, that is, that trauma survivors in their working through are 
capable of grasping realities that others have only begun to face. The separation 
established by the adverbs “here” and “there” marks the distance between “the heroes” 
and “the mad”, “the leaders” and “the failed”, as is also explicitly suggested in another 
poem from the same collection, “En este poema” (380). The barrier dividing those two 
realities of the self is one which draws a line between the sordid and the innocent.  
As indeterminate as “aquí” or “allí”—indeterminate in the sense of being ethereal 
and immaterial, notwithstanding it describes a well defined and solid poetical state—are 
other places of trauma. For instance, “abyecto barrio”. In other poems the poetic voice 
continues to convey a sense of claustrophobia through its references to dark abysses and 
claustrophobic deserts, the only locations in which the poetic voice manages to locate 
itself:   
  Igual que un dromedario cruza los arenales 
una y otra vez sin salir del desierto 
con su estéril nostalgia del valle, hasta que es muerto 
sobre los arenales, sobre los arenales. (64) 
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In reality these places are no places—they lead to death or they are in themselves deadly 
places.  In “Cita en la ciudad vacía” (139-141) having no place as a form of being in the 
world is framed within the context of an uncertain city. The city symbolizes a space other 
than the inner, the realm where the inner encounters the outer reality. This relationship 
establishes itself through memory. It points from the particular—family links—to the 
universal: humanity, to which the poem refers as “la familia fantástica” (139).  This place 
is not an imagined world having to do with fantasy. It is rather a way to accommodate the 
excess of a lacking referent. The naming of real, physical places in this poem—for 
instance, there are two direct references to indeterminate places: “ciudad” and “sala”—
does not presuppose that they are endowed with autonomous value in the context of the 
rest of the poem. Even the city, which is the only space with meaningful significance, acts 
as a background against which the poetic voice ruminates about something vaster. The 
values attributed to the city—its being empty and its medieval cloister—only reinforce 
the points made in the poem. Here perception and remembrance are intermingled in that 
the poetic voice perceives the city in ways that are confused with its own remembering. 
And to its own remembering the imagination of inexistent memories are added too, 
imagination (not to be confused with fantasy) being a powerful component of memory.  
“Cita en la ciudad vacía” is not only testimonial. Memory in it acts as the 
mechanism that connects individual memories to consciousness, exerting an influence 
over each other. The poetic voice extends experiences of pain and silence to an imagined 
vast family, as it instantiates an ethical use of memory. Memory here not only serves the 
end of bearing witness. It also recalls in ways that make pain’s signature 
indistinguishable. It suddenly becomes a universal pain. 
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There is a group of poems of narrative character, where the examination of places 
coincides, on another level, with the lack of settings hitherto analyzed. In Blanco 
Spirituals the condition of socially exiled characters such as the figures of the clochard 
and the gypsy highlight the insistence on this idea of being displaced and, therefore, 
having no place. Nevertheless, these poems are less interesting from the perspective of 
trauma, as in them the efficacy of their narrative power renders their traumatic aspects 
ineffectual. The potential traumatic components of the personal are here diluted in an 
intricate intermingling of consciousness filtered through historical events and personal 
experiences.  
 To be sure, the recurrence of non-places in the poetry of Grande denotes the fact 
that the poetic voice is in search of an indefinite place, which can be seen as an attempt at 
accommodating an excess, the very same excess at which the poetic voice awakes. This is 
not to say that Grande’s poetry is stripped of geographical or historical references to 
places (the Mérida of the Civil War, his place of birth, the countryside of Tomelloso, 
Madrid or cosmopolitan Paris, etc.). However, reference to these places hinges on an 
excess that resists being localized and contained in any of them. More importantly, they 
are subordinated to this ultimate reference of lack of setting which is the mysterious 
origin of an excess that can only be found at the origin. 
 
4.5 Fear 
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la infección de humillación y de miedo con que la posguerra contaminó el aire que 
respiraban a bocanadas todos mis familiares junto a millones de españoles. 
(Grande, La balada del abuelo Palancas) 
Una pena y un susto eternos 
(Grande, La balada del abuelo Palancas) 
Creedme cuando os hable del miedo 
(Grande, Parábolas) 
Violenta lucidez del miedo  
 
 
 Fear is a fundamental emotion in the poetic writing of Grande and one that is 
equally related to memory. For one of the central motives for fear that his poetry conjures 
up is time itself. The labour of memory, against all odds, painstakingly tries to resist the 
inexorable passage of time and, therefore, the terror with which the latter imbues the 
poetic self: 
Esa parte de mi memoria 
que labora febril […] 
y se obstina 
(no es sino miedo, miedo al tiempo, 
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miedo al remoto desarrollo  
del universo, horror 
a la velocidad de las canas), 
y se obstina en regar, regar, 
regar desesperadamente 
un lento chaparrón de pánico. (249) 
Fear overwhelms the poetic self as early as life begins to exist in the form of an 
embryo and elicits the action of curling or turning inwards: “ovillados como los fetos / 
crujimos de silencio y de espanto” (377). In “Oh materia materia” Grande refers to a 
remote fear, one which seems to appear at the moment of coming into existence, and has 
existed since the beginnings of time: “desde el origen de las comunidades” (375). It is life 
itself, in the poem “materia”, the powerfully mysterious and enigmatically unnameable 
reality whose very existence inflicts the punishment of fear: “Oh materia materia qué 
ominoso castigo / tu propia ceremonia innombrable” (377): 
Nos refugiamos en nuestra cueva 
lloramos con humildad abominable 
mordemos nuestra lengua hasta vaciarla 
de sus gallardas acusaciones 
escupimos sobre nuestros espejos 
y arañando la oscuridad 
reconocemos al terror 
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en nuestro propio corazón. (377) 
The references to cave (cueva) and fear, along with the instinctual metaphorical 
regression to the embryonic state, are reminiscent of the poems in which returning to birth 
was linked to the poetic voice’s embrace of death. Note the similarity of the experience of 
María Teresa León, a territorial exiled writer who in her Memoria de la melancolía 
expresses a wish to retract to this very same reality Grande’s poem also describes: 
“quisiera vivir sin vivir, olvidar, aletargarse como los lagartos, creer que el principio y el 
fin se unen y recomienzan. ¿Se puede recomenzar? Ojalá. ¿No será algo así como morir?” 
(1998: 159). Yet in “Oh materia materia”, in contraposition to the kind of situation 
presented by the poems analyzed earlier, it is fear that is causing involution. However, the 
tone assumed here is a condemnatory one, in that it deems fear to be socially approved of, 
calling for rebellion against an overt recognition, which is keeping humanity enchained: 
En el curso de los milenios 
los lujuriosos de la sinceridad 
fuimos odiados, perseguidos 
cazados como ratas 
Las religiones y el poder  
no toleraban nuestro desprecio 
ni nuestro coraje suicida 
Hostigados, hemos optado 
por extremar nuestra iracundia 
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hasta llegar a denunciar 
el pánico en el fondo del placer 
la ofuscación en medio del trabajo 
el miedo a las fauces del tiempo. (376) 
Fear is inextricably associated to haste. In “Letanía” from La noria the poetic voice 
implores: “dadme cosas que sirvan a esta prisa y este miedo” (477). There is a sense of 
urgency to stop the hemorrhage of profound sadness, which elicits action and movement. 
In “Letanía” an accumulation of surreal dreams, art and life memories, the physical with 
the immaterial, are interwoven. As if it were a prayer, there is a plea—the title already 
indicates this; “letanía” means prayer—for immediate consolation and an urge to fulfill an 
imprecise desire in which remembering, perception and desire mingle: 
Dadme un celemín de trigo   una manta con agujeros   un cabezal 
de paja   dadme un silencio que no amenace    nada          dadme un  
cofre con guijos blancos   dadme antes de la guerra      dadme des 
pués del napalm y del fósforo   dadme un mundo        sin asesinos. (447) 
The punctuation stresses the fusion of the three temporal levels, the past of 
remembering, the present of perception and the future of desire. The fact that punctuation 
marks are missing—there are solely the pauses of the blank spaces—and that there is no 
capitalization as well as no interruption of lines causes the illusionary effect of a seamless 
course, a timeless surface without sutures or cuts. In other poems the seemingly deliberate 
confusion of temporal levels appears to derive from the fear of forgetting. This is the 
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case, for instance, of “La rumia”, as the following lines illustrate: “Ya no queda./ Desde 
mañana! no he dejado de memorar/ el sol aquel, la piara veintenaria, su balido volviendo 
el cuello”. In another stanza in the poem: “Esta noche,/ tan serena como aquellas, sino 
más adelante/ padre fuma en el comedor” (35). Although the poem predominantly unfolds 
in the past—most of its references are related to a time that no longer is—, some of the 
references are given in the present. As the clause “no he dejado de memorar” suggests, 
the actions congregated in the memory of the poetic voice are mainly past activities and, 
yet, they project into the present with such a powerful aura that the last three stanzas of 
the poem are resolved in the present tense and in the conditional form of the future. The 
present wishes to borrow from the past a time that no longer is but it realizes that even 
remembering cannot do anything to replace the time past. The last two lines of the 
following stanzas can be understood in this way, with “demasido pretérito” standing for 
the irreplaceability of a painful loss:  
Y qué no diera por mostrarle al viejo 
una almorzada de yeros sobre la mesa 
para que sepa que aquel grano quedóseme en el alma 
y para que me mire, haciendo memoria, a punto  
de sombríos, mientras fumamos hoy, a las doce. 
 
Pero faltaría  
la rumia, la oración aquella (qué fueran unos yeros), 
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faltaría el olor del ganado, el lamento 
del choto mínimo faltaría, habría 
pretérito suficiente  
para que el símbolo desnudo 
nos haga daño en la médula dorsal del corazón. (36) 
In “Nevermore, dijo el cuervo” (Taranto), the re-enactment of loss taking place in the 
poem is embedded in an implicit refusal to embrace loss which is also marked in 
language, especially in the use of verb tenses. Consider these previously quoted lines of 
the poem:  
¿Y nunca más nos saldará mamá un pecado 
de un pescozón, para que la tristeza nacía con causa 
sino este ahora de tristeza unificada, 
pescozón permanente ¡y cómo, si mamá ya no pega! (48) 
The future tense (saldará), the past tense (nacía) and the present tense (pega) coexist 
in the illusion of the possibility of the three tenses being real at the same time or, in other 
words, of the timelessness of the poem. In this case the memory of a loss, in itself a kind 
of presence, gives existence back to what no longer is. Note how this is underscored by 
the use of an apparently incorrect verbal form: “nacía”. The conjunctive locution “para 
que” requires next to it a verb in the subjunctive. Instead, the verb appears in one of the 
past tenses of the indicative mode. The subjunctive makes the possibility that something 
will come true less likely. Here, sadness was born with all the peremptory force of the 
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indicative mode. Furthermore, the action described in the last line (“mamá ya no pega”) is 
somehow questioned by the first line (“¿Y nunca más nos saldará mamá un pecado?” ) 
and contradicted by the lines in which it is assured that the slap on the neck (“pescozón”) 
is permanent. 
The poem “Hermano marginal” (37-38) also shows what is stated above about the 
interweaving of tenses. Note the following line: “qué antiguamente observo lo desvalido 
que irás”, where the vision of the future (irás) coming from a present intended to be past 
is suggested by the strange combination of a present tense and an adverb denoting a time 
past: “antiguamente observo” (38). In fact, the simultaneous reference to past and future 
from the standpoint of a present in which the poetic self presents itself as an “être-pour-
la-mort” is a recurrent feature of Grande’s poetry. Observe, for instance, some lines from 
“Magia” (Las piedras) in which deathly imagery (“silent neck of an old guitar” “my 
skull”, funeral “shroud”) is called upon to summon up death. Quevedo’s “canción 
fúnebre” appears to foreshadow lines in which the poetic voice personifies a shipwreck: 
Aquí, […] 
enjaulado de ayer 
deriva de mañana,  
como una tabla rota 
que se pierde en el agua, 
como el mástil callado 
de una vieja guitarra 
[…]    el alma 
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pone en mi calavera 
estas señales blancas 
estos sudarios finos 
estas delgadas sábanas, 
oh cráneo. (83) 
Returning to the relationship between fear and haste, “Letanía” (447) is reminiscent 
of a series of poems belonging to the collection Blanco spirituals which convey the same 
sense of urgency in the face of hopelessness and fear that war and a violent world cause 
in the speaking voice, particularly “La edad de los misiles” (236), “El peligro amarillo” 
(213) and “Fragmento para un homenaje a Rayuela” (193). Another good example of how 
fear and haste go hand in hand is “Boceto para una placenta” (191), which abounds in 
expressions of hastiness such as “estoy apresurado”, “me urge”, “tengo una prisa 
desaforada”, and so on. In fact, this poem conveys precisely the fear of things occurring 
too fast, leaving no room for the speaking voice to assimilate processes of change, as if 
too hasty a pace could lead to a precipitous miscarriage (as the word “placenta” in the title 
of the poem might suggest): “estamos resistiendo la precipitación de lo que nace” (192). 
In opposition to the latter, there is the world of the countryside in which everything was 
predictable and which represents the harmony of cyclic time. But, also, it is the 
impossibility of change in “una sociedad detenida” (as was the Spanish society of the 
time) which elicits fear: 
Hay muchas situaciones quietas 
se empantana la realidad hiede a terreno pantanoso 
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se nos hunden los pies chapoteamos ¿cómo llamar sosiego 
o paz a lo que es sólo desasosiego extenuándose? 
chapoteamos con premura. (192) 
Fear is constitutive of the self: “te digo que con este amor y este temor habré de 
ambular hasta que muera” (456), and it is related to its being wary of its own 
disintegration and disappearance to the extent that the poetic self asserts: “yo soy mi 
horror y mi disipación”, “tengo una prisa desaforada por conseguir serenidad”, 
“precipitadamente añoro alcanzar el equilibrio” (191). As if the wreckage had been 
utterly destructive and there were not time enough to repair the disaster, the poetic voice 
asserts: “me falta tiempo o bien el tiempo aquí está roto / y agrupándolo me desgasto qué 
atroz subtarea” (191). It even suggests the mending task of reading poetry: “leo machado 
[…] es impaciencia / como apartar las piedras de alguna galería derrumbada” (191).97 
It is worth noting that in “Letanía” and many other poems whenever silence is 
brought to the fore it is often attached to fear. Silence is menacing, as it stems from 
wariness of censorship and, what is worse, the not so unlikely possibility of torture and 
violence. Along with surreal lines, cries and condemnatory lines are found: 
Dadme un mundo con menos asesinos  dadme un colibrí en la sandalia 
de mi      sobrina    dadme una cucharada de futuro   y en el   reverso  
de este  vejamen  dadme  un papel  pautado con  canas de  mi   padre. (447) 
                                                 
97 Grande writes “machado” instead of “Machado” to set the disrespectful tone that characterizes 
Blanco spirituals. 
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Interestingly enough, the end of the poem occurs as if the poetic voice had lost the 
vital breath, as it does not finish the word that it had begun to pronounce and only 
manages to say the first letter of what one suggests is the word “sea”: “dadme algo  
dadme lo que sea”. This undesiderable silence can be, on the other hand, the raison d’être 
of poetry, when silence indeed sings, as in “Beso pequeño” of La noria: “un gran silencio 
que canta” (437).  
 Yet feelings of fear are not limited to the tortured or those in danger, as the poetic 
voice often attributes this motif to the actions of those who commit evil and, also, to those 
too weak to denounce evil who apparently lead “normal” lives in the middle of imminent 
disaster. In “Os amaría” (445-446) the poetic voice warns of the dangers of a nuclear war 
and calls these “characters” the “modosos”, asking them to be more fearful so they can be 
more lovable: 
Modosos madrugáis  
y restauráis a vuestro ser 
con higiene y costumbres 
[…] 
(Todo esto en la hora atómica 
diosmío!: […] 
Un poco más de espanto os ruego 
y os amaría    Os amaría.  (445-46) 
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4.6 Illness, stasis and death 
 
Miro mis pies y mis rodillas, mi sexo y mis cartílagos, 
miro de arriba abajo esta fraterna máquina de morir. 
(Grande, Biografía) 
Artists […] often have frail health, a weak constitution, a fragile personal life 
[…] This frailty, however, does not simply stem from their illnesses or neuroses, 
says Deleuze, but from having seen or felt something in life that is too great for 
them, something unbearable that has put on them the quiet mark of death. 
(Daniel W. Smith in the prologue to Critical and Clinical by Deleuze) 
Narrative memory is like a stream. Trauma introduces discontinuity in the 
seamlessness of “normal” memory’s stream of consciousness. This sense of continuity 
taking place in consciousness is precisely what bestows a sense of duration of time. 
According to Henri Bergson, memory makes duration possible: “to tell the truth, it is 
impossible to distinguish between the duration, however short it may be, that separates 
two instants and a memory that connects them” (1988: 34).  
In the poetry of Grande, the presence of illness in the form of a sick memory 
stems from the general perception that a sense of continuity or duration has ceased to 
exist. The poetic self often appears to have become stagnated in an unresolved past. 
Hence the reader is presented with representations of death resulting from an established 
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fissure between past and present which cannot be connected into narrative meaning. The 
psychological division with a past that has not been made to signify is, in fact, 
emotionally experienced as death. This is not to say that the poetic voice never adopts the 
form of narrative memory –narrative memory being, according to Juan Francisco Egea, 
poetry that “prefiere la anécdota y la discursividad al símbolo y a la imagen” (2004: 53). 
It is, rather, the absence of a fully narrative or discursive sense or, even, the poetic self’s 
elaboration of a void that generates the spectral haunting of death. More often than not, in 
Grande’s poetry the transmission of this sense of death takes place through the 
description or re-enactment of emotions and feelings rather than the unfolding of 
narrative itself.  
The presence of death translates the abyss or nothingness to which the poetic self 
finds it so difficult to admit. Trauma is not a peripheral trait of the self but, rather, it is by 
nature constitutive of it. Therefore, in order for the traumatic experience to cease, at least 
partially, the unnarrativity and silence of the experience needs to be worked through 
rather than introjected. That is, it necessitates assimilation into the stream of 
consciousness that narrative memory represents.98 This section is therefore concerned 
with what this sense of death means and how it is conveyed. In order to illustrate how it is 
a constant feature of this poetry, I will use poems from all collections which will be taken 
as individualized but interconnected examples.   
                                                 
98 In trauma theory, “introjection” means, as observed earlier on in this thesis, that trauma has not 
been worked through, and the self has not yet been reconciled with the lost Object, the reaction to 
loss being melancholia.   
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Perhaps due to a lack of confidence in the concept of religion and the 
impossibility of obtaining comfort from it, Grande sees death with utter despair. 
“Sordina” (110), a poem whose title already refers to silence (the DRAE defines “a la 
sordina” as “silenciosamente, sin estrépito, con disimulo”), is constructed around two 
axes: death surreptitiously and quietly appropriates life and is manifested in physical and 
emotional signs of ageing.  Death as utter rejection of life appears in “Sombra de 
sombra”:  
Eres irreparable como una muerte. Eres  
tu propia enfermedad. Eres como un desierto. 
Eres el no del vivo sombrío. Eres la sombra 
que pudiera nacer de la sombra del tiempo. 
[…]                                             tu tránsito, 
una especie de nunca, una especie de lejos. (74) 
In “Magia”  (81-84) from Las piedras, we find the line “Aquí estoy como una 
sombra desenterrada” (82). And in “Noviembre llueve”:  
Comprendías entonces que tu vida, tu amada 
vida, tu única vida, tu pobre don, parece  
una mano cerrada por donde todo huye 
hasta que te clavaras los dedos en ella para siempre. (72) 
Note how life is defined with the metaphor “mano cerrada por donde todo huye”, 
which is closer to deathly notions of existence than to life itself. If we associate life with 
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openness, affirmation, possibility and permanence, the expression above recalls the 
opposite: closeness and closure, impossibility, negation and loss into absence. In the 
poem “Canción callada” (77) from Las piedras this point is developed further. In it the 
poetic voice simultaneously identifies itself with a wide-open door and a window, 
synonymous with life as openness and, further on, it is said that both door and window 
are left ajar, meaning that they are partially closed to that which is gone and left behind, 
and so the self is: 
Mi puerta y mi ventana abiertas 
soplan vida en mi corazón: 
me he enamorado de lo abierto 
[…] 
Ahora, la ventana y la puerta 
se entornan, y me entorno yo. 
Entornado estoy, entornado 
hacia aquello que no tornó. (77) 
Curiously, the words “being partially open to the unreturned” are precisely the 
operation taking place at the level of language when it comes to loss. In stanzas such as 
the above, there is confidence that language does not demonstrate total opacity to the 
apprehension of past experiences or events. But these lines of hope are outnumbered by 
many other lines where loss is irretrievable, for example, “por donde huyó la vida” (94), 
where everything slips through the window or where the window looks out to a “vast 
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sadness” (“abierta a una inmensa desdicha”, 94), as if reflecting past desolation. The 
image of the window stands as a mirage, as a mirror that reflects emptiness. But the 
window is also an image of a life that refuses to contain loss for it rather falls into plain 
identification with it. When the latter occurs, the power of memory to restore is 
deprecated, memory is incapable of putting the smithereens of a fragmented life together: 
“corazón y memoria inútiles” (in “Crueles pezuñas de los años idos” from Las rubáiyátas, 
371). The past emerges as a vacuum devouring the power of memory to retrieve. In the 
final stanza of the latter poem, loss is impervious, incapable of being penetrated, leaving 
no room for language to attempt understanding or explanation, as the negation implicit in 
the last line of the following stanza suggests: 
La puerta y la ventana un día 
vino un algo que las cerró. 
La casa se quedó vacía. 
Yo sólo sabía decir no. (77) 
And by this very same imperviousness death is made manifest by the refusal to 
accept loss as a component of the self. Instead, the poetic voice initiates a process of 
complete and total identification with loss, to the extent that the void of death is all-
encompassing. Loss (part of the self) ends up being internalized as something beyond 
content that is confused with the container (the self), denoting the lack of a dividing line 
separating them. The imagery of the window and the door, especially the window, 
bespeak the poetic self’s longing to resolve the problematic of individuation/separation. 
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That is, its search to establish psychic borders suggests the lability of unsettling psychic 
frames. In “Magia” (Las piedras) the following lines illustrate this point: 
Ahí fuera,  
en la noche estrellada, 
está mi vida, en forma 
de vacío y nostalgia. (81) 
Death is also presented as a seed that grows into anonymity, which is congruent 
with the kind of fusion with loss the poetic voice seeks to perpetrate: 
Apartando a brazadas tu juventud, te asomas 
al fondo de tu cuerpo y ves que allí, en lo oscuro,  
en lo callado, palpita una semilla  
de anonimato y de vejez. (110) 
Death looms over feelings of illness and premature oldness. The poetic voice 
experiences death through its pathological relation to growing old: “En la piel de tu edad 
se ha instalado un eccema de desgana / como sobre un visillo un coágulo de sangre” 
(110). Note how the poetic voice refers to this psychic experience of death: “eccema de 
desgana” and “coágulo de sangre”. Both expressions, especially the terms “coágulo” and 
“eccema” are medical terms that here point out that a wound exists. It is apparently 
inflicted in the body but, nevertheless, directs attention to a psychic condition.  The 
visibility of “eccema” and “coágulo” on the surface of a young and supposedly healthy 
skin and a curtain we imagine is an immaculate white lace curtain, respectively, call 
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attention to the inadequacy of the medium on which these wounds are displayed. They 
both suggest the overwhelming obviousness of a presence of enigmatic cause—how has a 
blood clot traveled to the surface of a curtain? —the very same existence of which 
denotes inappropriateness. The sense conveyed is that of an enigmatic and overwhelming 
presence that is taking over the self. In fact, it seems that the only movement occurring is 
along a pathway toward illness (madness) and death: 
Por medio de esta oscura demencia se diría 
que me he sobrepasado, que soy mayor; ¿a dónde 
voy a llegar en este crecimiento?  
¿A la muerte? ¿Es acaso la muerte tan informe? (73) 
This process of rapidly aging occurs almost as though the poetic voice were 
complicit with death, as if it had called upon death as to accelerate its arrival: “Hace ya 
tiempo que aspiras al reposo” (110). The latter line is ambiguous. It may indicate an 
“active” search for death as symbolized by “reposo”, or it might well suggest the hope of 
suffering being temporarily suspended—yet it might refer to the kind of eternal rest death 
brings—while “aspiras” points to a longing desire consciously nurtured by the poetic 
voice as illustrated by the expression of time “hace ya tiempo”. “Reposo” recalls the 
customary legend “rest in peace” engraved on tombstones. One cannot help but notice 
that “reposo” finds musical resonance in “responso”, a prayer offered to the “reposo” of 
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death.99 It is baffling that the poetic voice appears to be invoking death with a word 
similar to one that connotes an act of prayer or mourning after death. Furthermore, 
“reposo” echoes the emblematic resting postures—sitting and lying down. Interestingly 
enough, and according to Deleuze, in the works of both Beckett and Kafka sitting and 
lying down are modes of awaiting death (2003: 41).  
In “Caballos funerales” (Puedo escribir los versos más tristes esta noche) one of 
the lines reads: “Todo adiós es como un responso/ donde el cadáver participa en las 
letanías” (286). Hence, the poetic self’s experience of any separation as death and the 
tacit recognition that that which dies lives “in us” as is suggested by the image of a corpse 
participating in its own funeral song/prayer. 
In duplicating itself into an Other, as illustrated by the use of the second 
pronominal person in the line, the poetic voice becomes at the same time witness and 
victim of its own annihilation when it summons death through a double movement of 
testifying to its own ending and serving as a catalyst for annihilation. On some occasions, 
the poetic self acts as a hopeless witness to its own destruction. It acts as a motionless and 
complacent viewer who can only see its own fragility as if it were someone else’s. In 
“Hermano marginal” the poetic voice indulges in self-deprecating memories of its 
childhood. In this poem the poetic voice acts as an illusionary omniscient narrator 
speaking of the infant it was, the person that it is now, and the person who it will be, with 
                                                 
99 Carlos Bousoño in his poem “Introducción a la muerte”, similarly intertwins “reposo”, song and 
death: “Hay veces en que llegan a mi boca/ raros sonidos y a la muerte canto./ Allá en el esqueleto 
está escondida,/ dura, fija, aguardando./ Pero los hombres nunca saben./ Arriba hay quietos cielos 
vastos./ Tierra dorada, abajo, inmóvil./ Sol en la arena. Torsos, brazos./ Mas el hueso en el fondo 
de sus vidas/ (esa dureza de un futuro extraño)/ está tranquilo, porque luz no habita/ su funeral 
reposo milenario./ Yo sé lo mismo que los huesos saben,/ y miro, sin embargo,/ el viento puro, y, 
sin tristeza,/ suspiro en él, y algunas veces amo.” (1998: 81).  
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equal self-pity and despair. The temporal perspective is that of a hopeless present which 
sees the past and the future as equally hopeless. In this respect, the illusionary poetic 
voice speaks of a temporal division. The paralysis represented by the fusion of tenses in 
the emotional imagery of the voice renders superficial these arbritary divisions, for it 
converts them into a sole stagnated time. In the last lines of the poem the voice seems to 
foresee the future, but, in reality, it is only a projective dimension of present remembering 
into the past and the future. It is, ultimately, the recalling from the perspective of 
emotions with the same tonal imprints, such as fragility and hopelessness, which unifies 
the temporal perspectives. And the omniscient narrator behaves as if it were situated 
transhistorically outside time:  
Me escucho hervir con una atención tan filial; 
[…] 
igual que si yo fuera mi juguete pequeño del rincón, 
mi navío de corcho que echo al estanque y que zozobra 
porque tenía una vela de tela gruesa de remendar 
de tela burda e incapaz como un niño, ahora 
lo he recordado. […] 
hoy, esta cosa lejana e inasible que es hoy, hoy que considero 
cómo han quedado inútiles todas mis papeletas de sorteo,  
hoy te memoro, endeble criatura que fuiste […] 
tú, memorable hermano marginal, qué antiguamente observo 
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lo desvalido que irás por las ciudades con tus cuarentaitantos años de memoria 
          [a la rastra 
[…] 
y me recordarás a mí como yo ahora te recuerdo. (37) 
This hopelessness and sense of stasis of time is also closely related to the need to 
rest and feelings of fatigue. Apparently, tiredness, in contrast to exhaustion, allows one to 
witness one’s own progressive decadence and stagnation.  In a prose poem Luis Rosales 
asserts: “El cansancio es un don. […] nos hace comprender que hay un exceso en todo, un 
descarrilamiento progresivo” and connects fatigue with memory: “El cansancio nos ata y 
nos desata, y hay personas que son antiguas ya en el momento mismo de nacer. Vienen 
desde el recuerdo. […] Te juntan, te resumen dentro del orden del cansancio” (1981: 
358). Deleuze links tiredness to memory too when he refers to “the tiredness that 'lies 
down', 'crawls' or 'gets stuck'. Tiredness affects action in all its states, whereas exhaustion 
only concerns an amnesiac witness” (1998: 195). A line which indicates the “active” 
witnessing and conforming—he who witnesses also partly re-shapes—of the poetic 
experience of annihilation is, for instance, “Apartando a brazadas tu juventud”.  
Throughout Grande’s work in verse this summoning and witnessing of death is a 
clear feature of his poetic memory. More importantly, this feeling of mental death is 
rarely described within the framework of a narrative which would explain it and give it a 
sense. Death is, rather, a claustrophobic presence, a sort of suffocating spiderweb that 
configures the ways in which the central figure looks at the world, as if death were the 
only standpoint from which the poetic self perceives and remembers. In other words, the 
poem does not simply reflect on death. Death is rather lived in and through the poem as if 
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death referred here to an inextricably unconveyable experience one is unable to share. 
That is, experiences which are death-like because of their very same incommunicability. I 
shall refer to these experiences similar to and impregnated with death as the impossibility 
of communication or, in other words, as the silence accompanying melancholia and 
mourning.  
Silence, however, can be interpreted in the poetry of Grande in several ways. In 
Grande’s work the experience of silence is to be interpreted as death proper and mourning 
death, as impossibility of communicating, as catachresis—understood as lack of sense—
and as forgetting, all of which relate to death. Death represents the great silence, whereas 
any other “category” of silence mentioned above that we find in Grande’s work, 
ultimately harks back to the fundamental and definitive silence which is death. Yet these 
categories are distinguishable notwithstanding. As an example of silence understood as 
catachresis, in Sobre el amor y la separación Grande asserts: “¿Toda esa ausencia de 
sentido […] no es la muerte? ¿Qué otra cosa es la muerte?” (1996: 188).  
I shall now examine in detail the poems “Como una inundación”, “Premonición” 
and “Puesta de sol”, which belong to the collection Música amenazada. My analysis will 
show how each of these three poems rework in their own ways the concern of silence, 
highlighting death and unnameability as traits strictly related to silence. “Como una 
inundación” (119) can be described in a few words as a draining black hole, as the 
following reading aims to demonstrate. One of the main aspects of the topic of silence in 
the work of Grande is associated with oblivion and, more precisely, with the necessity of 
forgetting. “Edad de la carne” (111) illustrates this point. “Como una inundación” insists 
upon this dimension of silence, and, yet, it introduces a much more interesting dimension 
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of it—the impossibility of communication. Furthermore, in poems such as “La edad de la 
carne” and “En el fondo del vaso” (117) the mechanism of fleeing will be analyzed as a 
strategy to avoid working through trauma by a tacit refusal to produce a narrative of 
memory that would, ideally, disentangle emotions and their meaning. However, in “Como 
una inundación” flight constitutes an impossible task: “Hoy buscarás en vano / a tu dolor 
consuelo” (119). This poem re-enacts what is precisely the defining trait of trauma: a void 
or gap (in the poem, “agujero”) and even deems it impossible—“en vano”—to consider 
the alleviating mechanism of taking flight. The exclusion of the possibility of a way out in 
the form of flight, or in any other form, makes it a genuine illustration of what trauma 
involves: a state in which repetition of this very same hopelessness becomes the only 
recognizable feature throughout the poem. What is more, the impotence assumes the tone 
of being “absolute” to the extent that underlying it there can only be resignation to death 
and exclusion of hope. In “Como una inundación” (119-120) there is the recognition of 
trauma as a moment of death itself which is manifested in language through impotence 
and through dealing with the limits of language to express.  
If a geometrical figure can be linked to this poem, that figure would be a circle. 
And let us note that, as Bachelard has written, “profound metaphysics is rooted in an 
implicit geometry” (1994: 212). Readers will be disappointed in their attempt to find 
something other than the formation of a self-enclosing boundary line whose trace is being 
constantly drawn and trodden from beginning to end. The poem is, indeed, a vicious 
circle and one that leads, inevitably, to nothingness. The driving force behind this void 
appears to be the words that have elicited it in the first place: the couple of short lines by 
Antonio Machado mentioned above: “Hoy buscarás en vano / a tu dolor consuelo”. These 
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lines contain the trajectory of a circle where one extreme is bound to encounter the other, 
causing them to become identical. These extremes that touch are the containing limits of a 
catastrophe (in the poem “un desastre”) that cannot be told, hence to name it amounts 
here to conveying the impossibility of the endeavour. The two Machadian lines act as a 
fatalistic omen that repeats over and over the very same idea of the impossibility of 
telling, and therefore, of gaining some comfort from understanding. Comfort is discarded 
in the face of an impenetrable absence that cannot be put into words. After the omen, and 
as in a whisper—the lines appear in brackets—the following words are muttered:  
(Palabras que se acercan a tus calamidades 
y con piedad sombría las cubren de silencio; 
palabras que te suben el embozo hasta el cuello; 
palabras que te invitan a dormir las dos sienes 
y mamar, como un niño, de la teta del sueño). (119) 
The reference to an infantile period of life does not seem to be arbitrary. For if the 
pre-Oedipal or pre-Symbolic Order is characterized by the absence of language, the 
inability of the poem to express results in the involution to this very same absence, that is, 
to a pre-Symbolic, unmetaphorical order in which the reality of the child is constituted 
not by words but by the double reality of its bodily union with the mother and sleep. In 
this stage of life the mouth of the child, another circle, is essentially a void that the person 
will learn to fill with words in the eventually inexorable absence of the mother (Abraham 
and Torok 1994). In “Como una inundación” it appears as if in the poem’s insistence 
upon the absence of words, the only remaining opportunity were the regressive return to 
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the maternal nourishment and the unconscious state of sleep. However, the lines above 
may well be indicating how close to death and nothingness the two phases of life to which 
the poem refers, the life of the infant and that of the old man, really are.  
It is as if the very act of coming into existence, that is, the first extreme of life, were 
superseded by the final extreme, which is death, by the erasure of the path of life that lies 
in between. To be born is conveyed in the poem as synonymous with dying. The 
closeness among these two extremes, which constitutes a defining feature of the poetry of 
Grande, is similarly recognizable in the work of Leopoldo María Panero.100 The following 
stanza, which is the third in the poem, seems to confirm that the latter hypothesis provides 
an illuminating insight into the meaning of the second stanza: 
(Te ha rodeado la vida, 
o la muerte, o el tiempo 
como una inundación o como un terremoto, 
como una asfixia vasta o como un vasto ejército. (119) 
como una oscura cárcel, 
como un oscuro invierno; 
y estás inerme, estás perdido, estás sumado 
                                                 
100 From a very early stage of life, when he was apparently four years old, Panero began writing 
about death in his precocious poems. The best critic of Panero, Túa Blesa, asserts that: “Desde 
estos iniciales textos literarios se yergue la oscura sombra de la muerte, omnipresente, y, lo que es 
más significativo, la voz es la de un sujeto que ya ha atravesado el último río y habla desde la 
tumba, su reino es el de la muerte” (1995: 10). I believe that, even if less accentuated, Grande 
shares similar ways of making sense of his experience, in that Grande in his youthful twenties, 
similarly to Panero, already  “habla desde la tumba, su reino es el de la muerte”.  
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encanecido; viejo). (119-120) 
Lack of language, as equally represented by the pre-Symbolic Order of the child in 
the second stanza and an adult’s inability to express himself in the third stanza, is in the 
two cases revealing of silence. The state of nothingness that the impossibility of 
communication represents cannot be rendered more vividly than through the images used: 
“inundación”, “terremoto”, “megaterio ciego”. These are all images that convey a sense 
of catastrophe, although they fail to name or explain it. With regard to that catastrophe, 
metaphorically expressed by the natural phenomena, it seems unequivocally meaningful 
that the terms employed to describe its impact are associated with war: “asfixia vasta 
como un vasto ejército”, “como una oscura cárcel” and “Miraron tu vivir como mira un 
disparo”. And although there is no explicit reference to the Civil War, there are reasons to 
believe that lines such as the above echo the disasters of the Civil War as well as the 
impact they had on the poet’s psyche.  
The poet’s experience of the Spanish Civil War is attached to his first memories as 
an infant. In “Generación” from Taranto (homenaje a César Vallejo), Grande gives an 
account of a biographical story about how his mother, who worked as a nurse looking 
after wounded soldiers and civilians during the Civil War, would feed him with the 
“nourishment” of fear and tragedy, and he feels that this experience left a mark of death 
forever impressed upon his sensitivity, as a fatal destiny:  
y después me ponía sus trágicos pezones en la boca,  
 ebrios de obuses, apresurados de sobrevivencia casual,  
 para que yo chupara mi destino  
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 y cojeara luego con la niñez sin tronos. (50) 
Although much of Grande’s memory of the Civil War stems from experiences lived 
by his family, especially his parents—what is called “memoria diferida”—, scientists 
have also proved that the infant does record its own memories from the pram.101  
Thus silence, besides symbolizing lack of language in both the pre-Symbolic Order 
and in the survivor’s inability to express, is, furthermore, seemingly linked to historical 
and structural death. In the following lines, structural death is associated with silence and 
oblivion: 
Ya el labio inferior tienes sumergido en la nada 
Ya el olvido se acerca descomunal y lento 
como una densa niebla 
como un megaterio ciego 
Hoy tienes cerrado ya el silencio. (120) 
The poem “Premonición” similarly illustrates how the poetic voice conveys a certain 
muteness, combined with a specific way of making sense of the world from the viewpoint 
of death. Here, again, there is an element stressing the linking between the two extremes 
of life—coming into existence and dying simultaneously. Grande, citing Andreyev, calls 
coming into existence a “tránsito de lo oscuro a lo oscuro” (1996: 170). The charged 
symbol of a “sheet” can come to represent the infant’s state of sleep and, yet, in the poem 
                                                 
101 According to a BBC documentary, “Prof. Joseph LeDoux at the Centre for Neuro Science in 
New York and author of The Emotional Brain supports […] that it is possible to "remember" 
sensations or emotions [from infancy] in the adult body” (24-1-2007). 
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it also points to the old age, through the shroud’s association with illness, a hospital and 
death. In fact, in the opening poem of the collection Las piedras, reminiscent of 
Quevedo’s “pañales y mortaja”, there are these four short lines that clarify further the 
latter point:  
Una sábana es la doble 
definición de la esencia  
humana: campo con rosas;  
 luego, campo con violetas. (56)  
“Rosas” signals life and death through the association of red with blood and life, 
whereas “violetas” (black violets) reminds us of death. In the poem there is a reference to 
a “sala de espera”, which, by analyzing the rest of the poem, can be taken metaphorically 
to be a hospital’s waiting room. There is still another fundamental element in this poem: 
the window. The opening line of the poem reads as follows: “La gran ventana de la sala 
de espera” (121). According to Veronique Briaut, the window is an important recurrent 
object in the work of Grande (1988: 465). The window symbolizes the separation of two 
worlds. But such a division is only apparent, for what the window really comes to identify 
is the articulation between two elements, the self and the world, in that they have not 
achieved an autonomous or well differentiated status.102 On the contrary, a fusion often 
occurs among the two. One of the lines in the poem “El ojo enorme de tu sepultura” 
                                                 
102 In Mi música es para esta gente, the window comes to represent the temptation to commit 
suicide: “madrugada y silencio, alcohol, tabaco, yo con una manta sobre los hombros; una 
ventana que se asoma a la calle oscura desde muy alto y que cada vez que la miro me reafirma en 
una convicción: por ahí no voy a tirarme jamás. No voy a matarme” (1975: 28). 
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(Taranto), literally says that the window bleeds. In this case the window can be 
interpreted as a weak ego suffering from too thin a demarcation between the “I” and the 
world that leaves the “I” with shaky grounds for its own definition. So, in reality, it is the 
ego suffering from a poor constitution which is bleeding. This point seems to be 
confirmed in the poem “Canción callada” from Las piedras, where the poetic voice 
identifies itself with a suffering window: “La puerta espera, la ventana sufre. / Yo soy la 
suma de las dos” (77).   
In “Diana” we again find the window charged with significance. The voice tells us 
that the two realities separated by the window are in agreement. In this case, the external 
reality is a limping dog and the inner the voice’s life which also limps. There seems to be 
a projection of the inner into the external or a process of transference in which internal 
objects are described using external components: 
Yo y mis caries, ventana, 
nos hemos puesto a dialogar contigo, […] 
La noche me ha agitado dentro de una botella  
[…]         vengo 
al cristal y reflexiono su ofensiva:  
allá abajo, a la rastra, 
cojea un perro lo mismo que un pasado, todo 
concuerda, todo concuerda al sesgo de esa pata encogida. (45) 
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In “Premonición” the window also marks the separation between inside and 
outside. Bachelard has observed in general terms that the relationship between inside and 
outside is a dialectical one and in itself defining of being (1994: 211-31). “Inside” in this 
poem can be understood as inner, psychological reality, and “outside” represents the 
external world. What is more significant, inside and outside, owing to their shared 
signification, as will be explained, are not well differentiated in this poem, they almost 
blend into one another, in both the language and the mental state of the poetic voice. This 
is so because the main feature shared by inside and outside, inner and external reality, is 
their being embedded in silence. The inside of a hospital ward constitutes a metaphor, 
which implies the presence of illness and a willingness to cure it or the possibility of 
death. In the poem, outside is: 
Un descampado inacabable, silencioso  
[…] páramo  
con su impávida muerte tan sólo interrumpida  
por el sollozo de algún caserón derruido. (121) 
This description of the outside or external world can be taken as symbolizing the 
post-Civil War Spain—a moor where there is nothing but ruins—a reality to which the 
poem also alludes as “la gris o violeta realidad”. The term “páramo” takes its historical 
and cultural connotations from Franco’s Spain. In his analysis of how Tiempo de silencio 
by Luis Martín-Santos constitutes a metaphor of the dictatorship, Juan Luis Suárez 
Granda observes: “Hizo fortuna la expression “páramo cultural”, empleada para referirse 
a España en las dos décadas que siguieron a 1939” (1986: 11). However, “páramo” can 
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also be taken in its political and/or metaphysical sense, that is, as a time or a place in 
which a void, a sense of hopelessness, and a lack of perspective on the horizon reigns. 
The novelist Luis Mateo Díez observes: “«páramo» es la palabra más antigua que existe 
en castellano […] Es un territorio que yo llamo del «espíritu áspero», de esos paisajes del 
alma y de la desolación donde parece que no hay nada” (in Hernández 2003: 495).103 The 
inner Spain, namely, the psycho-sociological dimension of a people is metaphorized in 
the poem as a “sala de espera”, a place that involves a double meaning of hospital—
something being wrong, illness—and stasis, that is, a situation where an outcome—or 
diagnosis—is awaited and several possibilities with regard to the future are considered.  
 Although not all the poems of Grande make it possible to propose a historical 
reading, some of them can be plausibly interpreted by turning to historical trauma.104 In 
                                                 
103 The word “páramo” has a long literary tradition. Arturo Barea in the first book of his famous 
trilogy, La forja, describes a landscape—the author uses the words “campos de Castilla”, 
paradigmatic “páramos”—which is congruent in its desolation with the one found in Grande’s 
poem: “No hay árboles, no hay flores, la tierra está seca, dura y gris, raramente se ve la silueta de 
una casa […] El efecto es como si estuvierais desnudos y sin defensa en las manos de Dios: o 
vuestro cerebro se amodorra y se embrutece en una resignación pasiva, o adquiere toda su 
potencia creadora, porque allí no hay nada que la distraiga y vuestro yo es un “yo” absoluto que 
se os aparece más claro y más transparente” (2008: 56-57). As occurs with the main character in 
Barea’s book, Arturo, the poetic voice in Grande’s poem also sees its creative mechanisms 
activated and reenforced by the surrounding landscape and experiments the same sense of fear 
and solitude it prompted in Arturo: “en los paisajes desolados de Castilla renacen miedos 
instintivos y amáis la soledad como una defensa” (2008: 57). The difference, however, is that in 
Grande’s poem the landscape is more occlusive, insofar as it highlights the agony of the poetic 
self. 
104 The problem with historical readings is that they may encounter both the critic’s and the 
author’s objections, in their claiming that genuine literature requires a reading on the more 
universal level of the human. For example, Julio Llamazares recognizes that Antonio Gamoneda 
was opposed to the historical reading of his “Descripción de la mentira”: “Sé que a Antonio 
Gamoneda, tan poco amigo de las simplificaciones, la lectura que algunos hicimos entonces de su 
libro no le agradaría mucho, aunque, con su buen estilo, nunca dijo nada en contra. Me refiero a 
esa lectura que identificaba un tanto simplistamente (era la época y era también nuestra 
ingenuidad) la mentira del título de su libro con la que este país había vivido durante años. A 
través de ella, versos como el que abre el texto -"El óxido se posó sobre mi lengua como el sabor 
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Grande’s poems there is a vision of human life that overrides any historical interpretation, 
which can be demonstrated through the underlying coherence to the poems. However, 
such an interpretation may also be invested with historical detail, which the coherence 
implicit in a work not necessarily renders irrelevant. In contraposition, this thesis defends 
the idea that history impacts on the poet in ways that are difficult to predict but that these 
ways, nevertheless, are susceptible of being read historically.   
 Thus in “Premonición” the lack of resolution of trauma, that is, the act of being in 
permanent stasis, as if in a hospital’s waiting room anticipating bad news, activates the 
mechanism of fantasy and the latter is precisely what the poem puts into effect in the 
following stanzas. Here fear is the emotion triggering fantasy. According to Judith Butler, 
fantasy is a projection of trauma and does not resolve it but, rather, repeats it. Hence 
fantasy is meant to lead to the same stasis. Sánchez-Pardo observes that “unconscious 
phantasy could thus be understood as some sort of structuring principle that gives shape 
to the individual’s inner drama and transforms it into a particular and contingent 
                                                                                                                                                  
de una desaparición / El olvido entró en mi lengua y no tuve otra conducta que el olvido / y no 
acepté otro valor que la imposibilidad"- cobraban a nuestros ojos un sentido muy directo, tan 
directo quizá como distinto al que el poeta había querido darles. Y no digamos aquellos otros que 
expresamente apuntaban: "Los que sabían gemir fueron amordazados por los que resistían la 
verdad, pero la verdad conducía a la traición / Algunos aprendieron a viajar con su mordaza y 
éstos fueron más hábiles y adivinaron un país donde la traición no es necesaria: un país sin 
verdad". Esto, para mí y para mis amigos, en aquel año de 1977, era toda una declaración. 
Recordaba todo eso mientras Antonio Gamoneda, con su educación antigua, leía su discurso sobre 
la poesía y la pobreza delante de un auditorio -el de los premios Cervantes, en Alcalá de Henares- 
la mayoría del cual seguramente no sabía quién era hasta esa mañana y me venía a la cabeza 
aquella lejana época en la que yo pensaba que la mentira era algo del pasado, algo que 
afortunadamente se terminaba por fin en este país. ¡Qué ingenuos éramos todos! ¡Qué infelices 
creyendo que aquel libro que leíamos como si fuera una revelación no era una visión del mundo, 
sino el epitafio de una época concreta!” (2007: 17). I agree that to limit the interpretation of a 
poem to its historical reading is reductive, but to ignore that poetry is conditioned by and 
assimilates in its own way history would necessarily mean to miss part of the significance of a 
work.  
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configuration” (2003: 214). In fact, the poem meets these expectations. The illusion 
created in the poem in the form of a man moving toward an eye that acts as a witness is a 
mirage of desolation, abandonment, pain and illness:  
Acaso un vómito de miedo 
impulsó oscuramente a la compleja fantasía 
[…] y creíste imaginar, por sobre el descampado, 
el paso lento de un anciano 
tal vez borracho; al parecer, enfermo. (121) 
Once again, we are presented with the same technique of a split self; although in this 
case the illusion or the thing projected forms part of the self, it is, in fact, a defining part 
of the self. Recipient (self) and content (its illusion) are deliberately confused here.105 
Nevertheless, this phantasmagorical human figure is perceived as a cognitive entity 
autonomous from the self. In other poems, like “Puesta de sol”, there is self-awareness of 
such a technique: “Tú eres ese hombre; una hora larga llevas / pensando tus propios 
movimientos, / pensando desde fuera, con piedad” (127). In fact, “Puesta de sol” is a twin 
poem in the sense that it complements “Premonición”, as will be seen later on. In 
“Premonición” fear provokes a reaction that results in an effect of disjunction. The 
outcome is, thus, a looking eye projecting an image perceived as independent from the 
mind that creates it. The poetic voice is at the same time the eye producing the vision and 
the vision itself, that is, it is the victim and the witness. The poem is the medium that 
                                                 
105 “The collapse of the container-contained relationship is at the core of melancholia” (Sánchez-
Pardo 2003: 214). 
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permits the survivor to re-live and testify to its own re-living. The poetic voice projects 
itself into the fantasy of this vision, an abandoned and, perhaps, ill man: “Se diría que 
todos / le habían abandonado”. As the title of the poem suggests, there is also a 
premonition here in that the poet foresees his own death. In this sense this poem echoes 
César Vallejo’s lines from Poemas humanos “Me moriré en París con aguacero / un día 
del cual tengo ya el recuerdo” (1985: 67). The vision is of an ill man who advances 
willingly and with haste toward death: 
Ahora avanzaba  
tropezando con su sombría premura  
rodeada de vejez su voluntad y su historia 
Se iba hundiendo en el páramo, se perdía 
en la beneficiosa noche 
que sepulta la batalla del mundo. (122) 
It is impossible not to imagine that “la beneficiosa noche” is death itself, with the 
looking eye witnessing how the phantasmagorical figure desires death. This Freudian 
“death drive” is represented by a feeble and aged will to live. What underlies this is the 
poetic voice’s desire to become united to the silent moor, to assimilate itself to the 
surrounding “páramo” of death and nothingness, a desire that can only be explained by 
the fact that, according to Butler, one ends up desiring one’s own subordination to that 
which surpasses oneself and, therefore, cannot control. In this case, this is necessarily an 
ultimate solution, a self-destructive tool to end subordination. In relation to this Sánchez-
Pardo observes that Donald Meltzer “has compared unconscious phantasy to a theater in 
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which meaning and significance are first generated and only then projected onto the 
external world. The world is basically seen as empty and formless, a screen for the 
projection of unconscious phantasies” (2003: 214). 
 As anticipated above, “Puesta de sol” conveys the very same sense of stasis and 
mental death. The perspective of the speaker changes and, as a consequence, the tone of 
the poem is a more intimate one, verging on the confessional. While in “Premonición” 
there is a certain degree of aloofness implied in the use of the third person, in “Puesta de 
sol” we observe a self-conscious relationship with the “you”. The poetic voice recognizes 
itself as: 
Hombre pálido, cumplida ya, remota 
la mitad de su edad; fuma y se asoma 
hacia la calle desvaída; sonríe solitario 
a este lado de la ventana, la famosa frontera. (127) 
Here, once again, the meaning-laden symbol of a window acts as the frontier 
separating the inner and outer worlds. And, once again, this dividing object is a chimera, 
for the psychological reality is similar, if not identical, to what lies outside, or, to put it 
differently, the inner state is a projection onto the outer world. Whether this is so or, on 
the contrary, the external world reverberates into the inner, we cannot know. What seems 
clear, though, is that the scenes of the outer world are in harmonious rhythm with the 
emotional movements of the psyche. They are both descriptions of descending and 
distancing movements, processes as slow and arduous as acts of diving into self-
cognition. The lines “el pensarse pensando” and “viendo tus propios movimientos / 
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pensando desde fuera, con piedad, / […] pacientemente”, encounter parallel observations 
with what the speaker sees from the window: “y, allá al final, algunos caminantes 
pausados / se dejan agostar por la distancia”, “desciende el sol, lento como la muerte”, “la 
tarde casi enferma de tan lejana, / se sumerge en la noche / como un cuerpo harto ya de 
fatiga, en el mar, dulcemente” (127). The unfruitful act of seeing associated to movement 
reminds of Celan’s lines, “eyes-world blind”, “eyes submerged by words, unto 
blindness”, “eyes in the fissure of dying”, “Do not look any more—go!” (in Lacoue-
Labarthe 1999: 101). Precisely because the “awareness” that the poetic voice sets out to 
achieve is not self-visible but rather blind, wordless, revealing what is in the self but 
without a name, a word unsaid. It is in fact a silent awareness or a lucid awareness of the 
silence that inhabits part of the empirical and poetic selves. The poet’s attempts to step 
back and “articulate” that silence founder on a crude realization: “Y comprendes, 
despacio, sin angustia, / que esta tarde no tienes realidad, pues a veces / la vida se coagula 
y se interrumpe” (127). There is no place for the “you”, it belongs nowhere—its space is 
that of exile. For where is the “you” if its place seems to be constantly receding or being 
interrupted? That looking out for oneself, a hide-and-seek game, described as “un juego 
de niños que tortura, paraliza, envejece” (127), is marked by a lack of destination that 
resonates in the distant passers-by who seem to be going nowhere (a place “misterioso y 
sombrío”) and have, in the meantime, grown emaciated. The “you” is never found in that 
paralysis and the stasis resulting from the failure to come up with a frame, a position, has 
the effect of an unending suffering—“y nada entonces / puedes hacer más que sufrir un 
sufrimiento”—and the mark of death—“y recordar, prolijamente, / algunos muertos que 
fueron desdichados” (127). Here, the recourse to memory is meaningful. It proves that 
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memory signifies the wall against which the poetic voice and the empirical self leans the 
weight of the lost object.  
 Nevertheless, on occasions the poetic voice’s efforts to explore traumatic silences 
are rewarded with self-knowledge. This occurs in poems where there is more than mere 
witnessing and re-creation of trauma, as space is left for mourning.  
 
4.7 Fleeing: forgetting between necessity and (un) ethicality  
 
[Art] is only an instrument for tracing lines of life, that is to say, all these real 
becomings that are not simply produced in art, all these active flights that do 
not consist in fleeing into art… but rather sweep it away with them toward the 
realms of the asignifying, the asubjective. 
 (Deleuze and Guattari cited in Critical and Clinical) 
Las formas de la huida son numerosas como los minutos.  
(Grande, Biografía) 
 
  
There are a number of poems that can be regarded as performative texts where the 
poetic self awakes to the painful reality of trauma and seeks the evasion of oblivion. In 
these poems we observe meditative tones leading to the meaningful realization of a 
hitherto hidden and silent wound. In other poems, the wound was already there in the 
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shape of endless pain but it was an experience of silence because meaning was lacking. It 
was loss without a discourse or explicative context that made historical trauma into 
structural absence. 
When one awakes to trauma, mental flight constitutes an attempt at evasion. Yet, we 
may ask, evasion from what? In many senses Música amenazada is the book of 
awakening to trauma. One way of fleeing would be to seek a way out by the symbolic 
figuration of loss. Yet for Grande it is unethical to give closure to the death of the lost 
thing. It is important to maintain the remnants. This process can be called memorializing 
without finalizing.  
Forgetting can be linked to the realms of the asignifying, the asubjective, and the act 
of fleeing to forgetting. However, oblivion, as one of the forms that memory adopts, 
permits the possibility of belated understanding. This is very different from the critique 
asserting that memory is useless because it forgets. Trauma might take the modality of 
fleeing and forgetting. There is an aspect of the transformation and deletion that memory 
operates in an individual’s consciousness related to the necessity of forgetting. In this 
section I will explore the configurations of flight in Grande’s poems. What role does the 
destruction of memories occupy in his oeuvre? Does he consider that some memories are 
better to forget? Or, notwithstanding the pain, does he defend memory? What do 
insomnia and sleep have to do with forgetting? What are the literary techniques he uses to 
approach oblivion? I shall also explore how memory is encoded in the desire to flee. 
In Grande’s poetry fleeing constitutes a mechanism that often follows a two-phase 
process of self-reflection. In the poems that have fleeing as a theme or as the axis around 
which the poem is constructed, a common pattern is found. The structure of writing 
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reveals two identifiable stages preceding what can be called the poetic voice’s drive to 
escape. Such a structure tends to obey an order. First, the poetic voice passively 
experiences its subjection to the power of certain feelings, frequently tiredness and 
apathy, which demonstrates lack of vigour toward life or a hidden drive to death. Shortly 
afterwards, we find the poetic voice wishing to transcend the merely pragmatic 
experience of subordination to these powerful mental conditions and wanting to take a 
more critical and reflexive stance. It is as though, by adopting the structure of an implicit 
dialogue—or a dialectical monologue—with itself, that is, through a technique that splits 
the poetic voice into an analyzer “I” and an analysand “You”, the poetic voice undertakes 
the endeavour of curing itself from its maladie. Felman observes that: “The testimony is, 
therefore, the process by which the narrator (the survivor) reclaims his position as a 
witness; reconstitutes the internal 'thou,' and thus the possibility of a witness or a listener 
inside himself” (1992: 85).  It is significant that in “Otra figura del insomnio” the poetic 
voice compares this process of self-reflection, of testifying to itself with a harvest. “I am 
the harvesting tool and the harvest itself”, the poetic voice comes to assert: “esa cosecha 
misteriosa, de la que soy la/ espiga y la hoz y el cercén y el rastrojo” (285). 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the poetic voice and the “You” which it 
addresses is not specular, it is not one of identity, but, rather, a relationship with an 
unknown Other.  In Deleuze (1998) proposes that the writer act not as a patient but, 
rather, as a doctor of himself, that is, as a symptomatologist.106 Yet, as will be seen with 
                                                 
106 Daniel W. Smith states that “The fundamental idea behind Deleuze’s 'critique et clinique' 
project is that authors and artists, like doctors and clinicians, can themselves be seen as profound 
symptomatologists” (in Deleuze 1998: xvii). 
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regard to Grande’s poetry, the symptoms that a given work of art may isolate, also point 
to a particular mode of existence that can be extended to a whole period or civilization. 
Nietzsche was the first to put forward the idea that “artists and philosophers are 
physiologists, 'physicians of culture'” (cited in Deleuze 1998: xvii).  
Thus the second stage of what has been referred to as a two-phase process in much 
of Grande’s poetry, is the stage in which the poetic voice finds itself in a state of alert 
with regard to its own condition, which permits the poetic voice to attempt to explain its 
own symptomatology. In this latter stage the poetic voice’s experience is not reduced to 
its subordination to certain feelings related to its testifying to an inner or external reality; 
furthermore, it embarks on a process of recognizing the whole history of these feelings.107 
Thus the poetic voice is not a mere witness (as Lapuerta Amigo suggests: “mero narrador-
testigo de una situación que le parece injusta” [1994: 76]) but a witness that is at the same 
time, to say it with Beatriz Sarlo, “productor y analista” (2005: 100). The act of fleeing as 
a mechanism that apparently concludes this two-phase process consists in passing from 
the subjection to feelings to acquiring conscience of their powerful force. On the one 
hand, the act of fleeing usually appears as a poetic process caught up in the contradictory 
opposition between memory and forgetting, which results in the poem becoming a 
symbolic refuge or the exercise of introducing a pause in the impossible 
memory/forgetting binomy and in front of the dissolution of the self that the act of 
forgetting entails. On the other hand, in other poems, the poetic voice actively reflects on 
fleeing itself, as shall be seen further on.  
                                                 
107 Marina has studied feelings as forces displaying a history behind them. See (1996) and (1999). 
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“La edad de la carne” re-enacts a state of mind that is described with the terms of 
“desgana” (apathy), “cansancio” (tiredness) and “hastío” (boredom): 
Cuando medita en su desgana suntuosa, 
en su certeza sideral de cansancio, 
en su sueldo de hastío y temor. (111) 
The poem is written in the third person, a distancing technique that will precisely 
allow for the objectifying of a state of mind. The verb “meditar” (to reflect upon) acts as 
the key unlocking entry to a more conscious realm of the mind: “cuando medita en esa 
cerradura / enmohecida de miseria y espanto”. “Meditar”, thus, constitutes the turning 
point from which feelings of apathy, tiredness, and boredom will no longer be passively 
felt, that is, silently repressed, but actively thought. The fact that “meditar” is also 
regarded as a “light bulb” (“cuando se enciende en él esa rara bombilla”), that is, as that 
which makes it possible to illuminate in order to decipher the poetic voice’s condition, 
seems to reinforce the latter point. In this sense the poetic voice incurs in the recognition 
of two inextricable realities. The double labour of erasure and inscription of history takes 
place in the body. The title of the poem, “La edad de la carne”, may be pointing precisely 
to history being made “age” in the body—although its signification is ambivalent as it 
may also refer to the contradiction of experiencing death at an early age in life. The latter 
is conveyed, for instance, in lines where the poetic voice uses the opposing “tarde” and 
“mañana” to express this idea:  
Comprendías entonces durante esta mañana 
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—parecida a una tarde muy vieja, muy inerte— 
[…]                               
Comprendías entonces que estabas muerto, vivo 
para morir, muerto en camino, vivo decadente. (72) 
Furthermore, the poetic voice’s meditative posture is not one of resignation in the 
face of subordination to feelings but one of recognition of what lies beneath, and, 
therefore, it is one of resistance. The poem suggests the presence of a force seeking to 
traverse the superficial membrane of feelings in order to unravel their significance. Thus 
there is an attempt to decode memories encoded in emotions and inscribed in the body. 
This travail of carving into deepness leads to seeing the tip of an iceberg, whose salient 
features are repression, violence, illness, poverty (material and spiritual), terror, and a 
general sense of the world’s diminishing: 
Cuando medita en esa cerradura  
enmohecida de miseria y espanto, 
cuando se enciende en él esa rara bombilla 
con que alumbra la casa de la vida 
y ve en ella un cubil bárbaramente amenazado 
y ojeroso de historia imperfecta, 
de desamor y de coágulos, 
de aborto de generaciones y de ecuménica ruina. (111) 
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As soon as the tip of the iceberg is disclosed, how does the poetic voice react to the 
sight of it? By fleeing from this terrifying scene: “fugarse desde el miedo hasta el olvido” 
(111). This visceral reaction consists in consciously perpetrating an act of forgetfulness. 
Oblivion may be a willed act and a justifiable one when memories are too harsh to work 
through. However, the way this idea is conveyed in the poem makes oblivion appear not 
as an act of automatic self-protection, but rather as an act of assassination against memory 
and, also, against the existence of the self: “perpetrar actos orientados hasta el 
desnacimiento / asesinar su olvido hasta que sangre olvido” (111). Thus behind the poetic 
voice’s willingness to forget there seems to be far more than a melancholic disposition 
attached to trauma. It more significantly appears to be suggesting a belief in the 
imperatively important role of memory in the constitution of the self. When one forgets, 
according to the latter line, one perpetrates acts oriented toward the dissolution of the self.  
Thus, only a symbolic “act of assassination” could make the lost object and the 
unresolved object of trauma disappear and, therefore, eliminate suffering. But the idea of 
oblivion is presented with connotations of homicide. Furthermore, fleeing as loss of 
memory or deliberate abandonment of memory poses for the poet a moral problem. An 
integral part of the ethics of memory in Grande’s work is an overt attitude against 
forgetting: “la indignación contra el olvido” (1996: 175). Hence, the ideas attached to the 
act of fleeing oscillate among two extremes, the necessity to forget and how costly the 
consequences of such forgetfulness are in terms of both loss of identify of the self and in 
relation to ethics.   
 “La edad de la carne”, furthermore, opposes a voluntary act of silencing terror and 
a desire to put it to death (here, the lost object of trauma), to the implicit recognition that 
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overcoming terror would paradoxically have to entail an act of memory that is not merely 
a traumatic repetition of terror. Yet it is this very same act of memory that desire in the 
poem would like to annihilate. Thus this poem stresses the contradictory nature of 
memory, as it conveys the inexorable but ineffective necessities of both forgetting and 
remembering. The reference to the female body and to the peace it brings in its 
identification with a resting cave, a refuge or a shelter (“caverna de descanso”) may 
symbolize an interruption of this self-destructive process of having to remember what is 
too painful to be remembered and, therefore, deserves to cease to be assisted by the 
oxygen of memory. The poem re-enacts and resolves this contradiction by emerging as 
the symbolic “caverna de descanso” where the two contending desires are made to co-
exist and neutralize one another—one cannot voluntarily assassinate memory nor can 
memory be completely silenced, the poem becoming the site of eternal flight. Ultimately, 
and for the latter reason, the poem offers no solution to the re-enactment of trauma, 
irrespective of its attempts to come up with a narrative frame that would put an end to the 
introjection of traumatic repetition. The only escape is a temporary pause stemming from 
this act of fleeing to the body of the poem, which can, nevertheless, be seen as a sad 
metaphor whereby healing memory may be, in some cases, nothing but utopia. The poem 
represents the dramatic scenario in which one’s personal memory might be bound to 
remain subject-less, asignified, with the poetic voice’s only ability to escape to the 
asubjective flesh of the poem, leading to the poem’s final assertion: “comprende en 
silencio que se inunda en la carne / igual que el torturado se refugia en su ay tumultuoso” 
(112).  
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 In “En el fondo del vaso” the same technique of splitting the subject is used in 
order to facilitate the enquiry into the deeper layers of the self, that is, as a means for self-
knowledge and self-recognition. Splitting the self is, nevertheless, a useless strategy for 
true evasion, where the impossibility of fleeing (becoming other) lurks. In other words, 
this self-analytic tool facilitates self-knowledge (of trauma) but it does not permit the poet 
to transcend it. Nevertheless, it seems important for the poetic voice to maintain lucidity, 
so even when it seeks to escape, it knows that “pero tengo que volver a volver” (456), a 
form of recognition of the apparently irremediable nature of trauma. In one of his essays, 
Grande writes: “en nosotros existen constantes, y ellas nos dejan dividirnos pero no nos 
consienten un cambio: algo nuevo sin la memoria del gusano, ni siquiera sin la memoria 
de la larva […] ¿No hay escape?” (1975c: 28). 
What “En el fondo del vaso” underscores is a willingness to resist self-delusion or 
self-denial. The “posos del vaso” (sediments) underlie the effort of travelling from the 
surface to the bottom to discover what lies beneath. The structure generated in “La edad 
de la carne” is also used in “En el fondo del vaso”. First, a phase of subjection to feeling; 
second, a phase of meditation on subordination that leads to flight. What is different in 
this poem is that there is a double meditation or meta-meditation on the act of fleeing 
itself. “En el fondo del vaso” is one of the few poems, throughout Grande’s work in 
verse, where the poetic voice raises the problems posed by the act of fleeing by engaging 
in a reflection upon its ethical consequences. While in “Edad de la carne” fleeing is 
associated with a necessary (psycological) refuge, in this poem it constitutes a farce: 
A veces, sin embargo, 
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a ese entrañable, a ese entrañado 
se le desgajan las raíces, siente 
mortal deseo de huir, abandonar 
su casa, su mujer, su proyecto; abandonaros; 
[…]: necesita  
darle forma a los posos 
del vaso que se bebe a solas en la noche. 
 
En instantes así, vuestro amigo de tantos años 
os es desconocido, es decir, monstruoso. 
En instantes así, la verdad que construye 
con vosotros, acto tras acto, lo deslumbra 
con el esplendor agrio de la farsa. (117) 
There is an explicit recognition that fleeing is a stimulus, a drive, like the death 
drive, which leads to the poetic voice’s questioning whether fleeing should be resisted: 
La libertad, ¿consiste 
en resistir esas tormentas 
pensando desesperadamente que sólo son mentira? 
La libertad, ¿consiste en apartar esos estímulos 
como quien se aprieta una herida para expulsar la pus? (118) 
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To summarize, the poems analyzed are frequently reflective and self-reflective on the 
psychological mechanisms they put into effect. They are caught in a stand-off between re-
enactment and awareness, and therefore, they constitute an attempt at the resolution of 
trauma. Thus, arguably, by associating the themes of trauma and freedom they offer a 
reflection on the consequences of trauma not only from the perspective of health but, also, 
from the perspective of ethics.   
 
5. Conclusion to the thesis 
Grande’s work reflects upon and offers insightful illustrations of cognitive processes 
associated with memory, at times overtly and other times unwittingly. His ideas on 
memory differ from common conceptualizations of the theme in the work of fellow poets 
from his and subsequent generations. Unlike Grande, these poets thought that memory 
was faulty because it did not deliver “copies” of the past. Grande, rather, conveys in his 
work the idea that the nature of memory is necessarily pliable, and radically rejects the 
notion that memory is a defective medium for the retrieval of past events. He rather 
supports the view that memory’s main function is not the search for accuracy but the need 
to work through the past and elaborate understanding, which stands as a drastically 
diverse task. In his work, memory is construed as a “biological creature” that follows 
adaptational needs.  
More significantly, Grande’s work shows us that this crucial trait of memory, its 
being modifiable, constitutes the condition of the possibility for an ethics of the self and 
the very grounds on which the fashioning of the self is founded. His work indirectly 
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develops a relatively consistent “theory” of memory, even if it does so in a contingent 
manner. For Grande never thought of memory as a “programmatic” element structuring 
his work.108 He rather conceived of it in a rather intuitive and unplanned fashion (that is, 
he did not mean to appropriate the philosopher’s posture or the historian’s work).  
While for many of Grande’s contemporaries the exercise of memory was a 
frustrating experience, as they yielded to a long tradition whereby poetical memory is 
mendacious, Grande’s work restores credit to memory and even endows it with an 
importance that is in accordance with the prominent role it has acquired, as the impetus 
gained by Memory and Trauma Studies proves. His work demonstrates that poetry in its 
own unpredictable and uncertain way can also serve to pursue a certain truth. 
Grande’s poetry equally relates to memory in the recalling of traumatic events. In 
this respect his work shows that traumatic experiences may resist interpretation and 
assimilation into memory’s normal cognitive processes; yet, they are traceable in 
recurrent structures of writing and patterns through which the poet makes sense of the 
world. Trauma manifests itself in Grande’s work by constantly pointing to the existence 
of a gap, readable in the labour of suffering that his poetry ceaselessly evokes. Such a 
void underlies the presence of irretrievable loss or losses (it is impossible to know how 
many) and leads to unelaborated, hyperbolic pain and sadness. This sadness is pervasive 
and can be said to constitute the nuclear feature of the poetic voice. Recurrent emotions of 
pain point to sensory (cognitively barred) memories, that is, they speak of trauma. This 
                                                 
108 In conversation with Grande (16-3-2007).Grande’s theory is based a priori on instinct and, to a 
great extent, a posteriori on his own experience with and understanding of the phenomenon of 
flamenco. 
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excessive pain is visibly suffocating and jeopardizes life in the poems but we are 
excluded from the knowledge of whence suffering comes. We, as readers, can only testify 
to it, as vicarous witnesses.   
Trauma’s survival is dependent on language. The latter is behind Grande’s distinct 
attitude toward the Spanish crisis of the word. The Spanish post-Civil War poets who 
yielded to the modern critique of language understood the crisis of the word mainly from 
a formalist view of language, that is, they made of the inability of language to express an 
aesthetic end in itself, a rhetorical technique, without reflecting on the modern causes for 
such a failure to communicate. The latter emboldens me to think that the Spanish crisis of 
the word was grounded on a certain conception of art for which silence was not a 
symptom, but rather a new aesthetic trend which failed to see or chose to ignore the fact 
that the European version of this crisis, from which it took inspiration, derived from the 
emergence of a new kind of inhumanity; an inhumanity that more than anything else 
required linguistic rendering in order to be confronted. Such an ethical concern cannot be 
said to have been totally absent in the Spanish poetry of the second half of the twentieth 
century, but it was reductively—if not poorly—theorized and thought out. It was 
enshrined in the literary debate around social versus culturalist poetry. The level and 
quality of such a debate did not reach philosophical depths, as it did not embark on a 
reflection on the human condition. As a consequence, the silence inherent to this new 
inhumanity was hardly discussed. And the question of silence in poetry was drastically 
reduced to a mystical-religious issue or to a mere rhetorical device to “purify” poetry and, 
often, as a kind of historical continuation to Juan Ramón Jiménez’s undertaking of 
“poesía pura”. 
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However, rhetorical techniques are linked to history and subject to fashion, and they 
normally serve an end. This is an altogether different matter from the idea of a historical 
and transhistorical nothingness that inhabits the self. In other words, there were 
dimensions of the question of silence that the poets who adhered to the poetics of silence 
(and their critics) did not incorporate in their discourse.  Thus the poetics of silence, 
rather homogeneously and intransigently, disavowed an important aspect of language 
with respect to silence. Silence is that which cannot be brought into existence through 
words but only suggested by them. Given that silence and language are inextricably 
connected, there is no need to put emphasis on what is already irreducible. However, 
language can help to shelter from the reality of silence and this is what the poetics of 
silence tended to overlook. Language is indeed a hopeful tool for restoring life where 
death has taken over.  
The latter becomes clear if we think of trauma in its “kinship” with madness. In both 
experiences silence is locked up inside the suffering self. According to Felman, who 
reformulates Derrida, “the very status of language is that of a break with madness, of a 
protective strategy, of a difference by which madness is deferred, put off […] far from 
being a historical accident, the exclusion of madness is the general condition and the 
constitutive foundation of the very enterprise of speech” (2003: 44). This, applied to the 
Spanish crisis of the word and to the poetics of silence, puts things in a radically different 
perspective.  
As we have seen, to affirm that poetry emerges from silence and is irreducibly 
haunted by silence is an economical discourse, in the sense of being “essential to the 
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economy” of poetry.109 That is, it is a necessary predicament. Now, the conversion of 
silence into a technique of poetic expression, an “end” in itself and for its own sake, 
stands as an intrinsically different undertaking. Such a pursuit implicitly negates the 
premise that language wards off the psychic damage that silence, understood as an 
experience of the psyche, inflicts on the self. It is in this sense that Grande’s poetry 
instantiates another way of seeing silence; a new perspective that lays bare the 
inescapable connection between poetry and the complex psychic dimentions it seeks (and 
fails) to articulate fully.  
Grande’s work offers illuminating insights into the nature of traumatic memory by 
showing how the poem itself reconstructs the violence and deadly poison of the 
catastrophic event. Ultimately, it shows the extent to which epistemology engages with 
literature. And it points to writing as a form of contributing to the understanding 
(however limited) of devastating experiences surrounded by silence, at the level of the 
psyche but, also, on a collective level, even if the interconnections between individual and 
collective traumas, as this thesis has tried to show, are very difficult to determine. Where 
does the individual trauma end and the collective trauma begin? How does the silence 
proper to personal trauma intermingle with that imposed historically on individuals? For, 
to complicate things further, there are the institutional forces that impose practices of 
memory and merge individual and collective representations and manifestations of 
trauma, as we have seen to be the case with the control over the use of memory under the 
dictatorship. 
                                                 
109 Derrida talks about “economical” as that which is “essential”, in opposition to “historical”. 
(See Felman 2003: 44). 
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In Grande’s work the state of melancholia, alternated with states of mourning, 
entails both a rupture and a confusion with the external world (there is not appropriate 
integration of the internal and the external, necessary to survive)—inevitable under the 
conditions of inner exile imposed on the “defeated” by the regime —, enshrined in the 
poetic voice’s inability to protect itself against that which casts it outside the shelter of the 
symbolic. The battle against silence constitutes a struggle to come up with ways to keep 
at bay the “blankness of asymbolia”, in Kristeva’s words, through attempted linguistic 
elaborations of the void. But melancholia is first and foremost an emotional strategy that 
seeks protection, as Sánchez-Pardo observes: “[Melancholia] can be read, though, as a 
form of active resistance to the dispossession that the social as a devouring agent 
perpetrates upon the subject” (2003: 6). In Abraham and Torok’s words, “melancholic 
mourning is often the subject’s last chance at narcissistic restoration” (1994:137). That is, 
the social, understood as that which strips the self of a voice, which silences it, is 
counterbalanced by melancholy. Melancholy is irreducibly attached to Grande’s losses 
which permeate his poetry in elusive, disturbing and haunting ways. The reaction to these 
irrecoverable losses is, in the first place, one of hyperbolic pain and incurable sadness. 
But Grande’s inaccessibility to the lost Object and the conflating in his work of historical 
loss and structural absence makes it more difficult for the poetic voice to recognize 
sadness as its own, and so it prevents mourning from reaching a conclusion. 
I believe that the poetic voice’s misrecognition of losses and its conviction of their 
being unmasterable go hand in hand with its emotional attachment to sadness. Awareness 
of this maladie, sadness, does not imply resolution. For attempted representations of 
sadness evoke something of greater vastness and deprivation. And yet the poetic voice 
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falls short with words to avow the past. It relinquishes at the outset any chances of 
gaining access to them: “Mas no puedo volver”, the poetic voice asserts, as though no 
interpretation of the past were possible, or there were no paths leading to understanding. 
Sadness is seen as something compact, without fissures, embedded in a totalizing and 
universalizing discourse on pain, a madness only counteracted and mitigated by another 
discourse that splits the poetic self into trying to analyze this very madness. The use of 
metaphors such as the “círculo” and the “noria” precisely convey the claustrophobic 
movement in circles. So, the obsession with the past, the libidinal attachment to sadness is 
in correlation with an exploration of the enclosed territory of the unknown, as represented 
by the opacity of trauma. Often in his poetry, the inability to elaborate a sadness and a 
pain that is devoid of content negates the possibility of turning silence into memory. And 
this is the first striking contradiction emerging from the opposition between Grande’s 
theorizing of memory, which is a lucid account of the phenomenon, and the practices of 
memory of Grande’s poetic voice. Rather than keeping memory alive, the reaction 
produced by the poetic voice has the result of assuring silence to persist. Grande’s voice 
melancholically loves his trauma, his wound: “¿Se me creería si asegurase solemnemente 
que incluso llegué a amar a la momia? […] yo la amaba, por supuesto, con el cerebro y 
con los sentimientos” (1975ª: 60). Thus when the poetic voice states “Vieja bestia del 
sufrimiento, es ya casi majestuosa tu ritual obstinación. Remoto, incomprensible, como 
mi adolescencia, venía el dolor” (261), one must interpret this legitimate questioning, 
equally, as a certain unwillingness to question the self. This attachment to pain 
(notwithstanding the existence of a split self that both bears witness to trauma and 
attempts a deconstruction of it) forms part of the difficulty inherent in trauma but it also 
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has to do with an ethical disposition (apart from a survival mechanism) to adopt the voice 
of the vanquished and drowned:  
A veces 
 la alegría parece una calumnia, 
y esas veces impiden a la herida cerrarse  
y a la convalecencia afluir a la salud. (108)  
And yet, paradoxically, it is precisely through this engagement with pain and loss in 
the representations of death that the poetic voice aims to create the possibility of life out 
of the destructive and paralyzing power of trauma. Its undertaking is a search for survival.  
Ultimately, the poem is the symbolic site whereby an agonizing memory is confined 
and the poetic voice’s trauma is spoken. The sites of memory in Grande’s work are 
emotionally charged places or indefinite sites—sometimes only denoted by a vague 
adverb of location—that are the only possible frames in which silence can speak. For it 
might be said that they are non-places, places of no memory which point to the poetic 
voice’s difficulty in conveying an inexpressible reality. They configure a psychic space 
which acts as a container or dike to prevent the continuous hemorrhage of the wound of 
trauma from bleeding to death. It is, indeed, a question of life or death. In Las calles 
Grande confesses “también mi vida me ha hecho escritor, y de manera decisiva. Por lo 
menos, algunas zonas de mi vida no podían dar otro resultado que el suicidio o el arte” 
(1980: 14).  
There can be no doubts about the poetic voice’s will, need and desire to 
communicate, and his entire oeuvre proves it. However, there is an inner struggle to 
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define that which is urging to be conveyed, an excess which is the very essence of the 
silence. Such a tension is visible in a pervasive, incommunicable surplus of meaning 
which translates into a hyperbolic use of language and into aesthetic patterns attempting 
an escape through language, while pushing the poetic self into the labyrinth of its own 
contradictions. The poetic voice shelters and unshelters itself in language. Language 
protects it as much as it discloses threatening psychic material. Whilst also being the 
means for dealing with silence, words point inevitably to something never quite 
transmitted. Nevertheless, the struggle never results in the defeat of language. On the 
contrary, language turns out to be the only reliable defense mechanism that keeps suicide 
at bay. Thus words become the ultimate and definitive possibility of memory for the poet, 
the impossible and yet consoling place whither the poetic voice attempts an escape or 
where it painstakingly seeks to break out of silence. In this respect Grande’s poetry 
fluctuates between the testimony of catastrophe, a voice that speaks from the locus of 
trauma, and the knowledge that the voice, wanting to speak from outside this locus, 
derives from attempted dissections of trauma. Thus the poetic voice is simultaneously, as 
Beatriz Sarlo puts it, “productor y analista” (2005: 100). In other words, Grande’s work is 
irremediably caught between inescapable melancholia and its working through, two 
apparently irreconcilable attitudes which, nevertheless, coexist in a difficult tension.  
Melancholia leads to the traumatic introjection of history, in which death becomes 
the only possibility of giving an account of the self, eviscerating the poetic self’s capacity 
for self-recognition. It destroys the possibility of a genuine working through of the past in 
therapeutic forms, and so it entices the voice into becoming its own murderer. “I am a 
lethal machine”, says the poetic voice. In other words, the melancholic poetic voice does 
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not offer resistance to death through symbolic figuration, in order to survive loss, but 
rather writes its own compulsive repetition. Such a scenario of self-punishment 
undermines the recollection of the past in order to make sense of traumatic memory in 
narrative terms. And yet it is by virtue of this traumatic silence represented by the 
memory of death, paradoxically, that the possibility of witnessing and, along with it, the 
condition of survival, are established. For if the necessity to mourn rests upon the 
impossibility of a complete interiorization of death, the response that this situation elicits 
is one by which an ethical imperative is communicated. As much as we cannot cease to 
mourn the death of others, our relation to this procees requires that we never cease in the 
impossible enterprise of letting alterity speak, and in the dialogue with death, as a central 
part of what it means to be human. Furthermore, it is in this firmly established emotional 
link with death that the poetic voice’s own immortality rests. 
To conclude, Grande’s work is not limited to giving an account of the tribulations of 
the poetic voice. More significantly, it proposes to understand what it means to be human 
under catastrophe, even if this knowledge consists of the recognition of the extreme 
difficulty—and even failure—of such an undertaking. If there is one thing Grande’s work 
puts into play, it is precisely the idea that poetry is not so much about representation or 
mirror reflection as it is about a ruminative memory. A kind of rumination (even a way of 
whining) that attempts to apprehend what is most profound (his personal losses and those 
traumas tied up with the upheavals of his time, which became enmeshed in his own) and 
in so doing, it establishes the means for survival, as it poses active resistence to (and 
contains) the obscure psychic forces that drag the poetic self into an abyss of despair. In 
his poetry, elaborating understanding (even if precarious) of traumatic memory and the 
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role art plays in it, sets into motion a process of impossible foreclosing. Ultimately, his 
reflections on memory and trauma consist of an endless rumination to arrive at the core of 
what the act of writing poetry itself means (beyond the mere study of a tradition) and the 
recognition that such a meaning can never be fully conquered: “Lo que pasaba con el arte 
de la poesía es que ni siquiera entendiéndola era posible entenderla del todo” (2003: 197). 
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